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ABSTRACT
It is puzzling why autocracies, which typically are not renowned for their human rights record or
their observance of international norms related to human rights and are frequently inured in their
own violent conflicts, would choose to take on the seemingly humanitarian role of peacemaker
as often as democracies in the conflicts of other states in the absence of such things as a former
colonial relationship or shared geographic proximity with them. I argue that autocracies will
offer more often to mediate when they are subjected to international scrutiny, sanctioning, and/or
condemnation, as well as materially and immaterially benefitting from their efforts afterwards. I
also posit that based on institutional attributes such as the presence of a professional bureaucracy
(such as is found in a party “machine” autocracy) or by contrast an all-powerful autocrat (such as
is found in personalist regimes), different autocratic regime-types will be more likely to offer to
mediate than others. To test my theory, I utilize Large-N datasets about international mediation
and autocratic regimes, as well as qualitative sources including information derived from the
United Nations, the U.S. State Department, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, news
articles/reports, and statements and criticisms from various states, in order to investigate when
autocracies offer to mediate interstate conflicts, as well as which types of autocracies are most
likely to offer to mediate an end to an international conflict. Quantitative analysis yielded some
inconclusive results, however finding that Party-based autocracies are most likely to offer to
mediate an international conflict when being sanctioned relative to other types of autocracies,
while qualitative analysis did indeed uncover evidence that when being subjected to international
condemnation and scrutiny, autocracies are likely to offer to mediate international conflict.
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction
Mediation, as defined by the United Nations, is “a process whereby a third party assists
two or more parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage, or resolve a conflict by helping
them to develop mutually acceptable agreements” (Akpinar, 2015). States that mediate can
arrange how disputants interact in a bargaining scenario, confirm facts, relay information,
provide “good offices,” facilitate, prevent, or screen communications, recommend
concessions, moderate extreme demands, propose possible settlements, and can moot
compromises to the disputants (Beber, 2012). Mediation has become a favored tool for states
to utilize in order to end interstate conflicts. Becoming more prevalent after the Cold War
(Beber, 2012; Crocker et al, 2005; Melin, 2013), mediation amounted to greater than 20
percent of all third-party actions in their totality occurring between the conclusion of World
War II through the beginning of the new millennium (Frazier, Dixon, 2006; Beber, 2012).
There is also evidence that interstate mediation produces results, with mediation efforts
leading to an agreement in 45.5% of interstate conflicts in addition to resulting in more than
twice as many ceasefires relative to civil conflicts, as well as more full settlements and fewer
partial agreements (Gartner, 2014).
Democratic states, understood as states in which candidates compete for political
office through fair and frequent elections and where a large portion of the adult populace
can vote (Frieden et al, 2016), are often seen to be most likely to act as mediators in violent
conflicts, generating more and longer lasting peace agreements between disputants as
opposed to their autocratic counterparts (Melin, 2013). In addition, they have been
traditionally theorized as domestically more attracted to peace than autocracies, in that they
veer towards opposition to conflict (for example, coherent democracies experience fewer
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civil wars than anocracies or autocracies), the valuing of human life and welfare above
power, more peaceful leaders, and propounding human rights (Wright, 1942; Hegre et al,
2001).
Indeed, Mitchell (2002) observed that historically “The first efforts to resolve
disputes by processes such as…mediation can clearly be traced to…democratic states…”
(pg. 751). This in part can be attributed to the norms with which democracies are
associated. Scholars have noted that the difference between autocratic and democratic
norms and institutions starts at the domestic level. Mitchell et al (2008) observed that
“Whereas authoritarian governments are ruled by methods such as coercion, repression,
religious edict, and despotism, democracies are ruled by…consent…Leaders are elected
and controversies are settled with a system of bargaining, negotiation, and jurisprudence”,
and they elaborate that “States tend to externalize the norms governing their domestic
politics” into their international relations (pg. 7). Because democracies externalize these
norms of solving disagreements via negotiations and bargaining, they are thought to be at a
greater likelihood to offer, accept, and be successful at mediation between conflicting
countries, with these countries being at a greater likelihood of being in favor of mediation
by democracies due to their perception of trustworthiness and legitimacy in acting as a
third-party (Mitchell et al, 2008; Melin, 2013). This tendency towards, and success in,
mediation is even thought to extend into such difficult and intractable areas as territorial,
maritime, and river-related conflicts all over the world, both historically and
contemporarily (Mitchell, 2002; Mitchell et al, 2008; Mitchell et al, 2009).
Further, democratic states are thought to be better at international cooperation as a
whole (Gaubatz, 1996; Leeds, 1999; Martin, 2000; Mansfield et al, 2002; McGillivray,
Smith, 2008; Mattes, Rodriguez, 2014). For example, Mansfield et al (2002) observed that
2

“…the superior ability of elections in democracies to constrain leaders prompts democratic
rulers to be more cooperative internationally than their nondemocratic counterparts,” and
that “Hence, the probability of a country concluding an international…agreement increases
as its domestic institutions become more democratic” (pgs. 478-479). Mansfield et al
(2002) go on to note that “International…cooperation can…help democratic governments
boost their chances of re-election, thereby provide a strong inducement for them to pursue
such agreements” (pg.480). Mattes and Rodriguez (2014) agreed, stating “Whether in
treaty-making or informal policy coordination, democracies have been shown to possess an
advantage at international cooperation (for example, Gaubatz, 1996; Leeds 1999; Martin,
2000; Mansfield, Milner and Peter Rosendorff, 2002; McGillivray and Smith,
2008)…Democracies’ superior track record is usually attributed to three institutional
factors that make them particularly desirable partners: accountability of leaders, limited
decision-making flexibility, and transparency” (pg. 528). Further, democracies behave
more cooperatively and in a less conflictual manner towards other states regardless of those
states’ regime-types (Leeds, Davis, 1999).
This inclination towards international cooperation can reasonably be expected to
extend into the realm of mediation. Melin (2013) postulated that “The ideal state mediator
will have…democratic governance structures…Democratic third parties and disputants are
more likely to agree to generate an agreement” (pg. 90), while noting that “Mediation and
accepting offers of mediation are more likely when democracies are involved, as these
states are accustomed to third-party involvement in conflict and garner other states’ trust,
making them a more attractive option for conflict resolution…Democratic third parties are
more likely to be accepted as mediators…Mediation is therefore best encouraged when
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democracies are involved as…mediators” (pgs. 84-85). Other scholars agree, with
Crescenzi et al (2011) postulating that “…democratic mediators face costs for deception in
the conflict management process”, leading them to behave as more honest brokers, as well
as arguing that “Third-party conflict management occurs more frequently and is more
successful if a potential mediator is a democracy…” (pg. 1069).
This stands opposed to autocratic regimes. These regime types can be understood as
a political system where a small group of people or a single individual wields power with
little constraints, competition, or political participation by the general populace (Frieden et
al, 2016; Honig, 2019), and as mentioned are often known for abuses such as political
imprisonment, repression, and torture (Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, 2014; Akpinar, 2015),
which can lead to reputational costs to autocracies. Interestingly, autocracies have in fact
been found to not be less active in mediating the conflicts of other states when compared to
their democratic counterparts (Bercovitch, Schneider, 2000), even in seemingly unrelated
conflicts for the mediator. Current mediation literature proposes that states may mediate
given such considerations as trade ties, former colonial relationships, alliances, and
geographic proximity (Crescenzi et al, 2011). Yet, examples such as former Libyan leader
Muammar Qadhafi’s attempted peacemaking between Ethiopia and Eritrea, China’s
attempts at mediation between Israel and Palestine, Qatar’s efforts at mediation between
Djibouti and Eritrea, and Turkey’s mediation efforts between Afghanistan and Pakistan,
autocratic governments which do not fit this characterization continue to play a role in
conflict mediation (Adebajo, 2011; Akpinar, 2015; Guner, 2015; Rieger, 2016; Chaziza,
2018a).
It is puzzling why autocracies, which typically are not renowned for their human
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rights record or their observance of international norms related to human rights and are
frequently inured in their own violent conflicts, would choose to take on the seemingly
humanitarian role of peacemaker in the conflicts of other states in the absence of such
things as (for example) a former colonial relationship or shared geographic proximity with
them. This lack of observation for human rights and norms has been well documented by
academics. For example, autocracies are much more likely to wage war than are
democracies, particularly with each other (Garnham, 1986; Reiter, 2012). On the other
hand, democracies are less likely to go to war than autocracies because the population (who
will suffer the tragic humanitarian consequences from war) can directly eject their leaders,
and thus their leaders will be afraid of the reaction to war from the voters (Bueno de
Mesquita et al, 1999). Autocracies suffer no such inhibitions, as the members of society
who are likely to suffer the most have no say in the leadership. As opposed to democracies,
autocracies have been found to be more likely to be enmeshed in a crisis with the potential
for warfare as a result (Chan, 1997). Because democratic leaders are accustomed to
negotiation and compromise, they typically should resolve disputes peacefully because of
shared norms that are not commonly found among autocracies. Puzzlingly, autocracies still
function in the seemingly humanitarian role of mediating interstate conflicts that are
apparently unrelated to them directly.
The number and influence of autocracies and their resulting behavior underscores
the importance of studying their role in the realm of mediation, as the international system
has typically had more autocracies than democracies (Hagan, 1994). These autocracies
include a significant amount of variation between countries, including Libya, Qatar,
China, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Russia, etc. Despite all of this, research on autocratic
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mediation has lagged behind that of mediation by democratic states. Further, there are
different types of autocracies that have also been understudied in the area of cooperative
activities such as mediation, including single-party systems such as China, military
regimes/juntas such as Myanmar, and personalist dictatorships such as North Korea
(Mattes, Rodriguez, 2014). The lack of research on interstate mediation by autocracies,
active as they are, as well as the typological differences between them underscores the
importance of elucidating insights into the efforts of these numerous, influential, and
resilient regime types in mediation. Further research into the motivations for autocracies
to engage in mediation would not only be important for practical policymaking reasons
and helping to expand our theoretical understanding of mediation in general, but would
also add to the important and necessary endeavor of research on comparative politics in
authoritarian regimes and the analysis of conflict management (Wiegand, 2019).
Thus, in this dissertation I focus on investigating how autocratic regimes play a part in
the phenomenon of mediation in international conflict, filling the gap in the literature on
mediation and different autocratic regime-types. I argue that autocracies will offer more often
to mediate when they are subjected to international scrutiny, sanctioning, and/or
condemnation, as well as materially and immaterially benefitting from their efforts afterwards.
I also posit that based on institutional attributes such as the presence of a professional
bureaucracy (such as is found in a party-based autocracy) or by contrast an all- powerful
autocrat (such as is found in personalist regimes), different autocratic regime-types will be
more likely to offer than others.
To test my theory, I utilize Large-N datasets about international mediation and
autocratic regimes, as well as qualitative sources including information derived from the
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United Nations, the U.S. State Department, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International,
news articles/reports, and statements and criticisms from various states, in order to investigate
when autocracies offer to mediate interstate conflicts, what the results are, as well as which
types of autocracies are most likely to offer to mediate an end to an international conflict. In
the next chapter, I introduce the concepts, theories, and review the literature surrounding
autocracies, the reputations of states, international conflict, and mediation. Following the
second chapter, I develop novel theories and several hypotheses which attempt to fill in the
gaps in the literature on the subject, and explain autocratic mediation in a fuller and more
holistic manner.

7

CHAPTER 2: Literature Review
The research on mediation in interstate conflicts and civil conflicts has provided
extensive insight into the factors that determine the offer, acceptance, and success of
mediation efforts. This is despite the fact that the literature on mediation is lacking in such
areas as the study of mediation by autocracies. Before any novel theories involving autocratic
mediation can be introduced, it is important to review the existing literature surrounding the
study of mediation of interstate conflicts by third-parties in order to obtain a grounding in the
subject.
2.1 Interstate Conflict and Mediation
Interstate conflict and war has proven to be pernicious in the post-World War Two era.
From 1945 to the end of the new millennium alone there were 309 international conflicts,
these being defined as militarized conflicts involving states which are continuous and
organized, or the demonstration of the intention to utilize military force (Bercovitch, 2000).
However, there does seem to be evidence for a post-World War Two trend towards peace
(Clauset, 2020), due in part because of mediation. Of the aforementioned 309 conflicts, an
impressive 190 of them were mediated (with some of them undergoing several mediation
attempts), yielding a total of 1990 international mediation cases, not including 204 mediation
offers which were rejected (Bercovitch, 2000). Certain characteristics of conflicts seem to lead
to a greater occurrence of mediation. For example, mediation occurrence increases when the
disputants are rivals and/or there is reoccurrence of conflict between them, when violence
increases (which interestingly also seems to increase mediation success), when previous
mediation has occurred, when there is a conflict stalemate, as well as if the conflict is
international in nature (Melin, 2013). In the next section, I will discuss the literature and
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theories regarding the prolific and growing use of mediation by states in interstate conflicts.
2.2 Mediation
Out of all the activities of statecraft practiced historically by human beings, mediation
is ancient. States in the past and present have always intervened in the business of other states
(Annan, 1999), with mediation being one of the oldest and most frequently found methods for
successfully ending international conflicts when applied correctly (Bercovitch, Lee, 2003).
The first mediation effort recorded happened in 209 B.C. when Greek city-states aided
Macedonia and the Aetolian League in creating a truce during the first Macedonian war, and
contemporarily there have been well over 1334 mediation attempts by states to end over 333
conflicts since the end of the Second World War, with over half of these efforts happening
since the Cold War ended (Melin, 2013). Indeed, after the end of the Cold War, the practice of
mediating conflicts became much more prevalent (Beber, 2012; Crocker et al, 2005; Melin,
2013). The increasing use of mediation to solve violent interstate disputes has resulted in both
painful failure, like the inability of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan in 1948 to
facilitate peace, as well as impressive successes, like the Camp David Accords that led to
peace between Israel and Egypt (Gartner, 2014).
To review, mediation as defined by the United Nations is “a process whereby a third
party assists two or more parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage, or resolve a conflict
by helping them to develop mutually acceptable agreements” (Akpinar, 2015). Another
commonly used definition of mediation conceptualizes mediation as “…a reactive process of
conflict management whereby parties seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from,
an individual, group, or organization to change their behavior, settle their conflict, or resolve
their problem without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law
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(Bercovitch, Houston, 1996). The mediation of international conflict is a process where a
third party works with at least two disputants in order to attain an acceptable peace agreement
between them. As opposed to other conflict resolution methods involving third parties that
are judgmental and binding (like arbitration), mediation is both contractual and voluntary
where the third party cannot impose a solution on the disputants but can aid them in their
quest to obtain a peaceful end to their conflict (Gartner, 2014). In other words, mediation is
legally non-binding. This results in the adherence by disputants to any settlements being selfsustaining in order to last, as well as voluntary (Gartner, 2014). The lack of third-party
enforceability found in mediation, as well as the naturally open-ended nature with respect to
if a settlement will actually be achieved, profoundly differentiates it from legal-based dispute
adjudication (Beber, 2012). In fact, third- party mediation is the most frequently employed
method to resolve violent interstate conflicts (Gartner, 2014), with states being the most
common mediator (Melin, 2013). Taking into account the relative ineffectiveness of
conventional ways of addressing conflicts, mediation is critical as a method for their
resolution (Akpinar, 2015).
As such, mediation has increasingly become a favored tool for states to utilize in order
to end interstate conflicts. Notably, mediation amounted to greater than 20 percent of all thirdparty actions occurring between the conclusion of World War II through the beginning of the
new millennium (Frazier, Dixon, 2006; Beber, 2012). There is also evidence that interstate
mediation produces results, with mediation efforts leading to a peace agreement in 45.5% of
interstate conflicts in addition to resulting in more than twice as many ceasefires relative to
civil conflicts (Gartner, 2014).
Generally speaking, there are four different main types of mediators: regional

10

governmental organizations like the Organization of American States, individuals like
former President Jimmy Carter, international organizations like the United Nations, and
most commonly, states such as Qatar (Melin, 2013). Mediation consists of disputants, their
dispute (most of which start with two main disputants), mediators, and outcomes (Gartner,
2014). The types of interstate disputes take place over a range of topics, security being the
root of 32.5% of interstate conflict, territory at 27.5%, ethnicity at 20.8%, colonialism at
7.9%, ideology at 5.8%, and resources at 5.5% (Gartner, 2014). In all cases, the objectives
of mediators include both shaping the nature of the conflict’s outcome as well as changing
the actual physical circumstances of a conflict (Bercovitch, Schneider, 2000). Further, the
mediation of interstate conflict takes place across the globe, with the Middle East
experiencing most of it at 33.6%, followed by Africa at 16.8%, East Asia and the Pacific at
15.1%, Europe at 14.9%, Central and South America at 11.2%, and Southwest Asia at
9.1% (Gartner, 2014).
2.3 Research on Mediation
Some of the main areas that research on mediation has focused include offers and
acceptance by a third-party to mediate, tactics used during the process of mediation, and
mediation outcomes. Literature on offers and acceptance to mediate focuses on topics
including: the potential moral altruism of a mediator, direct geopolitical concerns (such as
access to resources), the level of violence in the conflict (which if intense can particularly
impede the free flow of finances, individuals, etc.), the presence of especially intimate trade
ties, alliances, geographic proximity, the presence of a rivalry, the recurrence of conflicts, and
the regime type of the mediator.
Research on the tactics that are used by mediators acknowledge that mediators
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are constricted in their ability to end a conflict due to the voluntary and contractual
nature of mediation. However, the literature indicates that mediators typically employ
three different strategies, these being directive strategies (where mediators try to
structure the substance, content, and outcome of the process of bargaining in mediation),
procedural-formulative strategies (which are used to help facilitate a positive
environment for conflict management, such as a neutral location, constructing the
agenda of the mediation, the distribution of information, etc.), and communicationfacilitation strategies (which concentrate on encouraging conflicting parties to
communicate via the mediator’s shuttle diplomacy or directly, and is a passive strategy
designed to provide information to the conflicting parties). The third area of research,
outcomes of mediation, is concerned about whether a state is likely to mediate and/or be
successful, as well as the four possible outcomes of mediation: whether they are
completely successful, partly successful, there is a ceasefire, or they are unsuccessful at
ending the conflict. Existing literature focuses on the willingness to mediate as well as
whether it will be successful, and how this ties into the characteristics of the mediating
state. Issues studied include whether that state has mediated before, established
connections with the conflicting parties, the ongoing debate about the impact of
mediator bias, institutional features of the mediating state (its domestic structures, for
example), the status and capabilities of a mediating state (whether that state is a member
of the UNSC or if it is a former colonial power of one or more of the conflicting parties,
for example), as well as the communication, procedural, and timing skills of the
mediator.

12

2.3.1 Reasons for Offers and Acceptance to Mediate by Third-Parties
There are many factors that could influence a third-party actor to offer or accept
mediation efforts in interstate conflict. It may be true that in some cases, third-party states
mediate out of some degree of moral altruism. However, the ultimate goal of the mediating
state may differ from this, but instead may be more aligned with the achievement of its goals
in foreign policy, making the success of mediation subordinate to the mediating state’s
personal concerns (Akpinar, 2015). For example, a third-party state may engage in or offer to
mediate a conflict if it can strengthen their immediate strategic concerns such as regional or
global influence, power, and/or access to resources (Melin, 2013: Akpinar, 2015; Kamrava,
2011). This can make the mediation of an interstate conflict an attractive proposition to a state
after they consider the costs and benefits associated with it, even if there is no firm guarantee
of success (Melin, 2013; Bercovitch, Schneider, 2000).
Strategic concerns such as the costliness of a conflict in terms of violence may also
lead to a third-party state deciding to mediate. For example, these conflicts can impact the free
flow of things such as individuals, trade, access to resources, and finances which can make it
more attractive for a third-party state seeking to quash these strategic inconveniences.
Mediators may also reasonably expect that less mediating actions will be necessary to resolve
costly violent conflicts and are thus more effective, taking into account the high costs
associated with death, destruction, and expenditures which would otherwise have to be faced
by the disputants (Melin, 2013). Other strategic concerns that may lead a third-party state to
mediate may have to do with especially intimate trade ties, alliances, and/or geographic
proximity to one or more of the disputants (Crescenzi et al, 2011), or whether the disputants
are involved in a rivalry. According to Melin (2013), “Such conflicts tend to be recurring, and
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especially destabilizing and violent— not only to the disputants but to third-party state actors
either located in the region or with other strong relationships to the disputants…although there
is some risk in taking on the mediator role in such circumstances, the risks of declining such
an invitation may be even greater” considering the costs to the parties who are associated with
regionally or even globally destabilizing, lingering, and violent conflicts (pg. 87).
Mediation in this regard can produce what may be construed as global public goods.
Wiegand (2019) observed that “On a macro level, public goods…include the reduced likelihood
of future conflict (Gibler, 2007; Owsiak, 2012), increased likelihood of rivalry terminations
(Owsiak, Rider, 2013),…and international legal recognition of borders that reduce uncertainty
and, therefore, future conflict (Simmons, 2005; Carter, Goemans, 2011, 2014)” (pg. 5). The
successful resolution of conflicts and disputes creates global public goods, where mutual gains
amongst concerned states are facilitated (Wiegand, 2019), which can then behoove a potential
mediating state in a variety of tangible strategic ways. Some of these can include such material
concerns as the resumption of or continued access to mineral resources, petroleum, water, and
access to arable land (Wiegand, 2019). The cessation of conflict also helps create a situation
which is conducive to improved economic relationships as an aggregate with neighboring states
(Simmons, 2005). Other benefits include the acquisition by the mediating state of a reputation
for global good citizenship, as well as possibly helping facilitate a reduction in military
expenditures which can then be spent on other state interests and policies (Wiegand, 2019).
2.3.2 Mediation Tactics
The second major aspect of mediation research examines the factors that influence the
process of mediation Even though mediators are limited in their influence because of the
contractual and voluntary nature of mediation where a solution for the disputants cannot be
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imposed, third-party states who mediate have a number of strategies that they can pursue in
order to end the conflict. Although one of the main characteristics of the mediation of
international conflict is its dearth of formulaic procedures and the wide degree of variation in
practices and procedures utilized by mediators in different disputes (Gartner, 2014), states that
mediate have tactics including arranging how disputants interact in a bargaining scenario,
confirming facts, relaying information, providing “good offices,” facilitating, preventing, or
screening communications, recommending concessions, moderating extreme demands,
proposing possible settlements, and mooting compromises to the disputants (Beber, 2012;
Kamrava, 2011). However, mediators typically do not stay involved after the conflict ends,
while tending to promote settlements which are not self-enforcing (Kamrava, 2011).
However, this does not mean that mediators hold no sway. For example, mediators can
prove successful in ending interstate conflicts by checking and shaming the disputants to
control violence, by recommending final settlement terms which create the opportunity for
disputants to consider previously unacceptable settlements by shielding them from domestic
pressure, and by putting pressure on the disputants to settle peacefully by providing logistical
support as well as incentives/disincentives that promote settlement (Schenoni et al, 2020).
This pressure can manifest itself along military lines in the form of threats to cease military
aid or offers to provide it to one or more of the disputants, or along economic lines, including
offering preferential trade agreements, removing sanctions, or providing other forms of
economic aid to one or more of the conflicting states. This creates a situation that is designed
to make settlement more palatable and thus incentivize it (Schenoni et al, 2020). Mediators
can also underwrite settlements in order to increase their sturdiness when the disputing states
may have incentives to renege on their settlements or peace treaties. When states sign a treaty
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as they frequently do in world politics (Mitchell, Powell, 2009), this creates an authoritative
rule system where the normal organizational presumption is one of compliance so as to help
states credibly commit to each other upon agreed upon actions, as well as to indicate that they
intend to keep their promises in a particular policy area (Chayes, Chayes, 1993; Simmons,
Hopkins, 2005). This underwriting by mediators of settlements and peace treaties serves to
reassure the disputants that they won’t have to renegotiate the settlement later from a more
disadvantageous position during the post- agreement settlement or treaty implementation
phase (Schenoni et al, 2020).
Mediating states can also render aid to disputants in terms of state capacity in order to
ensure that they have the capability of behaving in such a way as to make successful
mediation and the peaceful settlement of conflict possible. Mediators can help disputants
implement their commitments by helping to identify problems, and then rendering aid
building up state capacity, knowledge, and resources (Joachim et al, 2008). Mediators with
capabilities best suited for these activities are in an advantageous position to promote
commitment to peace treaties and settlements, including by improving the noncomplying
state’s bureaucratic efficacy. Indeed, it has been found that bureaucratic efficacy in terms of
state capacity raises levels of compliance with treaties, inferring that noncompliance can be
conditioned on a state’s capacity to fulfill its treaty or settlement terms, and thus
noncompliance may be inadvertent (Cole, 2015). Mediators can help states to behave in a way
which allows for settlements by providing diplomatic resources and knowhow, and under the
right institutional conditions can encourage compliance without coercion (Helfer, Voeten,
2014; Karns et al, 2015).
When setting out to peacefully mediate a conflict, third-party states usually employ
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three different strategies, these being directive strategies (used 29.6% of the time), proceduralformulative strategies (used 14.2% of the time), and communication-facilitation strategies
(used 43.7% of the time), ordered from first to last in terms of the intensity of mediator
involvement (Gartner, 2014; Bercovitch, Lee, 2003). Directive strategies by mediators attempt
to structure the outcome, content, and substance of the bargaining process in mediation. These
strategies are utilized to cope with and change the behavior and motivation of the disputants,
with the mediator perhaps advocating for a specific outcome and attempting to rally support
for it (Gartner, 2014). According to Bercovitch and Lee (2003), the specific tactics associated
with directive strategies include “…changing the parties’ expectations, taking responsibility
for concessions, making substantive suggestions and proposals, making the parties aware of
the costs of non-agreement, supplying and filtering information, suggesting concessions
parties can make, helping the negotiators to undo a commitment, rewarding party concessions,
helping devise a framework for acceptable outcomes, changing perceptions, pressing the
parties to show flexibility, promising resources or threatening withdrawal, and offering to
verify compliance with agreement” (pg. 4). As mentioned, this strategy requires the largest
degree of involvement by mediators.
Procedural-formulative strategies, on the other hand, create the structure for the
negotiations between the disputants. These strategies are created in order to facilitate a
beneficial environment for the management of conflict. This can encompass the mediator
selecting the location for mediation to occur, the structure of the mediation’s agenda, the
frequency of how often the parties meet, as well as the distribution of information about the
progress of mediation (Bercovitch, Lee, 2003; Gartner; 2014). In addition, Bercovitch and Lee
(2003) noted that further aspects of the procedural-formulative strategy include “…controlling
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constituency influences and media publicity, enhancing situational powers of weaker parties,
chairing the communication process…controlling the pace and formality of meetings,
controlling the physical environment, establishing protocols, suggesting procedures,
highlighting common interests, reducing tensions, controlling timing, dealing with the simple
issues first,…helping parties save face, and keeping the process focused on issues” (pg. 4).
This strategy is secondary in intensity relative to directive strategies.
The last strategy that mediators can opt for is the communication-facilitation strategy,
which focuses on encouraging the conflicting parties to communicate with each other directly
or via the mediator along the lines of shuttle diplomacy. By utilizing this strategy, mediators
primarily furnish information to the disputants (Gartner, 2014). A mediator utilizing a
communication-facilitation strategy adopts a more passive role than what is found in directive
or procedural-formulative strategies. The mediator functions by funneling information to the
disputants and aiding cooperation while exhibiting little direct control over the content of
mediation or the formal process. Bercovitch and Lee (2003) observed that this strategy
employs tactics including “…making contact with the parties; gaining the trust and
confidence of the parties; arranging for interactions between the parties; identifying issues and
interests; clarifying the situation; avoiding taking sides; developing a rapport with the parties;
supplying missing information; developing a framework for understanding; encouraging
meaningful communication; offering positive evaluations; and allowing the interests of the
parties to be discussed” while adopting the role of a “go-between” (pgs. 3-4).
As previously mentioned, this last strategy is the most common found in mediation by
a wide margin. However, the effectiveness and choice of mediation strategies is highly
contextual and situational, depending on the dispute and the disputants. Although directive
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strategies may be effective in high-intensity conflicts, they may come off as pushy (Gartner,
2014). Therefore, context and balance are thought to be vital for mediators in selecting
mediation strategies in order to lead to a peaceful end of a conflict.
2.3.3 Outcomes of Mediation
The third avenue of research on mediation focuses on the success of mediation efforts.
Mediation outcomes can be viewed in the context of four possible results: they are
unsuccessful, there is a ceasefire, they are partly successful, or they are fully successful
(Bercovitch, Schneider, 2000). Typically speaking, successful mediation of a conflict is not a
“one and done” sort of affair. For example, it has been found that for every agreement
reached, there were typically an average of 30 conflict management peace-making attempts
leading to a three percent success rate for any particular effort in conflict mediation (Gartner,
2014). On the other hand, a mediating state is more likely to serve (and to be successful) if
they have already engaged in mediation with the disputants. According to Melin (2013):
These prior mediation experiences, or mediation history, establish rapport and signal a
commitment to peaceful conflict management…Each instance creates a mediation
history of the state’s experience as a mediator and the disputants’ experiences in working
with mediators…Previous disputant experiences with mediation signals a disputant’s
willingness to work with an outsider and encourages mediation offers by states…A
state’s mediation experience can signal to disputants the mediator’s ability, preferred
methods, resourcefulness, and objectives. To be effective, the state mediator must be
perceived as having access to suitable techniques for encouraging bargaining, and as
having sufficient authority and experience to be able to utilize them. (pg. 88)
Other aspects of individual states are also thought to influence the likelihood of
mediation as well its success. One of the most contested of these aspects as far as its effect is
the role of bias. Bias can be regarded as a tendency that affects a mediator’s ability to act
impartially, and can cause a negative conflict of interest that may undermine voluntary
conflict resolution, and restrict disputants to less effective conflict management methods
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(Gartner, 2014). Indeed, Kamrava (2011) postulated that “Disputants often assume that an
unbiased mediator whose sole interest is to reduce the level of conflict is far more likely to be
believed by both disputants, and therefore be successful, as compared to a mediator perceived
to be biased…This assumption prompts the disputants to seek out an impartial negotiator or to
welcome offers of negotiations by a third party that they perceive to be unbiased” (pg. 543).
However, even though unbiased mediators are more attractive to disputants, it is this very
impartiality which can damage the credibility of the mediating state, and with it negatively
affect their performance in successfully mediating (Crescenzi et al, 2011). An unbiased
mediator’s immediate focus is on securing a peace agreement first and foremost, which can
introduce the possibility of the mediator lying to the disputants in order to secure this outcome
(Kydd, 2003). And without trust in a mediator to not lie, proposals put forward by them are
not likely to be accepted by the disputants (Bercovitch, Lee, 2003). This introduces a catch22. Since a biased mediator can influence and credibly signal information to the disputant it is
biased towards, it is more likely to be trusted, creating a situation where biased mediators
offer successful conflict resolution at the cost of the willingness of other states to utilize them
in the first place (Crescenzi et al, 2011). However, there are factors that can lead to unbiased
mediators being more successful by way of improving their credibility. For example,
Crescenzi et al (2011) summarized some of these aspects of unbiased mediators as such:
First, the institutional features of the mediator’s home state influence the reputational,
electoral, and policy failure costs for deception in the mediation process. The
second…emanates from the aggregate effects of the global democratic community,
which provides better and more frequent information about the dispute and the mediator
to the disputants…The third…begins with the supply of information provided by
international organizations. As the supply of neutral information from international
organizations increases, potential mediators face higher costs for deception. (pg. 1073)
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The status of a state is also thought to be a characteristic that affects their chances of
success (Kamrava, 2011). For example, a state’s membership on the United Nations Security
Council has been thought to lead to an increased likelihood that that state will be chosen to
mediate an international conflict (Bercovitch, Schneider, 2000). Further, former colonial
powers are in demand for such a role if they pursue a unilateral mediation mandate, and
potential mediators are more likely to be sought after if they are perceived as having the
ability to comprehend the positions of the disputants, possessing knowledge about the conflict,
and having a sense of timing, procedural skills, active listening, and communication skills
(Bercovitch, Schneider, 2000). Some of the factors that are thought to be especially important
for successful mediation include stamina, intelligence, patience, energy, and a sense of humor
(Bercovitch, 1984). The capabilities of a third-party state also play a part in the occurrence of
interstate mediation, with mediators that possess greater capabilities leading to a greater
likelihood of the occurrence of mediation and its success. Melin (2013) observed that
“States…with material strength and diplomatic prowess are likely…and successful as
mediators because these actors have access to resources and negotiating experience that makes
them attractive as mediators and able to create and sustain peace…Mediators with material
capabilities can incentivize agreements by using the proverbial carrot and stick to increase an
agreement’s appeal or threaten failed compliance” (pgs. 85-86). Directly pursuant to this
dissertation, the role of the mediating state’s regime type is also thought to be very important.
On one hand, scholars like Melin (2013) propose that “Mediation and accepting offers of
mediation are more likely when democracies are involved, as these states are accustomed to
third-party involvement in conflict and garner other states’ trust, making them a more
attractive option…” (pgs. 84-85), as well as apparently being more successful at doing so than

21

autocracies. However, contradicting this viewpoint, other scholars have found that (despite
their seeming lack of success) autocracies are not significantly less active than democracies in
mediating international conflicts (Bercovitch, Schneider, 2000). Explanations as to why this
puzzling behavior by autocracies is occurring, as well as speculation about which autocratic
regime types are the most successful at interstate conflict mediation, will be found in the
theory chapter of this dissertation.
2.4 Selection Effects
When studying mediation in an empirical fashion, it is necessary to take into account
selection effects (also known as selection bias). It is well recognized that a lot of the samples
utilized for statistical analysis are the result of some selection process, and it could be
construed that if the premise of politics is the result of decision making by individuals, then
all political interaction is one of repeated selection (Signorino (2002). Selection effects is the
bias which is introduced, for example, by the selection of states, groups, individuals, or data
to be analyzed in a way where proper randomization can’t be attained, meaning that the
obtained sample isn’t representative of the population which is to be analyzed (Wooldridge,
2006). Just as individuals self-select into specific programs or behaviors, selection effects can
cause participation by states in various endeavors to not be determined randomly
(Wooldridge, 2006). States may select themselves into alliances, disputes, arbitration, or the
role of (or offering to be) a mediator in an international conflict based on unobservable
factors like expectations, preferences, or resolve (Reed, 2002). In this way does the selection
effects problem rear its head in the empirical study of mediation of interstate conflicts.
For example, it has been posited by some scholars that, as opposed to other forms of
conflict resolution like bilateral negotiation, international conflicts that undergo mediation
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aren’t as likely to result in an agreement for peace, and agreements that are mediated are at a
likelihood of failing (Gartner, 2014). However, selection effects have a powerful effect on
what is observed about mediation, suggesting that poor conflict management results are
produced by mediation. However, this is actually a deception. There are three aspects of the
mediation of international conflicts which are important for understanding this deception,
these being that adherence to the outcomes of mediation as well as participation in it are
voluntary, mediation is associated with costs (such as the damage to a mediator’s reputation
from failure, operational expenses, political costs, and forgoing other peace efforts), and that
the costly and voluntary characteristics of mediation form selection effects which can vastly
obscure empirical inferences of observations (Gartner, 2014). In mediation, selection effects
identify specific populations of cases with specific traits of conflict management, and both
mediators and disputants take into account the likely repercussions of mediation when
deciding whether to engage in it (Beber, 2012). For example, Gartner (2014) explains how
selection effects can obscure the effectiveness of mediation by offering this anecdotal
scenario:
…imagine there are two types of disputes, hard (difficult to resolve) and easy (open to
resolution). Difficult to resolve disputes typically involve higher levels of violence,
greater stakes and more intransigent belligerents than easy to resolve disputes…on
average, hard disputes are less likely to result in peacemaking success than easy ones.
Thus, identifying the dispute’s type (hard or easy) helps to predict the likely outcome of
any conflict resolution…selection effects signal the conflict’s likely type and thus its
odds of a peaceful outcome…Because mediation is costly, belligerents try to avoid it…If
bilateral negotiations fail…then disputants…turn to a third-party mediator. As a result,
mediators work on tougher cases…disputes that, as a result of the selection process, are
less likely to result in peace…When the nature of the dispute is taken into
account…international dispute mediation has a positive…effect on reaching durable
agreements. (pgs. 290-291)
Another example of selection effects in the study of mediation and its effectiveness
involves the bias of mediators. As mentioned, some scholars believe that unbiased mediators
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prove to be more effective and are more credible than biased mediators, who derive utility
from the divvying up of the stakes to each disputant (in particular in regards to their preferred
side). Because biased mediators derive utility from the way a dispute turns out, they don’t care
as much about the fixed costs involved in mediating since this is offset by any impact that the
mediator has on the peace agreement reached between the conflicting sides. This causes
mediators that are ineffective because they are biased to be more likely to select into being
mediators. In this situation, Beber (2012) noted that “…impartial mediators are relatively more
likely to produce settlements, but they also have fewer incentives to become involved…and
are hence more likely to forgo mediation…This can create a selection effect by which an
unadjusted empirical analysis will indicate lower mediation success rates than we would
observe otherwise” (pg. 419). Because of these sorts of problems involving selection effects in
mediation, addressing them is a necessary prerequisite for empirical evaluation (Reed, 2002).
This dissertation similarly seeks to avoid the problems associated with selection effects
regarding mediation, and the measures it takes to address this problem will be enumerated
upon in the research design chapter. Although the aforementioned scholarly work and
literature contribute to the study of conflict mediation, there are indeed gaps in it that should
be filled in order to advance research on the subject. Benefits for future research are not only
important in the academic sense, but also important in regards to informed foreign policy
decisions. This not only applies to mediation by third-party states in general, but also
specifically for the numerous different types of autocracies found globally in both the past and
the present. In the next chapter, I will delve into mediation by several different autocratic
regime types, advancing new hypotheses and proposing novel theories which build on the
limited existing research on autocratic mediation in international conflicts. It may be that
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autocracies offer or accept to mediate as a response to when they feel that their reputation is
under attack due to condemnation, negative press, etc. However, autocracies are not one size
fits all, and just because an autocracy offers to mediate does not mean it will be successful. In
the next chapter, I disaggregate autocracies into different types, and propound the notion that
some types of autocracies are better suited to successfully mediating than others.
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CHAPTER 3: Theory
3.1 Novel Theories on Autocratic Mediation
I argue that autocracies mediate conflicts to protect their prestige and reputation when
they are under scrutiny for negative behavior. States may mediate for reasons that are more
related to the potential mediating state’s strategic interests rather than purely humanitarian
reasons, but not necessarily in a direct manner. As mentioned, interests can be to build and
enhance a mediating state’s international reputation, cement their legitimacy, increase their
level of prestige, as well as burnish their image (Akpinar, 2015; Melin, 2013; Bercovitch,
Schneider, 2000). Although not being as successful in conflict mediation when compared to
their democratic counterparts (Melin, 2013), autocratic states may have particularly strong
strategic motivations for mediation, which would explain their proclivity for activity in this
realm. My theory posits that autocracies are more likely to offer to mediate an international
conflict for the sake of sanitizing their global image when they are subjected to negative
international attention such as criticism for perceived undesirable behavior, are experiencing
sanctions, and/or are being censured by international bodies like the UN for issues such as
human rights. The presence of such negative international attention and actions are important,
as it indicates that states such as autocracies are beyond the norms of acceptability propounded
by the international community (Krain, 2012). Sanctioning and negative international attention
such as condemnation can badly damage a state’s reputation with potential military allies,
trade partners, donors, and IGOs (such as the World Bank, for example), as well as indicating
that other international actors may permissibly sanction the state subjected to such scrutiny
(Schneider, 2000; Lebovic, Voeten, 2006, 2009; Krain, 2012). Thus, negative global attention
and condemnation of a state may result in real, tangible consequences for that state (Franklin,
2008; Lebovic, Voeten, 2006).
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Autocracies in particular may be vulnerable to negative international attention and
condemnation as they are known to use repression as one of their main instruments (if not the
main instrument) for maintaining power (Escriba-Folch, 2013), and have often been found to
utilize repression more intensively than their democratic counterparts (Davenport, 1999, 2004;
Poe et al, 1999). This opens them up for international scrutiny. By mediating a conflict,
autocracies can work to offset potential damage to their reputation which could result from
international scrutiny, sanctioning, and condemnation, and instead foster a reputation as a
peacemaker (Melin, 2013). Burnell (2006) notes that “In fact, a growing acknowledgement of
the international dimensions…suggests that external judgements of [autocratic] regime
legitimacy may now carry more weight than perhaps at any previous time…” (pg. 552), while
mediation in conflict serves to enhance such legitimacy for an autocracy (Akpinar, 2015) and
potentially offset the aforementioned negative scrutiny and international condemnation. The
obtainment by an autocracy of international legitimacy can bestow upon them numerous other
benefits as well, such as attracting international investment and aid that can be used by the
regime to maintain its survival (Kendall-Taylor, Frantz, 2014), and possessing a good
international reputation can also be invaluable for the creation of domestic legitimacy (Burnell,
2006). Were an autocracy to not only offer but to successfully mediate the conclusion of an
international conflict, it could reasonably expect its image and legitimacy to improve
internationally (and to ideally benefit from it), as the successful mediation of an international
conflict provides global public goods. For my next theories, I turn my analysis towards
investigating the differences in mediating behavior found amongst different autocratic regime
types. Given that autocratic mediation does occur frequently, not all authoritarian regimes may
offer to mediate as frequently as others. For example, personalist autocracies, military juntas, or
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monarchies may not be the best equipped or naturally dispositioned to peaceful conflict
mediation. There is considerable variation across autocratic regime-types as to their ability and
willingness to have convivial, cooperative, and collaborative relations with other states. For
example, autocracies that more closely resemble democracies (particularly in the realm of
policy flexibility, transparency, and leader accountability like party-machine autocracies) have
been found to be more inclined for international cooperation than personalist autocracies of
either the civilian or military type (Mattes, Rodriguez, 2014). In addition, autocracies with large
winning coalitions that resemble democracies (such as party “machines”) have been found to
contribute to cooperative activities such as peacefully ending conflicts and providing public
goods more often than other autocratic regime types with smaller winning coalitions (like
personalist dictators).
As such, it may be that autocrats like personalists or monarchs are not the most
prolific in offering to mediate an international conflict. It may instead be party-based
autocracies, where there is the presence of a strong domestic audience and selectorate made
up primarily of civilian regime insiders with a broader range of policy options, political
points of view, as well as experiences, and who don’t instinctively prefer other solutions
over diplomacy (Weeks, 2014; Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, 2014). This is opposed to military
regimes or bosses/strongmen who rely primarily on the military, and who may be socialized
to military solutions (Sagan, 2003; Walt, 1987; Lai, Slater, 2006). Leaders of regimes with
larger winning coalitions, such as autocracies which are more similar to democracies than
other autocracies (Bueno de Mesquita et al, 1999; Weeks, 2014), need to produce policy
results, such as the preservation of their state’s reputation or to otherwise further its national
objectives.
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Kendall-Taylor and Frantz (2014) observed that unlike other autocracies, autocratic
regimes which “…control by altering democratic processes often still seek to portray
themselves as ‘democrats,’ making them likely to be more vulnerable to international and
domestic criticism that highlights the inconsistency between their behaviors and democratic
norms” (pg. 81). The pressure to escape the highlighting of inconsistencies with democratic
norms may result in “machines” offering most often to successfully mediate international
conflicts, relative to other autocratic regime-types. Further, Melin (2013) observed that the
offering of mediation is “…more likely when democracies are involved, as these states are
accustomed to third-party involvement in conflict and garner other states’ trust, making
them a more attractive option for conflict resolution…Mediation is therefore best
encouraged when democracies are involved as…mediators” (pgs. 84-85). Evidently,
autocratic “machines” are more closely similar to democracies than other autocracies
(Weeks, 2014), so it stands to reason that aspects of democracies which lead to them
offering to mediate more often and to be more successful at it could also be applied to
autocratic “machines” (Melin, 2013). It is postulated that the transparency associated with
democracies, including the possession of a free press, creates greater credibility for
democracies’ foreign policy actions and greater audience costs for foreign policy failure
(Fearon, 1994; Downs, Rocke, 1995; Smith, 1996; Van Belle, 1997; Schultz, 1998). In
addition, Crescenzi et al (2011) states that “…transparency and oversight of democratic
political systems disciplines democratic mediators to remain honest, which
means…democratic mediators become an attractive option for conflict resolution and can
successfully help the parties reach a peaceful settlement” (pg. 1075). As mentioned, these
characteristics for successful mediation possessed by democracies may also carry over into
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the behavior of autocracies that closely resemble them, i.e. non-personalist autocratic
“machines” (Weeks, 2014).
Switching regime focus, because they lack an ideology, military regimes struggle to
justify their long term rule in the absence of achieving national goals (such as the
preservation of reputation as well as the pursuit of other strategic objectives and benefits),
and due to a lack of institutional infrastructure they are not as capable as other autocracies in
securing elite cohesion and deflecting popular dissent through co-optation. Further, although
there is less of a winning coalition for junta leaders than autocratic “machines,” they still
have a larger winning coalition of officers and officials to please than monarchies or
personalist autocracies. As mentioned, political leaders with larger winning coalitions need
to produce successful policy and to protect the national interest to stay in power (Bueno de
Mesquita et al, 1999). By extrapolation, the above mentioned characteristics of juntas may
cause their leaders to be more sensitive than monarchies or personalists to condemnation and
a tarnished national image, pressuring them to offer to mediate international conflicts more
often than those autocratic regime-types as a means of producing “output legitimacy” for
their regime both domestically and internationally through the production of global public
goods (Burnell, 2010).
On the other hand, monarchies are relatively insulated from challenges to their
credibility and other criticisms by relying on tradition for domestic and international
legitimacy, leading them to be less sensitive to international and domestic criticism and
condemnation. Thus, they may not feel the same pressures to offer to mediate international
conflicts that “machines” and juntas face, leading to them offering to mediate less than those
regime-types but more than personalists since it is still feasible that members of the ruling
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family or court might punish or remove the monarch for foreign policy failure and for failing
to protect national interests (like a positive reputation or access to other benefits).
Moving on to personalist autocracies, Cassani (2017) observed that “…the
institutional features that differentiate contemporary authoritarian regimes can have
significant implications for leaders’ efforts to legitimize themselves…” (pg. 354). For
personalist autocracies, the interests of the state such as its reputation and legitimacy are
institutionally subordinate to the interests of the personalist (such as rewarding their small
and immediate selectorate). Because their winning coalition is so small, the survival of
personalists is based less on successful foreign policy and the promotion of the national
interest as opposed to the rewarding of an inner circle of cronies. This leads to a low
likelihood of the leader being punished by other elites (who owe their position to the
personal favor of the personalist dictator) for poor leadership or state stewardship (Weeks,
2008). Since they are less sensitive to domestic or international challenges and questions to
their legitimacy, personalists will be least likely to offer to mediate international conflicts
than the other mentioned autocratic regime-types since they will feel the least pressure to
respond to international criticism or punitive measures as long as they grease the palms of
their small inner circle. In the following sections, I will elucidate my novel theories to a
greater extent, discussing the role of reputation, prestige, and legitimacy in the context of
international ire and autocratic mediation. I will than discuss the differences in autocratic
regime-types, and how this influences their individual mediation behavior in terms of
offering to mediate.
3.2 Reputation and Prestige
States are known to covet and strive to preserve a good reputation amongst the
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international order. Indeed, conflicts and wars have been started and fought, along with their
accompanying casualties, for the sake of the reputations of states (Mercer, 1997). To put it
succinctly, reputations are subjective beliefs that actors (such as states) utilize in order to
forecast the future behavior of other actors based on actions they have taken in the past
(Mercer, 1996; Miller, 2003; Sartori, 2005; Weisiger, Yarhi-Milo, 2015; Lupton, 2018a;
2020), with the value of a reputation varying depending on how other actors interpret it
(Nalebuff, 1991). Actors such as states are not in direct possession of their reputations, as they
exist “in the eye of the beholder” (in this case, other states) (Harvey, Mitton, 2016; Lupton,
2018a). This makes a good reputation a valuable commodity for autocracies, whereas a bad
reputation is something to be avoided if at all possible.
Reputation as a concept when applied to states can be broken down into more specific
areas. For example, it is understood that a general reputation is a dispositional attribution
which has cross-situational validity, whereas it can be understood that a specific reputation is
a dispositional attribution which has same-situational validity (Mercer, 1997). As such,
reputation can be regarded as the sending of information about a state’s likely actions, with
states gleaning this information from prior direct or indirect experience (Peterson, 2014). For
a state wishing to change their reputation amongst the community of nations, this can be a
difficult proposition. It is thought that once a state’s reputation has been formed, it can be
challenging for a state to subsequently change it (Copeland, 1997; Lupton, 2018b).
In order for a state to gain a reputation due to a specific act, there are twin conditions
which must be satisfied. First, other states must chalk up the actions of a state according to
its character as opposed to the specific situation which concerns that state at a particular
place in time, while secondly other states must utilize this dispositional attribution in order
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to forecast a state’s behavior down the line (Copeland, 1997). States which aren’t directly
involved in a situation are still able to form a reputation about states which are dealing with
whatever circumstance they find themselves in. As such, states are clearly concerned about
their own reputations, and subsequently invest in actions designed to bolster them (Walter,
2006; Sechser, 2018; Lupton, 2018a). The lack of direct control over their state’s reputation
is a cause of concern for policymakers of that country. For example, Lupton (2020)
observed that “Leaders worry about their reputations…because they believe certain
reputations, such as a reputation for irresolute action, will make them and their states more
vulnerable to international threats; but other reputations, such as a reputation for resolute
action, will make them and their states more secure” (pg. 2). Thus the pursuit of reputations
regarded as “good” in some regard is something to be striven for by policymakers of states,
whereas a “bad” reputation is something to be avoided or, if possible, ameliorated.
As previously noted, the pursuit of a good reputation in some manner is one which
states put a lot of time and effort into developing and inculcating. The manner of reputation for
which a state designates the term “good” as attached to it varies across countries and time. For
example, a reputation for strength and fortitude is one which states have historically striven to
achieve at great cost, with reputation being regarded as one of the few areas worth fighting for
between states (Schelling, 1966). Having a reputation for martial strength has been posited to
be like a property which can be built up and invested in, with Guisinger and Smith (2002)
noting that “…countries make and follow through on threats not for the immediate gains but to
achieve a reputation for a certain trait, typically labeled aggressiveness, resolve, or
toughness…Countries anointed with a strong reputation are expected to encounter fewer
threats and are more likely to be believed when they say they will resist than those branded as
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weak or irresolute” (pg. 176). For a state which sees itself as in the midst of threats, a
reputation for these martial tendencies is perceived by them as a positive characteristic for
other states to view them as. On the other hand, a reputation for being an honest, peaceful state
is regarded by some countries as being equally if not more positive. Whereas a reputation for
strength can be developed through aggressive actions and investment in armaments, it has
been posited that an honest reputation instead must be defended vigorously (Guisinger, Smith,
2002). A reputation for honesty is valued by states because, as an example, it can be used by
states to determine the intent of other states and thus avoid unnecessary conflict (Guisinger,
Smith, 2002), with the leaders of states developing an honest reputation via their deeds and
statements (Lupton, 2018b). States may also desire to establish a positive reputation as a
peacemaker, enhancing their image and influence in the outcomes of conflicts (Melin, 2013).
By undertaking certain actions (such as facilitating and/or advocating for mediation), the
leaders of states can successfully develop reputations for credibility amongst other countries
(Lupton, 2018b; Guisinger, Smith, 2002; McGillivray, Smith, 2000, 2006). A positive
reputation as a peacemaker carries with it special benefits for a state, due to the proclivity for
human societies to reward those who contribute altruistically for the greater good of humanity
(Van Vugt et al, 2005). For states, these rewards can include much desired memberships in
organizations like the European Union or NATO, or the injection of funds by investors
(Lebovic, Voeten, 2006).
Clearly it is in a state’s best interest to maintain a positive reputation whenever
possible. There are numerous reasons why states seek to improve their reputation and status
regardless of the circumstances. But even more deleterious than not having a good reputation
as a state would be the designation of having a poor one. This isn’t solely for cosmetic reasons
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of national vanity, but also because of the real world hazards which can plague a state in the
present and future. For example, Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo (2015) observed that “…countries
that have earned a bad reputation will be more likely to be challenged, whereas those who
have earned a good reputation will be less likely to face challenges…More precisely, a bad
reputation leads observers to believe that they can convince the country in question to make
more significant political concessions than they otherwise would have been willing to
make…A similar relationship applies in reverse for countries with a good reputation who are
less attractive targets” (pg. 481).
For a state with a bad reputation (such as in the arena of human rights), shame which is
heaped on them by other states delineates the offending state as an outsider who is separate
from the community of civilized states (Franklin, 2008), a pariah state if you will. This
ostracizing of states of ill repute for things such as the violation of human rights, according to
Krain (2012), frames states “…as violating international norms and as untrustworthy partners
in future interactions; [and] publicly signals international disapproval to perpetrators, their
allies, partners or donors, and to domestic challengers...” (pg. 576), making it difficult for other
states to conduct business with and/or support a state with a bad reputation for fear of
themselves also gaining a negative reputation (Schneider, 2000; Peterson, Drury, 2011). Given
the challenges for a state in changing its reputation once established, this concern remains at
the forefront of the minds of policymakers.
With some similarities to a good reputation, as well as some notable differences, the
possession of “prestige” is also highly coveted by states. This term denotes admiration and
respect in a widespread fashion, and is something which (much like a good reputation) states
value and take seriously. Reputation and prestige are similar enough to where policymakers
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occasionally mix the two up. Both of them are relational concepts and refer to aspects of a
state instead of its environment, but a state’s reputation (unlike prestige) doesn’t entail
voluntary deference (meaning compliance with a state without the presence of coercion or
threat), it doesn’t depend on a community’s shared beliefs, it isn’t relative, it doesn’t depend
on a hierarchy, and it always predicts that a state will behave similarly in the future (Mercer,
2017). Whereas reputation is not relative but instead is relational, prestige is both. It has
been argued that states seek prestige both because it has value in of itself as well as serving
to increase the power of states who possess prestige in the eyes of others. Taking this into
account, the notable scholar Hans Morgenthau (1955) referred to prestige as an
“indispensable element of a rational foreign policy” (pg. 75).
When discussing prestige as applied to states, scholars typically highlight five
characteristics. According to Mercer (2017), prestige is first “…the collective beliefs of a
community that determine what merits respect and admiration…Second, prestige is a
relational (not a property concept)…Prestige depends on what a community of states thinks of
a community member, not on what an actor thinks of itself…Third, prestige is relative…It
exists in a social hierarchy…Fourth, prestige and status are synonyms…[and] a fifth aspect of
prestige— that it elicits voluntary deference—characterizes a strategic view of prestige” (pgs.
135-136).
For states, the quest for prestige is a rational endeavor since it may result in voluntary
deference from other states, and is in this way a type of soft power. Policies intended to
increase the prestige of a state (such as landing a man on the Moon, or successfully mediating
a conflict) can deplete the material capabilities of a state, but are designed to spur the creation
of admiration and respect from other states. Prestige, whether of a social group of people, an
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individual, or a state, is a product of several different components: basic characteristics, the
values of the others who grant prestige, short run activities partly governed by prestige
considerations, and activities chiefly governed by such considerations. According to Etzioni
(1962):
The prestige of a country rests first of all on its basic characteristics, including the nature
of its political structure (democratic or authoritarian), its economy (rich or poor), its
“culture,” the general level of its technology, its basic military potential, and the
like…Not less crucial are the values of the persons, groups, or nations which grant
prestige. Prestige is a judgment about the relative standing of one party made by other
parties. This judgment depends not only on what a country is, but also on the standards
by which the country is evaluated…It is only within the limits established by the
characteristics of the society which is evaluated and the values of those doing the
evaluating, that action can be undertaken to affect the international status of a country.
This may be attained either by introducing prestige as one consideration in directing
short-run, manipulative activities, or by allowing prestige-considerations to be the chief
determinant of a course of action. (pgs. 24-25)
Prestige is valued both for its own sake, but also for the tactical and strategic benefits
that come along with its possession. Prestige for a state can endow them with both influence
and power, as well as bequeathing upon them material benefits such as foreign direct
investment, low interest rate loans, as well as trade concessions and/or preferential trade
agreements (Carnegie, Dolan, 2015). Possessors of prestige have also been found to be at a
greater likelihood of being tapped for representative and leadership roles (Van Vugt et al,
2005). Prestige is thus a treasured commodity for states, and its lack is often seen by
policymakers as troubling. Thus, under any circumstance, states are concerned with their level
of prestige, reputation, and the status they denote because of the material and immaterial
benefits which are associated with having a good one. According to Mercer (2017):
Status can mean prestige, but it can also mean one’s rank in a hierarchy, an official
classification, or a position in a process…As Deborah Larson, T.V. Paul, and William
Wohlforth conclude: ‘No matter how irrational or petty they may seem, status concerns
cannot be evaded because they are inherent to human preferences.’ Joslyn Barnhart
suggests that humans are ‘hardwired’ to care about their status; it is an ‘innate human
trait’. This universal desire for self-esteem persists because it confers evolutionary
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advantages. Because human nature drives concern for prestige, it will be just as
important between states as within them. (pgs. 136-137)
This concern with status by states (and how to improve them) under any international
circumstance does indeed seem to be hardwired from the bottom up. Etzioni (1962) pointedly
observed that “Members of nations see in the state more than an agency to which they pay
taxes and which supplies them with security, welfare, and other services; they identify with it
and its fate…Most citizens derive symbolic gratifications and deprivations from…the
international status of their nation” (pg. 22), which in turn is often dependent on the roles
which states choose to enact in the international arena (and how those roles are perceived by
other states, for example the role of a peacemaker and mediator). The predilection of states
for seeking to adopt roles and identities seen as positive by other states as a means for the
pursuit of status can be understood through the lens of role theory. According to Thies
(2009), “Role theory…contains its own model of social identity based on…status…The
status dimension refers to a position in a social structure and its associated duties, rights and
legitimated power or authority…” (pg. 12), all of which status-seeking states are concerned
with as a matter of course. The perception of role and status is of course in the eyes of the
beholder, with role theory explaining this via the concept of the audience of states. In role
theory, this audience creates the agreed upon reality of the role. Thies (2009) observed that
“If the audience accepts the role enactment as appropriate then they serve as confirmation of
the reality of the role…Second, the audience provides cues to guide the performer’s role
enactment (Walker, 1979: 177)...Third, the audience engages in social reinforcement through
the positive and negative sanctions associated with the role enactment”, in this case of statusseeking states trying to improve their reputation (pg. 11).
Although status and prestige, both maintaining and improving them, are always a
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concern for states for the abovementioned material and immaterial reasons, leaders and
denizens of these states will feel personal umbrage if their state’s international status were to
suffer a negative change from where it had been (Etzioni, 1962). As such, the loss of prestige
which may occur due to condemnation and sanctioning by other states can lead to a spectrum
of responses, from enhanced efforts by states to regain prestige and enhance their status
through some action (such as seeking the role of mediator and peacemaker), or to enhance
already existing efforts being put forward by that state (Etzioni, 1962). Much like reputation,
the pursuit of prestige by states is one which has been deemed worthy of fighting for and
which has spurred conflict over the course of human history. This may be particularly true
when the reputation, prestige, and status of a state is deemed to be under threat by their
regime.
3.3 Autocracies and Reputation/Prestige
Autocracies in particular may be vulnerable to negative international attention and
condemnation as they are known to use repression as one of their main instruments (if not the
main instrument) for maintaining power (Escriba-Folch, 2013) and have often been found to
utilize repression more intensively than their democratic counterparts (Davenport, 1999,
2004; Poe et al, 1999). This opens them up for international scrutiny. The reputations of
states, which are formed by their patterns of past behavior (Mercer, 1997; Weisiger, YarhiMilo, 2015; Press, 2001; Crescenzi, 2007) and are held in the eyes of other international
actors (Harvey, Mitton, 2016; Lupton, 2018a), are not directly possessed by that state
(Lupton, 2014) and are frequently difficult to alter once established (Copeland, 1997). Thus a
negative reputation can be especially pernicious for an autocracy once it is in place. Indeed,
scholars have posited that a reputation for openness in particular is much harder to develop
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than to defend (Guinsinger, Smith, 2002).
However, research indicates that states and their leaders can and do alter their
reputations with both their contemporary words and deeds (Lupton, 2018a; Lupton 2018b;
Lupton 2020). By mediating a conflict, autocracies can work to offset potential damage to
their reputation which could result from international scrutiny, sanctioning, and
condemnation, and instead foster a reputation as a peacemaker (Melin, 2013). Burnell (2006)
notes that “In fact, a growing acknowledgement of the international dimensions…suggests
that external judgements of [autocratic] regime legitimacy may now carry more weight than
perhaps at any previous time…” (pg. 552), while mediation in conflict serves to enhance
such legitimacy for an autocracy (Akpinar, 2015) and potentially offset the aforementioned
negative scrutiny and international condemnation.
This may be especially important and problematic for autocracies, given the spreading
of democratic norms internationally by numerous influential democratic states and entities.
Burnell (2010) notes that for international supporters of democracy, “…the legitimacy of any
regime other than liberal democratic must depend heavily on its material record,” which is
also referred to as “output legitimacy” (pg. 7). Although difficult to measure, legitimacy as a
concept can be understood as what members of a state believe about their ruler’s right to rule,
with popular support for the legitimacy of a regime resting on the shared belief that the
institutions and rules which make up a political regime are valid (Cassani, 2017). The
aforementioned “outputs” can include cooperative actions such as peacekeeping. Such actions
have been found to shield states from condemnation from the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights (Lebovic, Voeten, 2006) for example, which is valuable for autocracies since
human rights are not something for which they are particularly known. A notably public way
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that autocracies can seek to distract other states from their negative behavior, offset potential
damage to their reputation, and to improve and sanitize their global image is to offer to
mediate in a conflict between other states. Mediation in conflict serves to enhance
international legitimacy for an autocracy (Akpinar, 2015), and potentially offset the
aforementioned negative scrutiny and international condemnation. Through mediation, closed
autocratic regimes can develop a reputation for openness as an “honest broker” and
peacemaker of international conflicts, increase their level of prestige, status, and visibility,
and cultivate a more positive image for themselves both internationally and domestically
(Melin, 2013; Barakat, 2014; Legarda, Hoffmann, 2018; Chaziza, 2018a, 2018b). Mediation
by an autocracy can therefore act as a way of countering negative international scrutiny,
sanctioning, and condemnation, while simultaneously increasing the perception of
international legitimacy of that autocracy by other states and political actors.
The obtainment by an autocracy of international legitimacy can bestow upon them
numerous other benefits as well, such as attracting international investment and aid that can
be used by the regime to maintain its survival (Kendall-Taylor, Frantz, 2014), and
possessing a good international reputation can also be invaluable for the creation of
domestic legitimacy (Burnell, 2006). In many ways autocratic legitimacy lies in the ability
of these regimes to provide desired policy outcomes and material benefits (Cassani, 2017),
the aforementioned “output legitimacy” (Burnell, 2010), to both domestic and international
audiences. For autocracies in particular, legitimacy is a challenge which if not met can bring
down the autocratic regime and consign former autocrats to the dustbin of history. Although
legitimacy for autocracies can be derived through traditions (such as a hereditary monarchy),
ideology (such as communism), or charisma (such as the case with many personalist
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dictators), these are considered weak when put alongside democratic legitimacy.
The wielding of seemingly altruistic behavior by autocracies in order to obtain benefits
seems to be a hallmark of the human experience. Van Vugt et al (2005) elaborated on this
notion by observing that “…human societies often reward people for their altruistic
contributions through medals for bravery in wars, statues for political and military leaders,
and awards for nurses and teachers…At the same time, they punish those who fail to consider
the interests of others, for example, public condemnation of cheaters, imprisonment of
criminals, and execution of army deserters in wars (Levine, Moreland, 2002; Van Vugt,
Chang, 2005)” (pg. 3). Acting in a seemingly altruistic manner can bring benefits even if not
successful so long as others are observing the behavior, which can then result in opportunities
being available to those who altruistically provide public goods which wouldn’t otherwise be
present (Van Vugt et al, 2005). For example, experiments have shown that contributors of
public goods obtain greater prestige, status, and are more likely to be selected to act in
leadership roles (Van Vugt et al, 2005), all of which offer ample reasons for states to act as
mediators in order to be these public goods providers.
This is not a solely contemporary phenomenon, but actually has historical precedents.
For example, as far back as the 17th century, King Louis XIV’s diplomats counseled him as to
the prestige and reputational benefits for acting as an honest broker of peace, stability, and soft
power which can be derived from mediating international conflicts (Kamrava, 2011). As
appearances in international politics can be as good as actual substance, successful mediation
may not be necessary in order to foster this image. This can be especially useful in the case of
rivalries and/or costly conflicts, as Melin (2013) noted that “The increased international
pressure and the disputants’ cost-benefit calculus create an appealing climate for state-led
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mediation efforts…Costly conflicts generally attract international interest…The international
spotlight offers a state mediator the opportunity to gain in terms of reputation and influence”
(pg. 86).
3.4 Autocracies and Mediation
As such, one public way that autocracies can seek to improve and sanitize their
global image is to offer to mediate in a conflict between two other states. When autocracies
are subjected to negative international attention, such as criticism for perceived undesirable
behavior, are experiencing sanctions, and/or are being censured by international bodies like
the UN for issues such as human rights, there is an increased need to disrupt the negative
attention and perception of the autocratic states. The presence of such negative international
attention and actions are important, as it indicates that states such as autocracies are beyond
the norms of acceptability propounded by the international community (Krain, 2012).
Sanctioning and negative international attention such as condemnation can badly damage a
state’s reputation with potential military allies, trade partners, donors, and IGOs (such as the
World Bank, for example), as well as indicating that other international actors may
permissibly sanction the state subjected to such scrutiny (Schneider, 2000; Lebovic, Voeten,
2006, 2009; Krain, 2012). Thus, negative global attention and condemnation of a state may
result in real, tangible consequences for that state (Franklin, 2008; Lebovic, Voeten, 2006).
I argue that autocracies offer mediation as a relatively low-cost attempt to generate
international legitimacy to reduce the negative perception that other states have about
autocracies and in some cases, to polish the image of their regime when they are subjected to
international scrutiny, sanctioning, and condemnation. When a state mediator like an autocracy
seemingly altruistically utilizes mediation, it is in line with the foreign policy goals of that
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state (Akpinar, 2015), which could reasonably be assumed to include such factors as seeking
opportunities to obtain foreign aid, investment, an improved reputation when under fire, etc.
According to Van Vugt et al (2007) “To behave altruistically could…bring benefits, even if it
was not reciprocated directly, as long as there were observers…Reputations matter a great
deal…and it might pay off to develop an altruistic reputation because being seen as an altruist
would create opportunities unavailable to non-cooperators” (pg. 8). By mediating, autocracies
benefit by having an opportunity to expand their influence, stable and strategic cooperation
with other states, develop trade with other parties, expand their economic interests, and
accessing resources such as arable land which was previously unavailable to them before their
seemingly altruistic behavior (Melin, 2013; Kamrava, 2011; Sun, Zoubir, 2018; Chaziza,
2018a, 2018b). Through mediation, international pariahs like Muammar Gaddafi have been
brought in from the cold and into the welcome embrace of other states (Peterson, 1999;
Huliaras, 2001). Through mediation, closed autocratic regimes can develop a reputation for
openness as an “honest broker” of international conflicts, increase their level of prestige,
status, and visibility, cultivate a more positive image for themselves both internationally and
domestically, while at the same time serving the regime’s political and economic goals
(Barakat, 2014; Legarda, Hoffmann, 2018; Chaziza, 2018a, 2018b). The decision to offer to
mediate an international conflict can also be related to the very survival of the mediating
state’s regime. Certain characteristics of a potential mediating state may lead to that state
calculating that assuming the role of mediator can help ensure its intactness and security
despite its geopolitical challenges. Giving the example of Qatar, Kamrava observed:
As a small state in a rough neighborhood…Qatari diplomacy, including the country’s
mediation efforts, is informed by a broader survival strategy that is aimed at ensuring the
security of the ruling Al Thanis. Mediation has helped carve out an image of Qatar as a
proactively neutral state in the multiple national and cross-border conflicts raging across
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the Middle East. At the same time, and to reinforce regime security, Qatar seeks to
maintain open lines of communication between disparate disputants in an effort to ensure
that its regional and global opponents remain as few as possible. The substance of the
country’s mediation efforts may be lacking in depth and long-term resilience, but by its
very hyper-activism, Qatar has begun to shape global perceptions of itself as regional
peacemaker, an honest broker, a proponent of mediated peace and reconciliation in a
region long ravaged by war. (pg. 556)
By virtue of being a smaller state with limited options (such as a lack of hard power)
in navigating its numerous challenges, Qatar has been able to leverage its role as a mediator
as a foundation of its policy for national survival. A state such as this can use mediation as a
tool for limiting the amount of global or regional adversaries that they might face otherwise,
thus utilizing it as a potent weapon for combating threats to their survival, with mediation
functioning as a strategy for state protection (Akpinar, 2015).
Thus, although not being as successful in mediation as democracies (Melin, 2013), the
relatively similar level of mediation-related activity by autocracies in international conflict
(Bercovitch, Schneider, 2000) may be explained by the pertinent realpolitik motivations of
these states when they feel that their reputation is under threat. Despite their relative lack of
success in conflict mediation compared to democracies (Melin, 2013), the potentially rich
benefits for autocracies in maintaining international stature and legitimacy that could result
from effectively rolling the dice on successful mediation may greatly outweigh the minimal
costs of failure, thus motivating autocracies to seek an active role in this endeavor when their
regime’s character is being called into question. Croissant and Wurster (2013) note that
compared to democracies, autocracies are “structurally disadvantaged…in providing
legitimacy” (pg. 7), since traditional sources of autocratic legitimacy (personal charisma,
ideology, and tradition) are seen as weak and scarce compared to democratic legitimacy
(Cassani, 2017).
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Given the critical importance afforded to international reputation by states (Mercer,
1997; Guisinger, Smith, 2002; Crescenzi, 2007; Clare, Danilovic, 2012), criticism,
sanctioning, scrutiny, and condemnation on the international stage may potentially threaten
an autocratic regime’s survival (with survival being the main filtering mechanism which
autocrats utilize in crafting foreign policy, pursuing external support to prop up their regimes)
(Shulman, 2008). Damage to an autocracy’s reputation undermines its credibility (Press,
2001) and can lead other states to believe that they can coerce autocracies to make substantial
political concessions that would not have been made otherwise (Weisiger, Yarhi-Milo, 2015);
while maintaining a good reputation can lead to material and immaterial benefits and may be
perceived as a desirable sign of leadership (Van Vugt et al, 2007; Carnegie, Dolan, 2015).
Mediation therefore can act as a way of countering negative international scrutiny,
sanctioning, and condemnation by providing a global public good.
The nature of the benefits of the aforementioned global public goods are that they
don’t limit themselves to any particular generation of people (present or future), aren’t biased
based on any demographic or population group, and extend to greater than one group of
states (Kaul et al, 1999). This is particularly true of peace, as Hamburg and Holl (1999) note
that “…peace benefits all, much like the public good of law and order at the national
level…Where peace and security prevail, everyone can enjoy the fact that there is no war or
threat of it, international travel and trade are unimpeded, people can go about their
work…everyone everywhere can enjoy the benefits of peace, the enjoyment of one not
detracting from that of another” (pg. 388). Using the example of successful territorial dispute
resolution by autocracies, Wiegand (2019) observed that “On a macro level, public
goods…include the reduced likelihood of future conflict (Gibler, 2007; Owsiak, 2012),
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increased likelihood of rivalry terminations (Owsiak, Rider, 2013),…improved economic
relationships with neighboring states (Simmons, 2005), and international legal recognition of
borders that reduces uncertainty and, therefore, future conflict (Simmons, 2005; Carter,
Goemans, 2011, 2014)” (pg. 5).
As previously mentioned, since autocracies tend to use repression as one of the main
instruments for maintaining power (Escriba-Folch, 2013), this can give them a poor
international image by other actors on matters such as civil liberties and human rights (which
can open them up to international criticism and sanctioning by actors such as the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights as well as other states and groups around the world);
this may be countered by an autocracy if they contribute to collective global public goods,
such as peacekeeping operations and, theoretically, conflict mediation. For example, many
analysts believe that the reason that China contributed peacekeepers to the UNTAC mission
in Cambodia from 1992-1993 was that China was seeking to improve its international
reputation after suffering large-scale international condemnation following its brutal
crackdown on protesters in Tiananmen Square in 1989, as well as its previous support for the
genocidal Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia (Hirono, 2011). In the words of Mendez
(1999) “…the maintenance of global peace…is the quintessential global public good, in both
substance and form,” and by providing peacekeepers to the UNTAC mission, autocratic
China was able to put itself in the position of a provider of this good (pg. 404). According to
Lebovic and Voeten (2006), “Because countries that contribute toward collective goods
within the [international] community seem to receive more favorable treatment than
countries that shirk their responsibilities, it appears that ‘good citizenship’ or at least a ‘good
reputation’ matters within the international community…States…might also acquire
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reputations as reliable coalition partners, which could make them less inviting targets for
condemnation” (pg. 885). This leads me to my first hypothesis:

o Hypothesis 1: When autocracies are subject to international scrutiny,
sanctioning, and/or condemnation, it is more likely that they will offer to
mediate international conflicts.

3.5 Variations in Autocratic Regime Types
In the second part of my theory, I examine the role of different autocratic regime types
to assess whether specific regime types may influence mediation by autocracies. In order to
elucidate the similarities and differences of different manners of autocratic regimes, four of
the main autocratic regime types (autocratic party machines, military regimes, personalist
regimes, and monarchies) will be analyzed one by one. The basis for the division of these
groups is founded primarily on the rules that delineate leadership groups and how these
groups represent specific interests in the making of policy decisions, the number of political
actors involved, which societal actors form the leader’s support basis, who exercises influence
over policymaking, who determines access to high office, the limited amount of political
pluralism that exists, as well who controls the security apparatus (Geddes et al, 2014; Mattes,
Rodriguez, 2014; Davenport, 2007).
It may be expected that leaders of autocracies function in a totally unconstrained
environment, able to indulge their whims as a matter of state practice. However, even leaders
of authoritarian regimes don’t function in a totally unconstrained environment (Moore, 1966;
Geddes, 1999; Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003; Horowitz et al, 2005), but instead inhabit a
spectrum of different autocratic institutional arrangements and regimes (Geddes, 2003;
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Gandhi, Przeworski, 2006, 2007; Gandhi, 2008; Weeks, 2008; Svolik, 2009; Conrad et al,
2014). In fact, there are not only different types of autocratic regimes but sub-types as well,
ranging from autocratic party “machines” to personalist dictatorships, traditional monarchies
to military junta regimes (Burnell, 2010). To clarify, a regime can be commonly characterized
as the informal or formal organization at the heart of political power (and its connections with
society at large) which decides who can access power politically, as well as the way in which
those in power deal with those who do not possess it (Lawson, 1993). When referring to a
regime type, this regards the formal structures, principles, and norms that govern how political
leaders come to power and the institutional setups that affect their ability to choose and
carryout policies (Hagan, 2010). In this sense, regimes can be seen as the different types of
political systems found amongst states in the global system (Siaroff, 2011). Regime types
themselves have been posited to be a function of multiple characteristics, namely the degree of
governmental functions, the different types of political participation, the manner in which
authority is regarded, the decision-making latitude and the independence and characteristics of
executive policymaking, the type of political opposition and competition, as well as the
method for selecting the executive (Gurr, 1974; Maoz, Abdolali, 1989). In the autocratic
context, regimes can be further understood as basic formal and informal rules that delineate
which interests are represented in the autocratic leadership group and if these interests can
impose constraints on the dictator, with these interests in turn holding some degree of sway
over an autocratic leader’s elevation to power as well as their policy choices and actions
(Geddes et al, 2014). Far from being a one-size-fits-all regime type, the differences amongst
autocratic regimes may be as significant as the differences between democracies and some
autocracies (Weeks, 2014).
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There are three primary variables which differentiate an autocracy from their
democratic counterparts. These involve the degree of organized and open participation
politically, such as by utilizing established political parties, the amount of constraints
institutionally on executive power, and the occurrence of public elections of the executive
(Hagan, 2010). In different autocracies, there is a spectrum of these variables playing out
across regime types. An autocracy can be understood as a political system where a small group
or person has power with little constraints, and without real participation by the general public
or actual political competition (Frieden et al, 2016). Compared to democracies, pivotal power
and support for the regime in autocracies is derived from a much more limited constituent set
of stakeholders, which can include the military, business interests, bureaucrats, and politically
active religious groups (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, 1995; Levy, 1998).
Beginning in the mid-2000s, researchers noticed an increased trend of state
“autocratization,” with less than a quarter of leadership changes in autocratic regimes resulting
in subsequent democratization, and half of all regime changes being a transition from one
autocracy to another (Cassani, Tomini, 2019; Geddes et al, 2014). There is tremendous
variation in the demographics and characteristics amongst autocracies. According to Burnell
(2006):
…autocracies…show much diversity in the following: demographic size; territorial size;
geographical location; size of economy; average income per capita; recent economic
performance (growth rate); socioeconomic inequality; culture (including religion);
military capability and general state strength or weakness (autocracies may all claim
‘despotic power’—the power to control and suppress through coercive means—but they
differ considerably in their ‘infrastructural power’, that is the power to penetrate and
transform society, and the capacity to promote modernization and development)…They
vary too in respect of the state’s patronage resources…and in their record of addressing
society’s material wants and other needs…also…how integrated they are into the global
trading system and their openness to foreign private capital flows, in their interaction
with peoples from…democracies through international communications, foreign
travel…and in the state of diplomatic relations with other countries…autocracies differ
also in regard to how much domestic legitimacy they enjoy…and, just as
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important…how they legitimate their rule. (pgs. 547-548)
As such, autocracies are hardly monolithic in their national aspects. Weeks (2014)
elaborates by noting that among autocracies there are states “…with massive economic and
military power, such as China and Russia; countries with important natural resources, such as
Iran and some Arab nations; and economically fragile countries that have nonetheless
managed to develop potent weapons, such as North Korea” (pgs. 2-3). The trend towards
autocratization amongst states is an increasingly salient phenomenon politically, particularly
in the post- communist states, Asia, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa (Cassani, Tomini,
2019). There has been speculation academically that underlying conditions of certain social
groups and societies lead them to be more receptive to autocratic regimes (such as lawlessness
and a lack of security), or that indigenous cultural values and beliefs can predispose societies
to accept authoritarian regimes in their country (Burnell, 2010). The apparent surge in
autocracies globally raises the specter of a rising set of autocracies not only tightening their
grip domestically in their own countries, but also garnering influence through their
international relations over other states (Burnell, 2010). Further, compared to past autocracies,
today’s autocratic regimes are far sturdier. For example, from the end of the Second World
War through the winding down of the Cold War in 1989, the average length of authoritarian
regimes was twelve years, while post-Cold War this number increased to an average of twenty
years (Kendall-Taylor, Frantz, 2014), with less than a quarter of autocratic leadership changes
seeing democratization as the result (Geddes et al, 2014). It has been postulated that the
transparency associated with democracies, including the possession of a free press, creates
greater credibility for democracies’ foreign policy actions (such as cooperating with other
states), and greater audience costs for foreign policy failures (Fearon, 1994; Downs, Rocke,
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1995; Smith, 1996; Van Belle, 1997; Schultz, 1998). However, many autocratic regimes face
similar curbs as democratic leaders (Marin, 2015; Frantz, 2007). In order for autocratic states
to credibly commit to cooperation and collaboration with other states, the generation of
audience costs in particular is important for autocracies to be taken seriously. According to
Conrad et al (2014):
…the generation of audience costs requires that a domestic political audience has the
means and incentives to coordinate to punish the leader. Second, domestic actors must
view backing down…as worse than conceding…Third, outsiders must be able to observe
the possibility of domestic sanctions for backing down…the institutions in
nondemocratic states vary greatly with respect to these three criteria, and therefore, in
their ability to generate audience costs. (pg. 543)
Although it has been thought that autocracies do not suffer the degree of audience costs
which leaders of democratic regimes do, this has been found to be an oversimplification.
Weeks (2008) observed that “While the small groups of supporters in autocratic regimes differ
from the more inclusive audiences that can punish democratic leaders, autocratic elites can
nevertheless visibly remove incumbents when elites have incentives to coordinate to punish
the leader…” (pg. 36). Kendall-Taylor and Frantz (2014) observed that unlike other
autocracies, autocratic “…regimes that…control by altering democratic processes often still
seek to portray themselves as ‘democrats,’ making them likely to be more vulnerable to
international and domestic criticism that highlights the inconsistency between their behaviors
and democratic norms” (pg. 81). In regimes where the leader has direct control over the
intelligence and security organs of the autocracy (such as in a personalist dictatorship) as
opposed to collective control by a political party, mounting a challenge to the incumbent can
prove very difficult because of the ability of the leader to monitor and repress any challengers
(Weeks, 2008). On the other hand, in some autocracies, “regime insiders” can have the
capability of punishing the autocratic leader (Wiegand, 2019). The presence of audience costs

52

holds sway over the ability of autocratic leaders to broadcast resolve and commitment to other
states (Weeks, 2008; Marin, 2015). Typically, autocratic leaders need the support of domestic
elites who, in a very similar way as voting publics in democracies, act as audiences (Weeks,
2008). The important question in the generation of credibility internationally (and thus whether
an autocracy is seen as a desirable partner in cooperative and collaborative endeavors with
other states) is if domestic elites have the ability and willingness to coordinate with each other
to punish the leader (which varies across autocratic regime types), leading the leaders to
hypothetically select the foreign policy that will make their winning coalitions happy (Weeks,
2008; Shulman, 2008). Further, the stability of an autocratic regime is vital for other states to
observe alterations in the structure of the leadership, which then can create a situation where
an autocracy can gain credibility (Weeks, 2008). These scenarios are reminiscent of
democratic countries, and conversely autocracies that more closely resemble democracies
(particularly in the realm of policy flexibility, transparency, and leader accountability) have
been found to be more successful in international cooperation than personalist autocracies of
either the civilian or military type (Mattes, Rodriguez, 2014).
According to Mattes and Rodriguez (2014):
…because their leaders are most likely to be held accountable by ruling elites, decision
making is relatively constrained, and they are potentially more open to outsiders, singleparty regimes should have a cooperation advantage among autocracies. Elites in military
regimes are also in a position to hold leaders accountable and check their policymaking,
so, while these regimes appear to be considerably less transparent, we also expect them
to do relatively well at international cooperation. Personalist dictatorships, on the other
hand, should not be popular cooperation partners…the fact that leaders are unlikely to
be held accountable for bad decisions and that policies can be changed on a whim should
deter prospective partners. (pg. 536)
As such, there is considerable variation across autocratic regime types as to their
ability to have convivial, cooperative, and collaborative relations with other states. Whereas
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states that have democratic characteristics (such as party machines) have been found to be
less conflictual and to cooperate to a significant degree internationally (Leeds, Davis, 1999),
the combination of a lack of constraint, the dearth of leader accountability, and personal
quirks lead personalist leaders to gamble to a greater extent on foreign policy when compared
to other autocratic or democratic leaders (Weeks, 2014; Mattes, Rodriguez, 2014).
In addition, autocracies with large winning coalitions that resemble democracies
(such as party machines) have been found to contribute to cooperative activities such as
peacefully ending conflicts and providing public goods more often than other autocratic
regime types with smaller winning coalitions (like personalist dictators). According to
Wiegand (2019), “…authoritarian regimes with larger winning coalitions, and therefore
broader domestic mobilization opportunities and accountability, have greater incentives and
ability to provide public goods and…pursue dispute resolution…Not only has it been
demonstrated that single- party regimes are the regime type most similar to
democracies…but…they are most likely to pursue peaceful resolution and the most likely to
pursue legally binding methods” (pg. 17). This in all likelihood makes them more attractive
for cooperative endeavors such as international conflict mediation, as well as more effective
at successfully carrying mediation out. Given that autocratic mediation does occur
frequently, not all authoritarian regimes may be equally likely to offer to mediate or to bring
it to a successful conclusion. For example, personalist autocracies or monarchies may not be
the best equipped or naturally dispositioned to peaceful conflict mediation, and even the
personal aspect of mediation by these types of regimes can be a downside in of itself. A
pertinent example of this is the case of Qatar, which has mediated a number of both
international and civil conflicts. However, a downside is that much of the mediation has
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been centered around the personality of the Emir, as opposed to a professional diplomatic
corps that is better suited for following through with mediation implementation on the
ground (Kamrava, 2011).
As such, it may be that autocrats like personalists or monarchs are not the most prolific
in offering to mediate international conflict. It may instead be autocratic party-based regimes,
where there is the presence of a strong domestic audience and selectorate made up primarily of
civilian regime insiders with a broader range of policy options, political points of view, as well
as experiences, and who don’t instinctively prefer other solutions over diplomacy (Weeks,
2014; Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, 2014). This is opposed to military regimes or bosses/strongmen
who rely primarily on the military, and who may be socialized to military solutions (Sagan,
2003; Walt, 1987; Lai, Slater, 2006). Leaders of regimes with larger winning coalitions, such
as autocracies which are more similar to democracies than other autocracies (Bueno de
Mesquita et al, 1999; Weeks, 2014), need to produce successful policy results, such as the
preservation of their state’s reputation or to otherwise further its national objectives.
3.5.1 Party-Based Autocracies
Although declining in number somewhat after the end of the Cold War, political
party- based autocratic “machines” (such as the Soviet Union or China) have been some of
the most common autocracies in the post-World War Two period (Geddes et al, 2014), as
they seem to possess an institutional makeup which leads them to be resilient to challenges to
their authority (Marin, 2015). In these regimes, there is only one legitimate party in politics
which has strong control over society, or occasionally multiple minor political parties that are
under the thumb of the dominant political party in the autocracy (Davenport, 2007; Wiegand,
2019). These party- based machine regimes can be understood as autocracies where the party
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has some degree of constraint and influence over the leader regarding policy, possesses
functioning local-level organizations, adopts some of the facades of democracy, and controls
the majority of access to government jobs and political power (Peceny et al, 2002). In
addition, they frequently possess a coherent ideology such as communism (Shulman, 2008).
Some of the limited restraints in these types of autocracies can include the legislature
blocking the implementation of some executive decrees, approving some types of executivenominated appointments, and initiating some legislation, as well as the failure of the
executive in changing constitutional restrictions to their authority, the presence of an
independent or semi-independent judiciary, and the ruling party performing some
administrative functions independently of the executive (Shulman, 2008).
Single-party autocracies appear to be the most peaceful autocracies. Personalist
dictatorships and military regimes have been found to be more likely to initiate militarized
interstate disputes than single-party autocracies (Weeks, 2014). Further, since autocratic
“machines” seem to be more closely similar to democracies than other autocracies (Weeks,
2014), it stands to reason that aspects of democracies which lead to them peacefully ending
conflicts such as offering to mediate more often could also be applied to party-based
autocracies (Melin, 2013). Single-party autocracies also experience less civil war than do
military regimes and multi-party autocracies, in part due to their fully controlled party
institutions which can monitor, co-opt, and coerce opponents without stifling political action
too much (like military juntas) or lacking effective institutions (like monarchists and
personalists) (Fjelde, 2010). Oftentimes challengers in autocratic “machine” are co-opted via
seemingly democratic institutions and political parties, which serve the double purpose of both
being a means for channeling perks and influence to co-opted challengers (causing them to
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have a vested interest in the longevity of the regime), as well as identifying who they are for
the regime to see.
One important reason autocracies use pseudo-democratic institutions is the hope that
they confer an aura of domestic and international legitimacy. For an autocracy, the obtainment
and conservation of legitimacy can be a struggle compared to the popular mandate which is
bestowed on democracies via their institutional practices. It has been postulated that the
transparency associated with democracies, including the possession of a free press, creates
greater credibility for democracies’ foreign policy actions, such as cooperating with other
states or mediating conflicts, and greater audience costs for foreign policy failures (Fearon,
1994; Downs, Rocke, 1995; Smith, 1996; Van Belle, 1997; Schultz, 1998). For example,
Crescenzi et al (2011) states that “…transparency and oversight of democratic political
systems disciplines democratic mediators to remain honest, which means…democratic
mediators become an attractive option for conflict resolution and can successfully help the
parties reach a peaceful settlement” (pg. 1075). These characteristics for successful mediation
possessed by democracies may also carry over into the behavior of autocracies that closely
resemble them, i.e. non-personalist autocratic “machines” (Weeks, 2014). It is notable that
autocratic regimes can face similar curbs as democratic leaders (Marin, 2015; Frantz, 2007),
particularly party-machine types. In order for autocratic states to credibly commit to
cooperation and collaboration with other states, the generation of audience costs in particular
is important for autocracies to be taken seriously, and has thought to take place more often in
party-based machine type autocracies (Weeks, 2008; Marin, 2015). Typically, autocratic
leaders need the support of domestic elites who, in a very similar way as voting publics in
democracies, act as audiences (Weeks, 2008). The important
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question in the generation of credibility internationally (and thus whether an autocracy is seen
as a desirable partner in cooperative and collaborative endeavors with other states) is if
domestic elites have the ability and willingness to coordinate with each other to punish the
leader (which varies across autocratic regime types), leading the leaders to hypothetically
select the foreign policy that will make their winning coalitions happy (Weeks, 2008;
Shulman, 2008). Further, the stability of an autocratic regime is vital for other states to
observe alterations in the structure of the leadership, which then can create a situation where
an autocracy can gain credibility (Weeks, 2008). These scenarios are reminiscent of
democratic countries, and conversely autocracies that more closely resemble democracies
(particularly in the realm of policy flexibility, transparency, and leader accountability like
party-machine autocracies) have been found to be more successful in international cooperation
than personalist autocracies of either the civilian or military type (Mattes, Rodriguez, 2014).
According to Mattes and Rodriguez (2014):
…because their leaders are most likely to be held accountable by ruling elites, decision
making is relatively constrained, and they are potentially more open to outsiders, singleparty regimes should have a cooperation advantage among autocracies. Elites in military
regimes are also in a position to hold leaders accountable and check their policymaking,
so, while these regimes appear to be considerably less transparent, we also expect them
to do relatively well at international cooperation. Personalist dictatorships, on the other
hand, should not be popular cooperation partners…the fact that leaders are unlikely to
be held accountable for bad decisions and that policies can be changed on a whim should
deter prospective partners. (pg. 536)
In addition, autocracies with large winning coalitions that resemble democracies such
as party-based autocracies (Wiegand, 2019) have been found to contribute to cooperative
activities such as peacefully ending conflicts and providing public goods more often than
other autocratic regime types with smaller winning coalitions (like personalist dictators).
Interestingly, the pressure to escape the highlighting of inconsistencies with democratic
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norms may result in “machines” volunteering most often and putting in the greatest effort
(resulting in greater effectiveness) to provide global public goods relative to other autocratic
regime-types. According to Wiegand (2019), “…authoritarian regimes with larger winning
coalitions, and therefore broader domestic mobilization opportunities and accountability,
have greater incentives and ability to provide public goods and…pursue dispute
resolution…Not only has it been demonstrated that single- party regimes are the regime type
most similar to democracies…but…they are most likely to pursue peaceful resolution and the
most likely to pursue legally binding methods” (pg. 17). This in all likelihood makes them
more attractive for cooperative endeavors such as international conflict mediation, as well as
more effective at successfully carrying mediation out.
Differentiating themselves from other types of autocracies like personalist
dictatorships, party-based autocracies have a hierarchical structure where political elites
aren’t personally bound to the leader of the autocracy (enabling them to be able to act to
remove the leader from power without fear of losing their job), and where regime insiders and
leaders rise up through the ranks based on seniority and merit as opposed to family or
otherwise personal relationships with the autocratic leader (Conrad et al, 2014; Weeks, 2008,
2014). Hypothetically, this leads the leaders of party-machine autocracies to get rid of
policies that don’t satisfy the interest of the party (Shulman, 2008). In this type of autocratic
regime, domestic institutions aren’t necessarily “rubber-stamp” organizations, the party
regularly holds intraparty elections competitively for certain positions, regime insiders and
factions may coalesce around specific policy issues and competition for important jobs
(Weeks, 2008; Davenport, 2007). In addition, because they attempt to parrot democracies,
this can cause party-based autocracies to be vulnerable to pressure to live up to their
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supposedly democratic image. Kendall-Taylor and Frantz (2014) observed that unlike other
autocratic regimes, autocracies which utilize pseudo-democratic institutions “…often still
seek to portray themselves as ‘democrats,’ making them likely to be more vulnerable to
international and domestic criticism that highlights the inconsistency between their behaviors
and democratic norms” (pg. 81). The pressure to escape the highlighting of inconsistencies
with democratic norms may result in party-based autocracies offering most often to mediate
international conflicts, as compared to other types of autocracies. Further, Melin (2013)
observed that the offering of mediation is “…more likely when democracies are involved, as
these states are accustomed to third-party involvement in conflict and garner other states’
trust, making them a more attractive option for conflict resolution…Mediation is therefore
best encouraged when democracies are involved as…mediators” (pgs. 84-85). Evidently,
autocratic “machines” are more closely similar to democracies than other autocracies (Weeks,
2014), so it stands to reason that aspects of democracies which lead to them offering to
mediate more often to mediate could also be applied to autocratic “machines” (Melin, 2013).
It is postulated that the transparency associated with democracies, including the possession of
a free press, creates greater credibility for democracies’ foreign policy actions and greater
audience costs for foreign policy failure (Fearon, 1994; Downs, Rocke, 1995; Smith, 1996;
Van Belle, 1997; Schultz, 1998). In addition, Crescenzi et al (2011) states that
“…transparency and oversight of democratic political systems disciplines democratic
mediators to remain honest, which means…democratic mediators become an attractive option
for conflict resolution and can successfully help the parties reach a peaceful settlement” (pg.
1075). These characteristics for successful mediation possessed by democracies may also
carry over into the behavior of autocracies that closely resemble them, i.e. non-personalist
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autocratic “machines” (Weeks, 2014).

o Hypothesis 2: Party-based autocracies will be most likely to offer to mediate
international conflicts when being sanctioned or condemned relative to the other
types of autocracies

3.5.2 Military Regimes
This type of autocratic regime has several important differences with party-machines,
but also some similarities which may lead to them offering to mediate (and to be successful at
it) relatively often. Although there is less of a winning coalition for junta leaders than
autocratic “machines,” they still have a larger winning coalition of officers and officials to
please than monarchies or personalist autocracies. Political leaders with larger winning
coalitions need to produce successful policy and to protect the national interest to stay in
power (Bueno de Mesquita et al, 1999). This characteristic of juntas may lead to their leaders
being more sensitive than some other types of autocracies (such as personalists or monarchs,
but not party-based autocracies that have a large winning coalition) to criticism and a
disgraced national image, pressuring them to produce public goods more often than these
other autocratic regime-types as a means of producing “output legitimacy” for their regime
both at home and globally (Burnell, 2010).
Further, because military juntas have collegial structures that are hierarchical and
observable to an international audience (and where individuals in the elite won’t necessarily
discover their careers to be in tatters if the junta leadership falls from power) military
regimes have some ability to create audience costs that bear a degree of similarity to that
possessed by more democratic regimes (Weeks, 2008). According to Weeks (2008):
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Military regimes…are ‘governed by an officer or retired officer, with the support of the
military establishment and some routine mechanism by which high-level officers could
influence policy choice and appointments.’ Mechanisms for leadership transfer typically
involve juntas or military councils of officers. Furthermore, the military hierarchy is
preserved and the army stays under the control of the military rather than the leader.
Countries are…military regimes if ‘merit and seniority [are] the main basis for
promotion, rather than loyalty or ascriptive characteristics’ and if the leader has ‘refrained
from having dissenting officers murdered or imprisoned.’ Moreover, because most elites
in military regimes are not personally connected to the incumbent, they can expect to stay
in power if the leader falls…in stable military regimes, these facts are observable to
foreigners. (pg. 46)
This may allow military regimes to be more effective at cooperative activities (such as
mediation) relative to personalist dictatorships or monarchies, but still not as much as
autocratic “machines” which are much more similar to democracies than other autocratic
regime-types (Weeks, 2014).
Military regimes typically lack political parties and institutions through which the
populace’s political energies can be funneled and controlled. They are also thought to have
a comparative advantage over other autocracies when it comes to coercive force (due to the
military’s expertise with the mechanisms of violence), are more likely to be repressive in
the violation of personal integrity rights (such as torture and mass killing), and are likely to
put an extra premium on internal order (Fjelde, 2010; Nordlinger, 1977; Davenport, 2007).
As such, military regimes are often obsessed with domestic security.
Direct military control involves technocratic and apolitical military officers making
direct decisions regarding their state’s foreign and domestic policies and where decisions must
be approved by at least a portion of the officer corps (with leaders ruling out policy options
that don’t please the ruling junta) (Peceny et al, 2002; Mattes, Rodriguez, 2014; Shulman,
2008), whereas indirect military rule refers to autocratic regimes where formal political leaders
are selected through elections which are competitive, but the military retains control over key
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policy choices and/or prevents political parties that could attract significant numbers of the
electorate from politically participating (Geddes et al, 2014).
In the case of military regimes, there is a smaller group of supporters that excludes
most of the domestic population as compared to autocratic machines (Wiegand, 2019). This
can create a legitimacy challenge for military regimes. However, military regimes can
rummage up a degree of legitimacy by providing robust economic performance, domestic and
global public goods, and by furnishing political stability, although there is the danger of
divisions between officers which can make them vulnerable to challengers coming from
within the ruling elite (Lai, Slater, 2006). Because they lack an ideology, military regimes
struggle to justify their long term rule in the absence of peace, prosperity, and the achievement
of other policy success. Because they lack an ideology, military regimes struggle to justify
their long term rule in the absence of achieving national goals (such as the preservation of
reputation as well as the pursuit of other strategic objectives and benefits), and due to a lack of
institutional infrastructure they are not as capable as other autocracies in securing elite
cohesion and deflecting popular dissent through co-optation. Further, although there is less of
a winning coalition for junta leaders than autocratic “machines,” they still have a larger
winning coalition of officers and officials to please than monarchies or personalist autocracies.
As mentioned, political leaders with larger winning coalitions need to produce successful
policy and to protect the national interest to stay in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al, 1999). By
extrapolation, the above-mentioned characteristics of juntas may cause their leaders to be
more sensitive than monarchies or personalists to condemnation and a tarnished national
image, pressuring them to offer to mediate international conflicts more often than those
autocratic regime-types as a means of producing “output legitimacy” for their regime both
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domestically and internationally through the production of global public goods
(Burnell, 2010).

o Hypothesis 3: Military juntas will be less likely to offer to mediate international
conflicts when being sanctioned or condemned relative to party-based autocracies

3.5.3 Monarchies
Although they share some characteristics with other autocratic regime types
depending on their configuration, monarchies are unique in that they rely heavily on a lengthy
pedigree of tradition immemorial. A monarchy can be understood as a political system in
which sovereignty is vested in an individual (such as a sultan or a queen) who is empowered
by custom and/or law to remain in power for life, and can be regarded as a kind of autocracy
with customary and/or legal foundations (Tullock, 1987; Kokkonen, Sundel, 2014).
Concerning the level of plurality and democratic characteristics found in monarchies, these
autocracies normally possess the lowest polity scores of all the autocratic regime types
(Geddes et al, 2014). Amongst monarchies, it is widely speculated that the important
determinant of whether the monarch can be considered accountable is whether they reign on
their own or with help from the extended royal family, or in other words whether the
monarchy is dynastic or non-dynastic. Monarchies are seemingly well protected from
challenges to their authority via historical tradition for legitimacy both at home and abroad,
leading them to be less sensitive to domestic and international criticism and condemnation.
As such, they may not feel the same degree of pressure to offer to provide domestic and/or
global public goods (such as ensuring peace and mediating international conflicts) that party-
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based autocracies and juntas face, leading to them offering to provide these less than those
types of autocracies, but more so than personalists since it is still possible that individuals of
the royal court or ruling dynasty might invoke punitive measures or depose the monarch for
foreign policy failure and for failing to protect national interests (such as the monarchy’s
level of prestige and/or positive reputation).
Monarchies can be classified as either dynastic or non-dynastic. According to Weeks
(2008), “In dynastic monarchies…members of the family share an interest in maintaining the
continued health of the dynasty, and cooperate to keep the leader in check…The leader does
not control appointments; instead, family members rise to high office through seniority, and
the ‘king or emir cannot dismiss…relatives from their posts at will…the family has the
authority to remove the monarch and replace him with another member of the
dynasty’…Importantly, dynastic monarchies differ from personalist regimes in that although
family members hold high office, they do not hold their position at the whim of the leader
and will retain power and influence even if the leader is removed” (pg. 48). The hierarchical
structure of a dynastic monarchy typically possesses mechanisms to credibly threaten or
remove the reigning monarch, and in this way possess similarities with military or partymachine regimes in that they can generate some audience costs (Weeks, 2008; Conrad et al,
2014). This allows insiders of the monarchy to possess incentives and opportunities to
remove the reigning monarch if they put in danger the prestige or authority of the royal
dynasty (Weeks, 2008), although the removal of still living monarchs is rare with the royal
family seldom killing, arresting, or overtly punishing them (Geddes et al, 2014).
On the other hand, according to Weeks (2008), non-dynastic monarchies “…tend to
more closely resemble personalist regimes…Although family members…can expect that

65

one of them will inherit the throne, they are excluded from holding important posts in the
regime…Rather, the king can promote loyal followers to high positions, similar to his
personalist counterparts…Moreover, leaders of nondynastic regimes…have ‘solid control
over the state and its coercive apparatus…’” (pg. 48). In this way, the characteristics of
nondynastic monarchies function through the consolidation of power (Conrad et al, 2014).
In this way, nondynastic monarchs possess a large degree of unlimited authority to rule by
decree and to ignore or suspend any inconvenient legislature or constitution which could
restrain them (Shulman, 2008). That being said, members of the court or the royal family
who conceivably have a claim to power can still credibly threaten or remove the reigning
monarch, and in this manner there exists similarities to other regime types in that they can
generate a degree of audience costs.
Although monarchies often possess a substantial degree of historical and/or religious
authority (endowing them with a traditional sense of legitimacy), they often reign without
political institutions which can monitor and control opposition from the populace, thus
meaning they lack the infrastructural advantage of a broadly based political party to both
identify subversive elements and to monitor societal groups and organizations (Fjelde,
2010). Monarchies are relatively insulated from challenges to their credibility and other
criticisms by relying on tradition for domestic and international legitimacy, leading them to
be less sensitive to international and domestic criticism and condemnation. Thus, they may
not feel the same pressures to offer to mediate international conflicts that “machines” and
juntas face, leading to them offering to mediate less than those regime-types but more than
personalists since it is still feasible that members of the ruling family or court might punish
or remove the monarch for foreign policy failure and for failing to protect national interests

66

(like a positive reputation or access to other benefits).

o

Hypothesis 4: Monarchies will be less likely to offer to mediate international conflicts
when being sanctioned or condemned relative to military juntas

3.5.4 Personalists
This is one of the more common autocratic regime types found in both the past and the
present. Post-Second World War, the proportion of personalist autocracies steadily increased
to the point where they now rival party-machines as the most frequent form of autocracy
(Geddes et al, 2014). Leaders of personalist autocracies (such as Saddam Hussein in Iraq or
Colonel Qadhafi in Libya) don’t possess influential domestic audiences to be concerned about
for their support or for fear of punishment, and they typically have a very limited winning
coalition of fiercely loyal and close cronies and family members who have everything to lose
if the personalist leader falls from power (Weeks, 2014; Wiegand, 2019; Mattes, Rodriguez,
2014; Geddes et al, 2014). This allows personalist leaders to be insulated from negative
consequences that result from their policy choices. For personalists, seemingly important
national objectives such as the state’s reputation and legitimacy are fundamentally beneath the
interests of the dictator, such as channeling perks to their very limited selectorate or
weakening state institutions which could pose a threat to the regime. As a result, personalist
leaders will dismiss policies which stand to endanger their hold on political power as opposed
to a collegial decision making approach or one that favors the political party over the leader
(Shulman, 2008).
Since their winning coalition is so limited, the political and literal survival of
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personalist dictators is founded not as much on successful domestic and foreign policy and the
promotion of the national interest as opposed to the rewarding of their inner circle. This
results in a low likelihood of the dictator suffering punitive measures or usurpation by their
very small selectorate, who owe their jobs and power to the individual whim of the personalist
dictator, for bad leadership or a lack of effective national administration (Weeks, 2008). As
such, because they are insulated in this way from both domestic and/or international criticism
and challenges to their legitimacy, personalist dictators may be least likely to offer to produce
global public goods such as conflict mediation than party-based autocracies, military juntas,
and monarchies since they will experience the least pressure to protect their state’s reputation
by, for example, responding to international punishment and/or scrutiny as long as they keep
their inner circle happy by hook or by crook. In addition, because of the often intentional
absence of merit-based officials, bureaucrats, and diplomats (as well as the ability of the
international community to see that personalist dictators are subject to few consequences for
foreign policy failures and abrupt changes to state policies and actions) personalist autocracies
should be least likely to successfully cooperate with other states or to care about providing
global public goods.
Personalists come closest to the characterization of an unrestrained autocratic leader
whose whims and impulses are as good as law. Personalists (in order to remove threats)
generally weaken their armed forces to stay in office and are thus constrained from foreign
wars (Peceny et al, 2002). As such, they enjoy relatively unlimited authority relative to other
autocratic regime types. For example, there are no regular constraints on the executive’s
actions (such that if there is even a constitution that it can be easily suspended or ignored), the
executive often rules by personal decree, and the legislature and/or judiciary (if they even
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exist in a meaningful way) can be packed with the executive’s supporters or outright
dismissed (Shulman, 2008). In fact, it has been argued that due to their political isolation,
personalist autocracies are the most repressive of all autocratic regime types and are built in
such a way that the personalist leader and their cronies control access to the political system,
and are the sole movers and shakers of power within the regime; in the absence of this access,
repression can be used to proactively get rid of challengers and control the disbursement of
influence (Davenport, 2007). According to Weeks (2008):
Personalist regimes…most closely reflect the conventional wisdom about nondemocracies: there is no domestic audience that can effectively coordinate to sanction
the leader. This is for two reasons: the leader has the means to punish internal critics,
and the fate of elites is…connected to the leader’s survival in office, reducing incentives
to punish leaders. For example, among the criteria for personalist regimes are whether
the leader ‘personally control[s] the security apparatus’ and whether ‘access to high
office depend[s] on the personal favor of the leader.’ Personalist leaders therefore can
discipline elites much more harshly than leaders of regimes where power is less
concentrated…For elites in personalist regimes, keeping a poor leader in office is more
often preferable to ousting the incumbent…foreign decision makers can observe that
personalist rulers face no consistent threat of punishment. (pgs. 46-47)
It is through their absolute control over their regime that personalists facilitate a
political environment where it is hard for elites to credibly threaten a personalist with
punishment and removal (Conrad et al, 2014). Personalists do have to derive their enforcement
power from some source, however. For example, personalist regimes where the leader
originates from and derives their power via political parties are referred to as “bossist”
regimes, whereas personalists who originate from and rely on the military for enforcement are
known as “strongmen” (such as Qadhafi) (Lai, Slater, 2006). However, the military is often
the biggest threat for personalists who will (as a result) systematically weaken it while creating
multiple overlapping intelligence and security forces to keep watch for any threats. According
to Peceny et al (2002), “…personalist dictatorships…thrive by destroying independent
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institutions, personalizing all politics, and ensuring that important political decisions are
funneled through the one supreme leader…Dictators gain allies through the creation
of…patronage networks…Graft and corruption bind…bureaucrats to the leader rather than to
rational, insulated bureaucracies…Those who cannot be coopted…are purged” (pg. 18).
Because personalists have the final say in the selection of their advisers, they are more likely
to be misinformed about policy but still able to stay in power regardless of policy failures
(Marin, 2015). Further, although personal charisma has provided some degree of legitimacy to
personalist regimes historically, these types of autocracies are often seen as the most
illegitimate amongst autocratic regime types. Cassani (2017) observed that “…the institutional
features that differentiate contemporary authoritarian regimes can have significant
implications for leaders’ efforts to legitimize themselves…” (pg. 354). For personalist
autocracies, the interests of the state such as its reputation and legitimacy are institutionally
subordinate to the interests of the personalist (such as rewarding their small and immediate
selectorate). Because their winning coalition is so small, the survival of personalists is based
less on successful foreign policy and the promotion of the national interest as opposed to the
rewarding of an inner circle of cronies. This leads to a low likelihood of the leader being
punished by other elites (who owe their position to the personal favor of the personalist
dictator) for poor leadership or state stewardship (Weeks, 2008). Since they are less sensitive
to domestic or international challenges and questions to their legitimacy, personalists will be
least likely to offer to mediate international conflicts than the other mentioned autocratic
regime-types since they will feel the least pressure to respond to international criticism or
punitive measures as long as they grease the palms of their small inner circle.
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o Hypothesis 5: Personalist autocracies will be least likely to offer to mediate
international conflicts when being sanctioned or condemned relative to the other
types of autocracies.

71

CHAPTER 4: Methodology
In order to assess my theory and test my hypotheses about why autocratic regimes
and specific regime-types mediate in international conflicts, I conducted both quantitative
and qualitative analyses by using a mixed methods approach. So as to effectively
investigate when autocracies offer to mediate interstate conflicts, the results of the
mediation, as well as which types of autocracies are most likely to offer and be successful
at mediating an end to an international conflict, I utilized Large-N datasets on international
mediation, sanctioning, condemnation, political and economic ties, and regime-types, and
used many qualitative sources from international bodies, nongovernment organizations,
news articles, and state archives.
For the quantitative portion of this dissertation’s analysis of all five of its
hypotheses, I used Probit regression as my primary testing method. I utilized a Probit
regression model because the data was time-series cross-sectional with binary dependent
and independent variables. Further, I also used OLS linear probability models as a
robustness check on direction and significance, due to its unbiasedness and its distinction of
having the least variance among all linear unbiased estimators, its linear properties, its
asymptotic unbiasedness, and its status as a consistent estimator. I also investigated
predicted probabilities for my dissertation’s quantitative analysis, as these show real
likelihood and substantive effects above and beyond what Probit on its own would provide.
So as to obtain the correct estimates and their confidence intervals, I simulated the Probit
model using the “Clarify” program, which King et al (2000) note “…uses Monte Carlo
simulation to convert the raw output of statistical procedures into results that are of direct
interest to researchers, without changing statistical assumptions or requiring new statistical

72

models” (pg. 3). In order to avoid problems with heteroscedasticity of observation, I tested
for robust standard errors as well. Further, instead of creating a figure of 95% CI, I
generated a figure of 84% (which could be equivalent to 95%) when I tested for the
substantive importance of my binary explanatory variable, as Payton et al (2003) found:
If the researcher wishes to use confidence intervals to test hypotheses, it appears
that…using 83% or 84% size for the intervals will give an approximate α = 0.05 test.
Theoretical results for large samples as well as simulation results for a variety of sample
sizes show that using 95% confidence intervals will give very conservative results,
while using standard error intervals will give a test with high type I error rates. (pg. 5)
Qualitatively, I examined three cases of autocracies being motivated to mediate
a conflict after being condemned, negatively portrayed, and/or sanctioned, and were
subsequently rewarded with tangible and/or intangible benefits in order to illustrate the
plausibility of this phenomenon. After analyzing these cases, in order to ground my
theory within the context of existing literature, I examined two cases of autocracies that
did not experience substantial or new condemnation, portrayal, or sanctioning, but still
chose to attempt to mediate (one successfully) international conflicts.
4.1 Autocracies and Mediation Offers
In order to conduct my quantitative analysis, I required a set of conflicts in which
mediation could have been offered by autocracies, and a subset of cases in which mediation
was offered by them (only autocracies are included as mediators/potential mediators for the
sake of my analysis, although in the future this may be broadened to include other regime
types. In order to satisfy these requirements, I used the Bercovitch International Conflict
Management (ICM) Dataset (Bercovitch, 2004) on international conflicts and conflict
mediation from 1945 to 2000, which is the time period of this study. It contained 116,327
observations. The purpose of this dataset is to provide a comprehensive, chronological
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account of international conflict, and to elucidate knowledge of its management and
occurrence. My unit of analysis was a potential mediator for each year of a dyadic conflict.
For my first hypothesis, my dependent variable was the dichotomous variables Mediation
Offer. If mediation was offered for an international conflict during any calendar year in the
dataset, the dependent variable is coded as 1 (and 0 if not). In determining how to measure
international condemnation, the independent variables take into account both material interests
and symbolism. Beginning with mediation offers provided the best initial steps for an extended
elaboration on my theory, as it functions to eliminate potential selection bias that might arise.
For my independent variables, I used tangible and nontangible measures. My
tangible measure was economic sanctions, and was the dichotomous variable labeled
Sanctions. Burnell (2006) noted that for autocracies “…international legal recognition and
support, whether material and/or symbolic—that is to say external legitimation—are very
valuable to the manufacture of legitimacy…a regime’s main claim to legitimacy can shift
over time, adjusting to…changes in the international environment” (pg. 549). If sanctions
were levied and/or threatened during any calendar year in the dataset on a mediating state
or potential mediating state, this independent variable was coded as 1 (and 0 if not). The
data for these sanctions were derived from the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES)
Dataset 4.0 (Morgan et al, 2013) which covers sanctioning cases from 1945-2005, which I
then merged with the Bercovitch International Conflict Dataset. According to the TIES
Dataset, by definition a sanction must involve at least one sender state and a target state,
and be implemented by the sender in order to alter the actions of the target state. In
addition to the material manifestation of condemnation embodied by sanctions, there is
heavy international symbolism attached to the action itself. Peterson (2013, 672) observed
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that “The sending of messages—that is, signaling—has become central to our
understanding of sanctioning behavior…recognizing the logic of sanctions as international
symbolism.”
In order to capture nontangible symbolic international condemnation, I utilized
condemnation of a state by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) as
my second independent variable. This was the dichotomous variable UN Condemnation,
which was coded as 1 if a resolution on a mediating state or potential mediating state’s
human rights record was formally discussed by the UNCHR in a given year, and 0 if not.
Data for this variable was derived from Lebovic and Voeten’s (2006) dataset on targeting
and punishment by the UNCHR from 1977-2001, which was then merged with the
Bercovitch International Conflict Management Dataset (2004) for the analysis.
Because of the limited time frame for the UNCHR variable from 1977-2001, the
data analysis involves two different models – one with sanctions and one with
condemnation. The analysis for sanctions includes the years 1945-2001, while the analysis
for condemnation covers the years 1977-2001. There are 69,273 observations in the
sanctions dataset that examines mediation onset. For the analysis of the effect of
condemnation, there are 41,338 observations in the dataset for mediation onset. In order to
assess the likelihood of offering mediation, both datasets include all states in the
international system that existed in any given year between 1945-2001 or 1977-2001. This
universe of cases allows comparison of autocracies to democracies and other mixed regime
types. The data analysis includes a variable for Sanctions as well as Condemnation, and a
variable for Autocracy (which is coded as such if these regimes possess formal and informal
structures through which the state exercises power in a way which doesn’t reflect the
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sovereignty of its people, and who often have a democratic façade but are not sufficiently
legitimized by the people, including regimes run by the military or traditional military,
family, clan, and tribal-run polities, which are measured as being an autocracy by when they
cross a polity threshold of halfway through the scale reflecting the regime’s possession of
these attributes) (Bercovitch, 2004). These are the variables that are used to test the first
hypothesis. Also, in order to interpret my results, I tested for joint significance.
I also included several control variables which may affect a state’s decision to offer
mediation, which were fixed at their modes. These included Same Polity, which compares
the polity of the mediator with the polities of the parties of the conflict. This variable is
coded 0 if the mediator’s polity is different than the belligerent parties’ polities, 1 if it is the
same as one party, and 2 if it is the same as both parties. Potential mediators might be more
likely to offer their services if they share a government type with one or more of the
conflicting parties due to common political bonds and beliefs. Another control variable
included was Same Region, which indicates if the mediator shares the same geographic
region as one or more of the conflicting parties (these regions being North America, Central
and South America, Africa, South West Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, Middle East, and
Europe). This variable was coded as 0 if the mediator doesn’t share the same region as
either belligerent party, 1 if it shares its region with one party, and 2 if it shares its region
with both parties. States that share their geographic region with one or more of the
conflicting parties may be more motivated to attempt to mediate. A further control variable
included was UN Security Council Member, which indicated if a mediator is a permanent
member of the UN Security Council (UNSC). I included this variable since powerful states
are thought to act as mediators more frequently and with greater success (Crescenzi,
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Kadera, Mitchell, 2011). This variable was coded as 1 if the mediator is a permanent
member of the UNSC, and 0 if not. These control variables were all derived from the
Bercovitch dataset (2004). My last control variable was Previous Relationship, which is
based on previous alliances and/or economic relationships between the conflicting parties
and the potential mediator. This particular control variable was derived from Gibler’s
(2009) International Military Alliances dataset and Kohl et al’s (2013) Trade Agreement
Dataset. This variable was coded as 0 if there was no previous relationship between the
mediator and either belligerent party, 1 if the mediator has a previous relationship with one
of the conflict parties, and 2 if the mediator has a previous relationship with both conflict
parties. Because the data was time-series cross-sectional with binary dependent variables, I
utilized a Probit regression model (as well as OLS for a robustness check). Further, in order
to avoid problems with heteroscedasticity of observation, I tested for robust standard errors.
4.2 Autocratic Regime-Types and Mediation, Offers
For hypotheses 2-5, I continued my quantitative analysis with the previous
dichotomous variable. Again, this was coded 1 if mediation was offered, and 0 if not. I
derived this information from the Bercovitch (2004) conflict dataset. The unit of analysis
for these hypotheses was state year. I merged the Bercovitch (2004) dataset with the
Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2004) dataset covering authoritarian regime types from 19462010. This dataset divides autocracies into four different types of regimes, monarchies,
personalist dictators, party-based autocracies, and military regimes/juntas. The basis for
dividing these groups up as such is based primarily on the rules that delineate leadership
groups, as well as how these groups represent specific interests in the making of decisions
(Geddes et al, 2014). Part of the reasoning for choosing the Geddes et al. (2014) dataset was
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that the specific autocratic regime-types that they identify can be tied directly to specific
levels of regime flexibility, transparency, and accountability, grounded in how these
regimes measure on scores of these concepts and on existing academic work on the
subject (Mattes, Rodrigues, 2014). Via the same line of reasoning, I derived information
for states with less than a million inhabitants which were omitted from the Geddes et al.
(2014) dataset from Magaloni, Chu, and Min’s (2013) dataset on autocracies of the world
from 1950 through 2012, as well as via the CIA World Factbook’s (2021) database. The
data analysis includes a variable for Sanctions as well as Condemnation, and a variable for
Party, Military, Monarchy, and Personalist. These are the variables that are used to test
the final four hypotheses about offers of mediation. Also, so as to interpret my results, I
tested for joint significance. In order to test hypotheses 2-5, I utilized Probit with OLS as a
robustness check for significance and direction, with robust standard errors to analyze the
breakdown of autocratic regime-types. I ran multiple models, one for each regime type and
independent variable, where I coded that regime type as 1, while combining the remaining
three in that variable and coding them as 0. The data analysis included a variable for
Sanctions as well as Condemnation, and the combined interacted variables
Sanctions*Party, Sanctions*Military, Sanctions*Monarchy, Sanctions*Personalist, UN
Condemnation*Party, UN Condemnation*Military, UN Condemnation*Monarchy, and
UN Condemnation*Personalist (with one model for each regime type corresponding to
each interaction term). I used this strategy in order for me to draw a proper comparison
between all of the regime types in order to establish which one is more likely to offer to
mediate relative to the others, and I do this for both sanctions and condemnation. Further, I
included the four control variables from the analysis of my first hypothesis, all of which
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were coded identically.
4.3 Cases of Autocratic Mediation
In order to focus and contextualize my investigation into autocratic mediation, I used a
least-similar case studies approach to explore offers of conflict mediation by an autocracy
when they are being condemned and/or sanctioned, and whether that will lead to increased
rewards in the form of tangible benefits (such as foreign aid, trade, and investment) and
intangible benefits (such as praise, acceptance, avoiding criticism, and the bestowing of
legitimacy) being conferred upon the autocracy. The use of process-tracing in the case
studies approach, a detailed examination of a portion of a historical episode to test historical
explanations that may be generalizable to other events, is appropriate due to its high level of
conceptual validity, as well as its ability to model and explore complex causal relations in
detail in relatively infrequent phenomena (a quality that can be missing from quantitative
analysis) (George, Bennett, 2004; Bennett, Elman, 2007). The use of a least-similar case
studies approach enables one to identify interactions between variables, and helps create a
chronological sequence of events that aids in mapping out the pathways connecting the
dependent variables (offers and successful conflict mediations by an autocracy) to the
independent variable (international condemnation of that autocracy) (Sambanis, 2004).
In order to contextualize my theory, my unit of analysis was the mediator. I utilized
a qualitative least-similar case studies approach in my analysis by studying three cases in
which an autocracy offered to mediate (and in two of them was successful) after being
internationally condemned, and was subsequently rewarded with tangible and/or intangible
benefits. Specifically, I analyzed mediations by the monarchic regime of Qatar, Libya under
the erstwhile personalist military strongman Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, and Communist
Party- dominated China. I selected these cases for variation with the independent variables,
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as well as their geographic, temporal, and autocratic regime-type variations. The countries
involved in these cases come from a variety of areas around the globe, including Africa, the
Middle East, and Asia. The cases occur over the course of decades, exhibiting variation due
to the passage of time. By selecting cases with such a degree of dissimilitude between them,
this helps furnish evidence that the independent variables account for the common
dependent variable between them (Bennett, Elman, 2007). After analyzing these cases, in
order to ground my theory within the context of existing literature, I examined two cases of
autocracies (Iran and Turkey) that did not experience substantial or new condemnation,
portrayal, or sanctioning, but still chose to attempt to mediate (one successfully)
international conflicts. These cases provide variation on the independent variable and help to
tease out the mechanisms that influence authoritarian regimes to offer and succeed in
mediation.
In conclusion, so as to analyze my theory and hypotheses regarding mediation by
autocracies, I utilized a mixed methods approach hoping to observe that autocracies are
more likely to offer to mediate international conflicts when being subjected to punitive
measures on the international stage, and that the most likely autocracies to offer and
successfully mediate international conflicts will be party-based autocracies, followed by
military juntas, monarchies, and lastly personalists. In order to deduce when autocracies
offer to mediate interstate conflicts as well as which types of autocracies are most likely to
offer, I utilized Large-N datasets on international mediation, sanctioning, condemnation
and autocratic regimes, and used many qualitative sources. Quantitatively, for my first
hypothesis I utilized Probit regression, with OLS as a robustness check for direction and
significance, testing for robust standard errors as well. For the quantitative analysis of my
remaining four hypotheses, I once again analyzed the same datasets and utilized Probit
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regression, once again with OLS as a robustness check, with robust standard errors to
analyze the breakdown of autocratic regime types. My quantitative analysis required using
several different merged datasets on sanctioning, condemnation, regime-types, political and
economic ties, and conflict mediation. Qualitatively, I examined three cases of autocracies
(China, Libya, and Qatar) being motivated to offer to mediate a conflict after being
condemned, negatively portrayed, and/or sanctioned, and were subsequently rewarded with
tangible and/or intangible benefits in order to illustrate the plausibility of this phenomenon,
as well as analyzing two cases of autocracies (Iran and Turkey) that did not experience
substantial or new condemnation, portrayal, or sanctioning, but still chose to attempt to
mediate international conflicts. In the next chapter, I will discuss the results from my
quantitative analyses before delving into my case studies in the chapter after that.

81

CHAPTER 5: Quantitative Results
5.1 Effects of Sanctioning and Condemnation on Autocracies
My first hypothesis provided assessment of whether autocracies are influenced by
international scrutiny and actions, such as economic sanctioning and international
condemnation. I hypothesized that it is more likely that autocracies will offer to mediate in
international conflicts when they are subject to negative international actions, such as
sanctioning and condemnation. My quantitative analysis yielded inconclusive results, largely
failing to produce evidence before or against my hypotheses.
5.1.1 Mediation Offers from Autocracies
Starting with my first analysis, this generated results of Probit regression and OLS
regression after simulating the models with Clarify for mediation offers by autocracies when
being condemned by the UNCHR. Unfortunately, UN Condemnation was negatively correlated
and statistically insignificant. This yields results which do not providence or detract support fry
hypothesis 1. The control variables behaved largely as expected, with a previous relationship
between a potential mediator and one belligerent, previous relationship between a mediator and
both belligerents, and UN Security Council Membership all achieving rather strong significance
in both OLS and Probit (except for UNSC membership for OLS, which was slightly significant).
Other than that, there was nothing substantively to report regarding my hypothesis.
Moving on to Sanctions, results again were inconclusive. Analysis showed the results of
of Probit regression and OLS regressions. My results indicated that for both OLS and Probit,
Sanctions were positively correlated yet insignificant. This provided neither support nor rejection
of my first hypothesis. Regarding the control variables, for both a previous relationship between
a mediator and one belligerent, a previous relationship between both belligerents, UNSC
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memberships, and a shared region between a potential mediator and both belligerents were all
positively correlated and strongly significant.
5.1.2 Mediation Offers from Different Types of Autocratic Regimes
For my next stage, I examined specific autocratic regime types and tested hypotheses
about these different regime types and international condemnation and sanctioning. I
hypothesized that autocratic Party-based regimes will be the most likely out of the autocratic
types analyzed to offer to mediate when being sanctioned or condemned, with Military juntas
being less likely to mediate than Party-based autocracies, with Monarchies being less likely to
mediate than military juntas, and with Personalist autocracies being the least likely to offer to
mediate. However, again my results largely did not yield support or rejection of my
hypotheses.
The next stage of my analysis involved using Probit and OLS regressions after simulating
the models with Clarify for mediation offers by Party-based autocracies when being condemned
by the UNCHR. UN Condemnation on its own for autocracies in general yielded slight
significance and was negatively correlated for both OLS and Probit. Party-based autocracies on
their own were both negatively correlated for OLS and Probit, and were statistically significant.
UN Condemnation*Party was positively correlated yet statistically insignificant. After testing
for joint significance in Probit, it was found to be absent. As such, these results yielded neither
support or rejection for my hypotheses regarding Party-based autocracies being the most likely
autocracy to offer to mediate international conflicts when being condemned by the UN. The
control variables behaved as expected, with a previous relationship between a potential
mediator and one of the belligerents, a previous relationship between a potential mediator and
both belligerents, shared geographic region with both of the belligerents, and UNSC
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membership all being positively correlated and strongly significant for both Probit and OLS
(although slightly less so for UNSC membership with OLS). Shared geographic region between
a potential mediator and one of the belligerents was slightly statistically significant and
positively correlated for Probit.
The next stage of my analysis moved on to using Probit and OLS regressions after
simulating the models with Clarify to discover whether Military regimes would be less likely to
offer to mediate international conflicts than Party-based autocratic regimes. Again, my results
came back inconclusive, neither providing or detracting from evidence regarding this behavior.
UN Condemnation on its own (reflecting all autocracies) was negatively correlated and
statistically insignificant, as was the variable for Military in both OLS and Probit. UN
Condemnation*Military was negatively correlated for both OLS and Probit, with it achieving
slight statistical significance for OLS and none for Probit. After testing for joint significance, it
was found to not be present, causing making inferences to be problematic. Regarding control
variables, they again largely behaved as expected. A previous relationship between a potential
mediator and one belligerent, a potential mediator having a previous relationship with both
belligerents, and a shared geographic region between a potential mediator and both belligerents
all having strong statistical significance and a positive correlation. UNSC membership was
statistically significant (although slightly less so) for both OLS and Probit.
Turning to Monarchies, again results were inconclusive. The results of Probit regression
and OLS regression after simulating the models with Clarify found that UN Condemnation on
its own was negatively correlated yet statistically insignificant for both OLS and Probit.
Monarchy on its own was positively correlated yet only slightly significant for OLS. UN
Condemnation*Monarchy was positively correlated yet insignificant for both OLS and Probit.
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After testing for joint significance, the analysis did not find any, thus neither providing or
detracting support for my hypothesis. Control variables again largely behaved as expected. A
previous relationship between a potential mediator and one belligerent, a previous relationship
between a potential mediator and both belligerents, UNSC membership, and a shared
geographic region between a potential mediator and both belligerents were all found to be
positively correlated and strongly statistically significant in both OLS and Probit (although
UNSC membership was slightly less significant for OLS). In addition, a shared geographic
region between a potential mediator and one belligerent was positively correlated and slightly
statistically significant for Probit.
Turning to Personalists, again results were inconclusive. The results of Probit regression
and OLS regression after simulating the models with Clarify found that UN Condemnation on
its own was negatively correlated and statistically significant for both OLS and Probit, while
Personalist on its own and UN Condemnation*Probit was both positively correlated and
statistically insignificant for both OLS and Probit. This required carrying out a joint
significance test, which found that it was not present. Again, most of the control variables
behaved as expected. A previous relationship between a potential mediator and one of the
belligerents, a previous relationship between a mediator and both belligerents, UN Security
Council membership, and a shared geographic region between a mediator and both belligerents
were strongly statistically significant and positively correlated (although for OLS, UNSC
membership was slightly less significant). For a shared geographic region between a potential
mediator and one of the belligerents, Probit found it to be positively correlated and slightly
statistically significant.
Moving on to Party-based regimes, my results after simulating the models with Clarify
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found support for my second hypothesis, that Party-based autocracies will be the most likely to
offer to mediate international conflicts when being faced with sanctions. The variable for
Sanctions on its own (applied to all autocracies, since I am not testing for democracies) was
strongly statistically significant yet negatively correlated for both OLS and Probit, while the
variable for Party on its own was negatively correlated for OLS yet positively correlated for
Probit (neither achieving statistical significance). Very importantly, Sanctions*Party was
positively correlated and strongly statistically significant for both OLS and Probit (in sharp
contrast to the statistically significant negative correlations found in Sanctions by itself for both
OLS and Probit). After conducting a joint significance test, significance was indeed found.
These results lend support to my hypothesis, that Party-based autocracies are the most likely to
offer to mediate international conflicts when being confronted with sanctions. These autocracies
are the most affected by sanctions, which has a negative effect on all other regimes combined.
An additional note of substantive results is that Party-based autocracies are 82% more likely to
offer to mediate international conflicts when they are confronted with sanctions. Regarding
control variables, they again behaved largely as expected. A previous relationship between a
potential mediator and one belligerent, a previous relationship between a potential mediator and
both belligerents, UNSC membership, and a shared geographic region between a potential
mediator and both belligerents were all positively correlated and strongly statistically significant
for both OLS and Probit.
Turning to Military regimes, after simulating with both OLS and Probit models with
Clarify, my results did not offer either evidence supporting or detracting from my hypothesis.
Sanctions on its own was positively correlated yet insignificant for both OLS and Probit.
However, Military came back both negatively correlated and statistically insignificant for both
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OLS and Probit. The variable Sanctions*Military was both negatively correlated and
statistically insignificant for both Probit and OLS. After testing for join significance, I was not
able to find any. Regarding my results variables, they nearly uniformly behaved as predicted. A
previous relationship between a potential mediator and one belligerent, a previous relationship
between a potential mediator and both belligerents, UNSC membership, and a shared
geographic region between a potential mediator and both belligerents were all positively
correlated and strongly statistically significant.
Lastly turning to Monarchies, once again my quantitative results yielded neither support
nor rejection for my hypothesis. After simulating both OLS and Probit models with Clarify, I
found that Sanctions on its own was positively correlated yet insignificant for both OLS and
Probit. Monarchy, however, was positively correlated and strongly statistically significant for
both Probit and OLS, while Sanctions*Monarchy was negatively correlated and statistically
insignificant for both OLS and Probit. After testing for joint significance, I found that it was not
present. This makes inferences as to my hypothesis impossible to make, since my results
provide neither support nor rejection for my hypothesis.
Control variables, yet again, behaved as expected. A previous relationship between a
potential mediator and one belligerent, a previous relationship between a potential mediator and
both belligerents, UNSC membership, and a shared geographic region between a potential
mediator and both belligerents were all positively correlated and strongly statistically
significant. According to my research design, I wanted to also conduct a similar analysis for
Personalist regimes and sanctioning. However, due to a lack of variation, STATA was not able
to produce results in this regard.
In order to focus and contextualize my investigation into international condemnation’s
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and economic sanctioning’s effects on autocratic mediation (particularly given the frequent
statistical insignificance or lack of variation in my quantitative analysis), in the next chapter I
switched from quantitative analysis on this aspect of my theory and used a qualitative leastsimilar case studies approach to explore whether international condemnation and the
threatening of and/or implementation of economic sanctions leads autocratic regimes to offer to
mediate international conflicts doing so, and whether this action by an autocracy will lead to
increased rewards in the form of tangible benefits (such as foreign aid, trade, and investment)
and intangible benefits (such as praise, acceptance, avoiding criticism, and the bestowing of
legitimacy) being conferred upon the autocracy. The use of process-tracing in the case studies
approach (a detailed examination of a portion of a historical episode to test historical
explanations that may be generalizable to other events) which I adopted in the following chapter
is appropriate due to the high level of conceptual validity as well as the ability to model and
explore complex causal relations in detail in relatively infrequent phenomena (a quality that can
be missing from quantitative analysis) (George, Bennett, 2004; Bennett, Elman, 2007). The use
of a least-similar case studies approach enabled me to identify interactions between variables,
and helped me to create a chronological sequence of events that aided in the analysis of the
phenomena at hand (Sambanis, 2004).
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CHAPTER 6: Qualitative Autocratic Case Studies Analysis
By mediating an international conflict when being subjected to international
condemnation, theoretically an autocracy can burnish its image, enhance its reputation and
prestige, and reinforce its legitimacy with tangible and intangible benefits resulting from it.
Hypothetically, this should motivate autocracies to offer more frequently to mediate an
international conflict given these conditions. In order to illustrate this notion in practice, I
examined three cases of an autocracy seemingly being motivated to offer to mediate a conflict
after being condemned, negatively portrayed, and/or sanctioned, and was subsequently
rewarded with tangible and/or intangible benefits. Such examination helps me to illustrate so
that I may further test the plausibility of this phenomenon, as discussed in the methodology
chapter. Specifically, I cover mediations by the monarchic regime of Qatar between Djibouti
and Eritrea, Communist Party-dominated China in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (which
continues to this day), and Libya’s mediation between Eritrea and Ethiopia under the
erstwhile personalist military strongman Colonel Muammar Qadhafi. I will also introduce
two cases, Turkey and Iran, where autocracies mediated for more traditional reasons in order
to draw a contrast with the cases that support my theory.
6.1 Qatar
I start with the case of Qatar as a mediator in the dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea
in 2008. Not too long after a long-running border dispute erupted into a shooting conflict in
June of 2008, the absolute monarchy of Qatar interceded and successfully mediated an end to
militarized hostilities. Whereas intense efforts to mediate the conflict by international
organizations and other states alike had failed, the centralized and extremely personalized
engagement of Qatar was successful in halting the conflict. The high-level contacts,
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communiques, and personalized mediation by chief policymakers and members of the ruling
family, as well as the Emir of Qatar himself, demonstrated trustworthiness and a heavy
commitment to mediation by the kingdom. It seems that capitalizing on the individual
personalities of these upper members of Qatar’s monarchy was key for Qatari mediation in the
conflict, and after involving themselves in 2010 Qatar succeeded in bringing Djibouti and
Eritrea to the mediating table. The shuttle-diplomacy, provision of good offices, and
importantly the personal touch by key members of the Qatari monarchy helped to convince
Djibouti and Eritrea to set up a commission for ending the conflict chaired by Qatar’s prime
minister alongside representatives of the belligerents. On June 6th of 2010, Eritrea and Djibouti
inked a Qatari-mediated agreement which stipulated there be a ceasefire, withdrawal, and a
buffer zone be created under the auspices of Qatar.
This was an important success for Qatar, and soon afterwards the kingdom benefitted
in several ways. As the Qatari mediation took place in the backdrop of negative scrutiny and
attention which was being paid to Qatar globally, this case supports my theory that autocracies
will mediate in seemingly unrelated conflict in order to improve their image and obtain
rewards. As such, the following sections discuss the conflict broadly, introduce the mediating
state, reflect on the negative scrutiny which Qatar was enduring at the time, expound on the
successful mediation efforts of Qatar in the conflict, and then recount the tangible and
intangible rewards which Qatar was able to derive post-mediation.
6.1.1 The Conflict
As with many conflicts around the world, the 2008 Djibouti-Eritrea border conflict in
the Horn of Africa was rooted in a territorial dispute left over from colonialism. Prior to
independence, Djibouti was part of the French colonial empire while Eritrea was part of
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Italy’s. The modern border between Djibouti and Eritrea extends for around 63 miles from the
Red Sea to the tri-border meeting area of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. The northernmost
portion of the border between Djibouti and Eritrea was defined by an agreement that took
place between 1900 and 1901 between Italy and France as following the watershed along the
Doumeirah peninsula, which forms a prominent headland located on the coastline of the Red
Sea (Durham University, 2010). Problematically, although this portion of the border was
defined by the Franco-Italian agreement, it was never actually officially marked and
eventually became the locale for the border conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea (Frank,
2015).
Relations between the two states deteriorated in February of 2008. This occurred when
the government of Djibouti observed that Eritrea was building fortifications on both sides of
the border on the Ras Doumeira ridge, a strategic promontory overlooking the entrance of the
Red Sea to the north of the city of Djibouti (the capital and largest city of the country of the
same name), and which the two states had opposed over twice in 1996 and 1999 (Frank, 2015;
Shaban, 2017). Cursory contacts between officials from the two states came to no avail, and
by April 17th of 1999 Djiboutian military forces were deployed to the Ras Doumeira ridge in
order to meet the threat. The positions of the two states’ military forces were so close that they
were literally toe- to-toe with each other, only distinguishable by the Djiboutians’ use of tin
for cover as opposed to the Eritreans’ use of palm fronds (Durham University, 2010; Frank,
2015). Not only was this sort of geographic proximity problematic due to the increased risk of
clashes, but unhappy Eritrean conscripts began to take advantage of the closeness of the
Djiboutians’ lines by defecting to the other side (thus exacerbating tensions).
On June 10th of 2008, during one of these incidents of desertion, shots were exchanged
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by both sides with armed clashes continuing for days, eventually drawing in French military
support for Djibouti (Frank, 2015). During the clashes, it was reported that 44 Djiboutian
soldiers died, 55 were wounded, and 19 were missing in action; there were also reports of the
defection of 21 Eritrean soldiers, with 100 killed and 100 captured during the fighting (Frank,
2015; “Djiboutian-Eritrean Border Conflict,” 2020). Although this spate of fighting was the
only violent clashes that occurred, both French-backed Djiboutian forces and their Eritrean
counterparts continued to remain and/or increase in numbers in the area. The conflict brought
international concern, condemnation, and mediation efforts by international actors including a
variety of states worldwide, the United Nations, the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD), and other regional organizations; however, Eritrea refused to even
acknowledge the existence of the conflict while all mediation efforts throughout the next
couple years failed (Frank, 2015).
6.1.2 The Mediator
Located across the Red Sea and the Arabian Peninsula from the conflict, bordering on
the Persian Gulf sea, is the small state of Qatar. With a population of 2,444,174 (of which only
11.6% are Qatari) clustered mostly around the capital Doha, Qatar is a hereditary absolute
monarchy governed by the Al-Thani family, who have ruled since the mid-1800s (CIA World
Factbook: Qatar, 2020). Located on a peninsula in the Gulf between Iran and Saudi Arabia,
Qatar’s metamorphosis into a high profile and independent actor only came about when
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani seized control of Qatar from his father, Emir Khalifa, in
1995 (Barakat, 2014). After this point in time, Qatar emerged from under the influence of
Saudi Arabia to begin its own ventures. Barakat (2014) noted that “Qatar…began to chart an
independent and pragmatic foreign policy in which it has attempted to maintain good relations

92

with apparently contradictory actors, such as Iran and the United States or Hamas and
Israel…Domestic stability allowed Qatar to engage externally ‘in an imaginative and daring
way that challenged perceived norms in the region’” (pg. 7).
The assumption of power by Sheikh Hamad ushered in reforms that facilitated its
petroleum-based economy towards providing the highest per capita income in the world,
while simultaneously avoiding domestic violence and unrest which occurred in other
countries during the Arab Spring (CIA World Factbook: Qatar, 2020). In 2013, Sheikh
Hamad transferred power to the current leader of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani,
who as absolute monarch maintains control of the country. Political parties in Qatar are
forbidden, the state is governed according to Sharia law, and there is an officially imposed
absence of elections for national leadership (U.S. Dept. of State, 2009).
By using Qatar’s immense wealth to create and support public works, healthcare, and
education, Al-Thani has proven by and large to be a domestically popular leader. However,
relations between Qatar and its neighbors hasn’t always been harmonious (particularly since
2011), as Qatar has supported popular revolutions around the region, leading to the
deterioration of relationships between it and Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United
Arab Emirates (CIA World Factbook: Qatar, 2020). Perceived misbehavior by Qatar has also
resulted in the imposition of sanctions. However, tensions between Qatar and its neighbors
have recently begun to relax (“Arabian Gulf Leaders…,” 2021), and Qatar has continued to
pursue a role of prominence in international affairs. As Barakat (2014) noted, Qatar has
attempted to create and maintain “…an image as a modern, daring, and dynamic actor—an
image it has tried to carry over into the foreign policy arena” (pg. 9).
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6.1.3 International Condemnation
However, the maintenance of such a positive image has at times been problematic for
Qatar, particularly given its own domestic human rights issues. Although Al-Thani has by and
large proven to be popular, the regime maintains an iron grip on the state and society. And
although Qatar has attempted to position itself as an advocate for humanity, it has gained
negative attention and been condemned for such matters as the violation of human rights
domestically, implying a mismatch between practice and rhetoric (Akpinar, 2015). The
presence of said negative attention and condemnation was very much the case during 20082009. During that time period, the U.S. Department of State (2009) charged that:
Citizens lacked the right to change the leadership of their government by direct ballot.
There were prolonged detentions in overcrowded and harsh facilities, often ending in
deportation. The government placed varying restrictions on civil liberties, including
freedoms of speech, press (including the Internet), assembly, association, and religion.
Foreign laborers faced restrictions on foreign travel. Trafficking in persons, primarily in
the labor and domestic worker sectors, was a problem. Cultural discrimination against
women limited their full participation in society. The unresolved legal status of
“Bidoons” …stateless people with residency ties…resulted in discrimination against
these noncitizens. Worker rights were severely restricted, especially for foreign laborers
and domestic servants. (pg. 1)
Qatar also gained notoriety for its deprivation of Qatari nationality to members of the
Al- Murra tribe, for which the government blamed for a failed coup attempt in 1996, denying
them social security, healthcare, employment, and entry into the country; in addition, the
presence of numerous individuals on death row with no rights to recourse and Qatar’s UN
General Assembly vote against a resolution calling for a global moratorium on executions also
raised eyebrows (Amnesty International, 2009). In May of 2008, the Qatari government
acceded to the Gulf Cooperation Council Counter Terrorism Convention, which has gained
negative attention for its ability to suppress activities which are seen as legitimate exercises of
the rights to assembly, association, and expression, as well as allowing the state to detain
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suspects for extended periods of time with no charge and/or trial (Amnesty International,
2009).
Corporal punishment, including flogging for minor offenses, was noted internationally
to be a continuing phenomenon in Qatar during this time period, as was its lack of an
independent judiciary (U.S. Dept. of State, 2009). This was particularly bad for non-Qatari
migrant workers, whose plight and slavery-like conditions observed during 2008-2009 brought
worldwide negative attention and condemnation from a variety of international actors.
Amnesty International (2009) reported that foreign migrant workers were “…exposed to, and
inadequately protected against, abuses and exploitation by employers…Women migrant
domestic workers were particularly at risk of exploitation and abuses such as beatings, rape
and other sexual violence…Some 20,000 workers were reported to have fled from their
employers in 2007 alone due to delays in or non-payment of their wages, excessive hours and
poor working conditions” (pg. 2). Numerous reports also stated that compulsory labor for
children occurred during this time period (U.S. Dept. of State, 2009). Individual states whose
workers were abused in Qatar charged that when cases of rape came up, the migrant workers
were typically deported with no criminal charges being filed against the employer. In 2008,
numerous foreign embassies reported that the Qatari government responded to any labor
unrest involving their nationals by sending large numbers of its security forces to work sites to
quell dissension, while the Sri Lankan Embassy charged that it had 700 cases of sexual
harassment against its workers on its hands, the Indian embassy complained that 236 maids
were forced into physical and sexual exploitation and were not protected by labor legislation,
the Nepalese Embassy reporting it had received about 1,500 complaints relating to failure to
pay overtime, nonpayment of salaries, the refusal to obtain residence permits, and the deaths
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of 85 of its nationals, and finally the Indonesian Embassy decried an increase in the amount of
complaints of sexual harassment and physical abuse against its citizens as well as five cases of
alleged rape (U.S. Dept. of State, 2009). In addition to both private international organizations
and states, during this time period Qatar also experienced condemnation from the United
Nations. During this time period, the U.S. Department of State (2009) recorded that:
…the UN Special Rapporteur (UNSR) on Trafficking in Persons noted that the country
is a destination and, in some instances, transit point for trafficking of migrant workers,
mainly for forced labor…and for sexual exploitation. The UNSR criticized the
sponsorship system as an unjust arrangement that increases the vulnerability of foreign
migrant workers by rendering them dependent on their sponsors, thus fostering demand
for trafficking. The UNSR also raised concern that [Qatari] labor law excludes foreign
domestic workers from protection…Women and girls…were vulnerable to domestic
servitude and physical and sexual exploitation and unprotected by labor
legislation...[and] Legislation guiding the sponsorship of foreign laborers created
conditions constituting forced labor or slavery. (pg. 16)
From the period of 2008-2009, Qatar thus endured a withering string of negative attention and
condemnation from a variety of international actors which put it up for severe scrutiny,
globally.
6.1.4 Mediation
The practice of mediating interstate conflicts is one which Qatar has proven itself to
be capable. The extremely personalized and centralized decision-making within the
monarchy allows for the state to make sharp foreign policy decisions quickly when
opportunities arise, particularly when it comes to deciding where and when to mediate
(Kamrava, 2011; Khatib, 2013; Barakat, 2014). And with this manner of decision making,
Qatar in 2010 chose to involve itself with the task of mediating the simmering conflict
between Djibouti and Eritrea. Where other countries and organizations had failed or failed to
act to attempt to bring the conflict to an end, Qatar thrust itself into the conflict, and by June
6th of 2010 it was able to bring the belligerents to the mediating table (Frank, 2015).
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Qatar in this case was successful at bringing Djibouti and Eritrea to the bargaining
table in much the same way that it has brought other combatants into mediation. The
intensively personal engagement provided by members of the monarchy to the practice of
mediation helps demonstrate Qatar’s commitment to mediation to combatants while
promoting the trust of these belligerents in the mediation process and also members of the
monarchy themselves (Barakat, 2014). Indeed, Kamrava (2011) noted that “Qatar’s mediation
efforts have been intensely personal, capitalizing on the personalities of the Emir and other
chief policymakers who have acted as objective, dispassionate, well-informed, and wellintentioned mediators interested in turning intractable disputes into win-win scenarios…This
has been extremely effective in getting the disputants around the negotiating table and
motivating them to move the negotiations forward” (pg. 555). This seems to have been the
case with Qatar’s mediation efforts in resolving the conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea.
On June 5th, 2010, Eritrea withdrew its forces from the disputed territories, and on
June 6th Eritrea and Djibouti signed a Qatari-mediated agreement brokering a ceasefire, a
withdrawal, a buffer zone under Qatar’s auspices, as well as allowing for Qatar to address the
problem of prisoners of war and missing people; this was in addition to creating a mechanism
to aid in demarcating the boundary by an international company (Security Council Meetings
Coverage, 2010; Frank, 2015; Bukhari, 2020). This staccato of developments can be at least
partially attributed to the personal touch which members of the Qatari monarchy gave to
ending the conflict between Eritrea and Djibouti. The agreement mediated by Qatar,
announced on June 9th of 2010, set up a commission chaired by Qatar’s Prime Minister
Hamad bin Jassem Al-Thani with representatives from the two former belligerents, while
simultaneously the combatants agreed to a Qatari force to monitor the cease fire until a final
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resolution had been achieved (Durham University, 2010; Shaban, 2017). When compared to
the efforts at ending the conflict that had been put forth (or withheld) prior to this point, the
Qatari mediation was seen as being quite successful.
6.1.5 Rewards
For a country that had only just previously been experiencing scathing international
condemnation and negative attention for a host of problems related to human rights violations,
modern day slavery, and a closed political system amongst other issues, post-mediation of the
Djiboutian and Eritrean conflict seems to have brought Qatar rich rewards. These rewards
manifested themselves in both tangible and intangible ways. Just months prior, multiple states
across the world, as well as private international organizations and the UN, were united in a
chorus of criticism about Qatar on a wide-ranging spectrum of subjects. Now, these same
actors (in addition to merely Djibouti and Eritrea) sung Qatar’s praises, giving its image a
much needed refurbishment. The combatants themselves were so publicly won over, that even
seven years later Eritrea was still insisting on mediation by Qatar (and Qatar only) in its
occasional territorial disagreements (Shaban, 2017).
The United Nations, only shortly before condemning Qatar for its quasi-slavery like
practices with migrant workers, duly conferred accolades upon the kingdom for its part in
ending the conflict. On July 20th, 2010, then UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs
B. Lynn Pascoe heaped praise upon Qatar for its singular role in obtaining a mediated
settlement of the Djiboutian-Eritrean conflict (Security Council Meetings Coverage, 2010). In
an official United Nations Security Council press statement on June 11th, 2010, it was
specifically noted:
The members of the Security Council welcome and fully support the mediation efforts
by the State of Qatar, under the auspices of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, Emir
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of the State of Qatar, aiming to resolve the border dispute between the Republic of
Djibouti and the State of Eritrea…They welcome further the signing of the agreement
and the issuance of the implementation document by which the leaders of both countries
entrusted the Emir of the State of Qatar to undertake the mediation efforts…The
members of the Security Council attach great importance to the resolution of the border
dispute and to the normalization of the relations between the two countries for the overall
stability and security in the region. (pgs. 1-2).
This commendation on all sides by actors who had just been decidedly negative with
regards to Qatari actions did much to draw attention away from the negative scrutiny and
condemnation which Qatar had previously undergone just shortly before its efforts in
mediation. Then came the most tangible reward for Qatari efforts thus far. In December of
2010, Qatar won its much coveted bid to hold the 2022 FIFA World Cup (Barakat, 2014). This
conferral represented both a matter of national pride and investment, and has served to raise
Qatar’s profile globally amongst even non-politically inclined actors. Thus it seems that
Qatar’s mediation efforts between Djibouti and Eritrea, after suffering much negative scrutiny
and condemnation internationally during the years immediately prior, were rewarded in both
substantial tangible and intangible ways.
6.2 China
In the summer of 2014, the bedeviling and long-running Israeli-Palestinian conflict
erupted into a major military confrontation, with thousands of rockets fired by Palestinians into
Israel and a major Israeli military operation in Gaza taking place. A wave of violent conflict
commenced, and in 2015 Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas asserted that Palestinians
would no longer be bound by previous peace agreements. As a result, communist China
ramped up their mediation efforts in 2016 and 2017 by hosting high-level members of the
belligerents in Beijing as well as directly involving senior members of the Chinese
government, including President Xi Jinping, in peace efforts. As an important part of China’s
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conflict-management diplomacy, Xi put forward a new four-point Middle East peace proposal
calling for the advancement of the two- state solution. The proposition stipulated the
promotion of peace coupled with development, enhanced coordination and the strengthening
of concerted efforts for peace, the upholding of a comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable
security concept, as well as the Palestinians having East Jerusalem as the capital of their state.
The Palestinian and Israeli governments signaled their welcoming of the proposal and their
willingness to engage with China in the mediation process. In addition, during the course of
high-level meetings between President Xi Jinping and Palestinian Authority President
Mahmoud Abbas in China, Xi proposed the establishment of a tripartite dialogue mechanism
between Israel, China, and the Palestinians, as well as the holding of a peace conference to
help end the conflict. Much like Qatar, high-level meetings between top echelon members of
the Chinese government and members of the belligerent governments, and the provision of
good offices by the hosting Chinese, helped to convince the Israelis and the Palestinians of the
utility and seriousness of China’s continuing involvement in peace efforts. And much like
Qatar, China benefitted soon after these stepped-up efforts to end this most difficult of
conflicts. However, unlike Qatar, at the time of this writing China was not able to successfully
bring an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict yet. However, China was still able to incur the
same benefits and improved image which Qatar had. This supports the basic mechanism of my
theory, that mediation in a seemingly unrelated conflict can be used by an autocracy in order to
improve its image and to derive tangible and intangible benefits. As the Chinese mediation
attempt took place in the backdrop of negative scrutiny and attention which was being paid to
China globally, this case supports my theory that autocracies will mediate in seemingly
unrelated conflicts in the hope of deriving image improvement and rewards. This also
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opens up the possibility that successful mediation is not absolutely necessary for image
improvement and the obtainment of rewards, and that perhaps the mere effort will suffice.
As such, the following sections discuss the conflict broadly, introduce the mediating effort,
reflect on the negative scrutiny which China was enduring at the time, expound on the (so
far unsuccessful) mediation efforts of China in the conflict, and then recount the tangible
and intangible rewards which China was able to derive from these efforts.
6.2.1 The Conflict
Considered one of the world’s most intractable, the conflict between the Israelis and
Palestinians has been ongoing for a lengthy period of time and has largely defied resolution.
The violent conflicts between them can be construed as the result of Arab-Jewish friction
which had been ongoing since the 1800s, when Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe
(driven by both religious devotion as well as fleeing anti-Semitic pogroms back home)
traveled to the area of Palestine to settle and fulfill the “Zionist” dream (Morris, 2008). For
their part, Muslims had conquered the area back in the mid-seventh century and had been
there ever since, and now considered these Jewish immigrants as the “new Crusaders” bent on
a land grab (Morris, 2008). Zionists, on the other hand, believed that it was a matter of
reestablishing a Jewish state in their traditional homeland after largely being scattered by the
Roman empire during “the Diaspora,” which followed several Jewish revolts during Roman
times. This disagreement over whose land is whose helped create the conditions for conflict
over the next several decades, and even contemporarily the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is
grounded on contested territory (Bar-Tal, Salomon, 2006). Both the majority of Israelis as
well as Palestinians believe that they are the victims of aggression at the hands of the other,
and that the other group wishes to take over their land (Hausofer et al, 2010).
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Shortly after World War Two, violent conflicts between Palestinians and Israelis broke
out into all-out war. In 1947, the United Nations adopted what was known as the “Partition
Plan” (officially Resolution 181), which aimed to divide the British Mandate of Palestine into
Jewish Israeli and Arab Palestinian states, and on May 14th of 1948 the State of Israel was
created (Global Conflict Tracker, 2020). This began the first Arab-Israeli War, pitting the
nascent state of Israel against the Palestinian Arabs, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and Saudi
Arabia. The Israelis emerged victorious, with the territory now divided into the West Bank,
the Gaza Strip, and the State of Israel; in the process, 750,000 Palestinians were displaced
following the conflict (Global Conflict Tracker, 2020).
Tensions continued throughout the region, with Israel fighting several wars with its
neighbors over the years and capturing territory in the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula from
Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. In
1979, Israel and Egypt inked the Camp David Accords, ending their 30-year conflict and
helping to improve Israeli relations with its neighboring states. However, the matter of selfrule by the Palestinians remained an unresolved issue. In 1987 the First Intifada broke out,
with hundreds of thousands of Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank rising
up against the Israeli government. However, according to the Global Conflict Tracker (2020),
“The 1993 Oslo I Accords mediated the conflict, setting up a framework for the Palestinians
to govern themselves in the West Bank and Gaza, and enabled mutual recognition between the
newly established Palestinian Authority and Israel’s government…In 1995, the Oslo II
Accords expanded on the first agreement, adding provisions that mandated the complete
withdrawal of Israel from 6 cities and 450 towns in the West Bank” (pg. 3).
Violence reared its ugly head soon enough between the Israelis and Palestinians. Upset
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by a peace process which seemed to be going nowhere, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s
visit to the al-Aqsa mosque, and Israeli control over the West Bank, Palestinians launched the
Second Intifada from 2000-2005; as a response to this and continued terrorist attacks by
Palestinians against Israelis, the government of Israeli gave the go-ahead for construction of a
security fence around the West Bank in 2002, drawing worldwide condemnation (Frieden et
al, 2016; Global Conflict Tracker, 2020). Although the United States tried to restart the peace
process between the Palestinians and Israelis, these peace talks were disrupted when rival
Palestinian factions Fatah and Hamas (the latter of which is designated as a terrorist
organization by both the U.S.) formed a unity government with each other, further aggravating
efforts at mediation. The peace process began to unravel, and clashes between Israelis and
Palestinians continued.
Finally, in the summer of 2014 clashes between Israel and Hamas (who never
recognized the Oslo Accords) led to a major military confrontation between the two, leading
to a major Israeli military offensive in Hamas-ruled Gaza and the launching of about 3,000
rockets by Hamas towards Israel before a ceasefire was negotiated by Egypt (Global Conflict
Tracker, 2020). Numerous casualties were reported on both sides during this conflict, and
tensions continued to simmer. Finally, following a wave of violent conflict between
Palestinians and Israelis in 2015, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas declared that
Palestinians would no longer be constrained by the territorial divisions founded by the Oslo
Accords (Global Conflict Tracker, 2020), dealing a mediated end to the conflict a substantial
blow. To date, no complete resolution to the conflict between Palestinians and Israel has
manifested itself, although many actors continue to try to mediate.
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6.2.2 The Mediator
Slightly smaller than the United States and one of the oldest known cultures in the
world, China’s history dates back to at least 1200 BC. For two thousand years following the
3rd century BC, China oscillated between periods of disunity and unity under a series of
imperial dynasties (CIA World Factbook: China, 2020). During the latter portion of the 1800s
and the first half of the 1900s, China struggled with foreign occupation, defeats on the
battlefield, natural disasters such as famines, and civil unrest. Shortly after the end of World
War Two, the Chinese communists prevailed over the formerly ruling Nationalist forces in a
heated civil war which ran from 1927-1950. Following victory, the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) under Chairman Mao Tse-Tung created an authoritarian socialist state which ensured
the sovereignty of the country, but one which imposed strict restrictions and controls over all
aspects of the lives of people in addition to costing tens of millions of people their lives (CIA
World Factbook: China, 2020). Nevertheless, China remains the world’s most populous
country.
To date, the Chinese Communist Party maintains a firm grip on their authoritarian
state. Ruling from the capital of Beijing, the CCP is the ultimate authority in the country,
members of which stand astride all the top security and government posts. Top authority in the
government is the CCP Central Committee’s 25-member Political Bureau (also known as the
Politburo) and its seven-member Standing Committee; currently Xi Jinping continues to
occupy the three most powerful positions in the country as state president, chairman of the
Central Military Commission, and CCP general secretary (U.S. Dept. of State, 2020). As such,
China is a single party-dominated autocratic machine-type state (there are 8 nominally
independent small parties, but all are controlled by the CCP), where civilian authorities remain
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in control over the security apparatus consisting of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the
People’s Armed Police, the Ministries of State Security and Public Security, and the state
penal, prosecutorial, and judicial systems (U.S. Dept. of State, 2020; CIA World Factbook:
China, 2020).
China politically has some outward trappings in common with democracies, albeit
not infrequently superficially. For example, China’s constitution specifies for an independent
judiciary. In reality, however, the judiciary largely is subject to the desires and influence of
the CCP (particularly if the cases are considered to be politically sensitive). Although
previously a strict communist state, Chairman Mao’s successors began to open up China’s
economy to the world. Although communism continues to provide the official theoretical
grounding of Chinese politics, Mao’s successors focused on market-oriented economic
development and decentralization of the Chinese economy (phasing out collective
agriculture, fiscal decentralization, the growth of a private sector, the opening up to foreign
trade and investment, etc.), and by the beginning of the new millennium Chinese output had
quadrupled (CIA World Factbook: China, 2020).
This opening up of the Chinese economy has dramatically improved the living
standards of Chinese citizens, and there is currently a burgeoning middle class in the country.
However, strict controls on many aspects of society remain in place. Individuals who advocate
for civil and political rights, ethnic minorities, and public interest causes are frequently subject
to repression; citizens don’t have the right to select their government (with elections only
existing at the most minor level of government), independent candidates in whatever elections
do exist are heavily screened and sometimes prevented from running for office, and citizens
have limited mechanisms for redress against official abuse (U.S. Dept. of State, 2020).
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Nevertheless, compared with China’s recent past during such events as the Cultural
Revolution, life for everyday Chinese citizens is more prosperous then it once was. In
addition, China has sought to put on a charm offensive over the years, and has increased its
participation in international organizations and global outreach while portraying itself as a
reliable and trustworthy partner (CIA World Factbook: China, 2020). That being said, it is
notable that despite being a permanent member of the UNSC, China has traditionally opted for
a foreign policy based on nonintervention in the domestic matters of other states,
distinguishing itself from other permanent members of the UNSC.
6.2.3 International Condemnation
However, despite its attempts at portraying itself positively, 2016 and early 2017 saw
China receiving an especially large amount of international criticism, condemnation,
negative attention, and the threat of sanctions and tariffs for perceived bad behavior, such as
the increasing amount and variety of human rights infractions and abuse. In addition, during
this time period China also received negative scrutiny and condemnation due to the passage
of restrictive laws which open fresh horizons for the abuse of Chinese citizens. In 2016,
Human Rights Watch released a scathing report of Chinese behavior around and during that
time which observed that:
Senior Chinese leaders…now explicitly reject the universality of human rights,
characterizing these ideas as “foreign infiltration”…Freedoms of expression and
religion, already limited, were hit particularly hard…by several restrictive new
measures…The government also proposed or passed laws on state security,
cybersecurity, counterterrorism, and the management of foreign NGOs; these laws
conflate peaceful criticism of the state with threats to national security…Activists
seeking to defend human rights have faced a surge of reprisals…The government has
increasingly used vague public order charges to silence human rights defenders...the
State Internet Information Office issued multiple new directives, including tightened
restrictions…the government passed a cybersecurity law that will require domestic and
foreign Internet companies to practice censorship, register users’ real names, localize
data, and aid government surveillance…the government announced that it would station
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police in major Internet companies to more effectively prevent “spreading rumors”
online…[and] Education Minister Yuan Guiren told universities to ban teaching
materials that promote Western values and censor speech constituting “attack and
slander against the Party.” (pgs. 1-3)
In addition, during this time period the Chinese authorities were charged with
removing crosses from (and occasionally demolishing) churches, with observers noting that in
August of 2015 the National’s People’s Congress increased the penalty for participating in
“cults” (the term that the government typically refers to religious groups outside their control,
such as Falungong) up to life imprisonment (Human Rights Watch, 2016; Amnesty
International, 2017). China during this time also received attention for its increased pressure
on other countries to forcibly return allegedly corrupt Chinese (including those from Taiwan)
to China, with dire consequences often waiting for these individuals there (which then raised
eyebrows around the world) (Human Rights Watch, 2017). Some of these individuals had been
granted refugee status by the UNHCR, but were still repatriated to China to be detained to the
UNHCR’s public dismay (Amnesty International, 2017). Human Rights Watch (2017)
observed that, during this time period, Chinese “Authorities’ hostility toward those who
advocate for human rights reached new heights…” (pg. 188), and that during this period
“Freedom of expression, already severely restricted through censorship and punishments, was
hit particularly hard in 2016” (pg. 191).
China was accused of drafting even more restrictive laws and regulations as time went
on between 2016 and 2017. According to Human Rights Watch (2017), “Authorities
increasingly use vague public order charges against activists, including ‘creating disturbances’
and ‘disturbing social order,’ in addition to serious political charges such as ‘subversion’…In a
disturbing trend, charges of ‘subversion,’ which previously had been reserved for those who
voiced opposition to the [CCP], are now being extended to lawyers and activists who do not
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directly challenge the party…” (pg. 189). Further restrictive legislation during this time period
that garnered negative attention included guidelines to increase the use of law enforcement of
cultural matters to “safeguard the ‘national cultural and ideological security” of China,
proposed amendments to the Regulations on Religious Affairs that would extend the power of
authorities to monitor, control and sanction religious practice (amongst other things requiring
that religion “protect national security” as well as forbidding people and groups who aren’t
officially approved as religious bodies from attending meetings abroad on religion), the
Foreign NGO Management Law (which placed NGOs under the supervision of the Ministry of
Public Security and which created additional barriers to the already constricted rights to
freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly), the Cyber Security Law (which
obligated internet companies working in China to store the names of domestic users, enforce a
name registration system, and censor content), the Film Industry Promotion Law (which
prohibited the production of movies which include subjects considered to incite ethnic hatred,
violate religious policies, and otherwise endanger Chinese national security), as well as other
similar restrictions for videogames and live- streaming (Amnesty International, 2017; Human
Rights Watch, 2017; U.S. Dept. of State, 2017).
During this time period, foreign governments and international organizations,
universities, and trade and business associations expressed dismay globally via statements as
well as directly via submissions to the National People’s Congress about China’s restrictive
laws concerning NGOs and the punishment of Chinese citizens who took part in them. The
UN Secretary-General publically observed that China had still not replied to questions about
the death in custody of Cao Shunli (a prominent human rights defender), and both the
Committee against Torture (aka “CAT”) and the UN Committee on the Elimination of
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Discrimination against Women expressed concern at Chinese attempts to limit the
participation of civil society in the treaty body reviews (Human Rights Watch, 2016).
Amnesty International (2017) blasted China for the notable increase of the use of
“…’residential surveillance in a designated location’, a form of secret incommunicado
detention that allowed the police to hold individuals for up to six months outside the formal
detention system, without access to legal counsel…their families or anybody else from the
outside world, and placed suspects at risk of torture and other ill- treatment…Family members
of those detained were also subject to police surveillance, harassment and restriction of their
freedom of movement…[and] The number of carefully choreographed televised ‘confessions’
increased…” (pgs. 119-120).
China also received negative attention worldwide for its behavior in the UN, including
voting against a resolution designed to create an expert post dedicated to addressing violence
and discrimination based on gender identification and sexual orientation, attempting to block
discussion of the human rights situation in North Korea, and opposing the granting of UN
accreditation to the Committee to Protect Journalists, prompting a public outcry (Human
Rights Watch, 2017). In February of 2016 particularly, China received worldwide
condemnation from a variety of groups, international organizations, and countries all over the
globe over its drastic and increasingly dismal record. According to Human Rights Watch
(2017):
In February [of 2016], the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed concern
regarding China’s continued arbitrary detention and interrogation of lawyers, harassment
and intimidation of government critics and NGO workers, and the negative impact on
basic rights of the new Foreign NGO Management Law. In February 2016, the European
Parliament adopted a strong resolution condemning human rights abuses in China and
in March, a dozen governments led by the United States signed on to an unprecedented
statement condemning China’s “deteriorating human rights record” at the UN Human
Rights Council. Several governments, including those of Canada, the European Union,
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Germany, and the United States, issued statements in 2016 about the crackdown on civil
society, disappearances of the Hong Kong booksellers, and the Foreign NGO
Management Law…UN Secretary-General…Ban Ki-moon…expressed concern about
the crackdown on civil society, and urged Chinese authorities to give “citizens a full say
and role in the political life of their country.” (pg. 198)
Despite the fact that Hong Kong is guaranteed autonomy in every way outside of
defense and foreign affairs (enjoying expanded civil liberties compared to mainland China as
well as having an independent judiciary) under its Basic Law, the encroachment of China was
observed to be taking place during this time period in the areas of personal expression,
freedom of assembly (for example, over 1,000 individuals were arrested in connection with
the “Umbrella Movement”), and political participation (Human Rights Watch, 2016; Human
Rights Watch, 2017). Further, individuals who disappeared from Hong Kong made global
headlines when they reappeared on television in mainland China, later alleging ill-treatment,
forced confessions, and arbitrary detention on the part of mainland Chinese officials (Amnesty
International, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2017). During this time period, China also
declined to clarify whether, and under what sort of situation, its security forces were operating
in Hong Kong, adding to the uncertainty in the situation and causing anxiety worldwide.
China made headlines globally with its encroachment on Hong Kong in 2016, with Human
Rights Watch (2017) publicly noting that:
In July [of 2016], Hong Kong’s Electoral Affairs Commission announced a new
requirement that candidates running for the semi-democratic Legislative Council…must
formally declare their recognition of Hong Kong as an ‘inalienable part of
China’…Election officers then disqualified six candidates who have peacefully
advocated for the territory’s independence. In August, a spokesperson for the Education
Bureau warned teachers that they could lose their professional qualifications for
advocating independence…In November, China’s top legislature issued an interpretation
of a provision of the Basic Law…on oath-taking that seemed designed to compel the
Hong Kong High Court to disqualify two recently elected pro-independence legislators
from taking office. It marked the first time Chinese authorities had issued a ruling on the
Basic Law while legal proceedings were ongoing in Hong Kong. (pg. 193).
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During this time period, China received dramatically amplified attention for their
increasing discrimination and persecution of their Uighur minority population. In their
2016 indictment of China’s human rights record, Human Rights Watch observed:
…authorities have detained, arrested, or killed increasing numbers of Uighurs alleged
by police to have been involved in illegal or terrorist activities, but the authorities’ claims
are impossible to verify independently…Xinjiang authorities promulgated
comprehensive yet vaguely worded new religious affairs regulations…These prohibit
“extremist” attire and ban “activities that damage the physical and mental health of
citizens.” In recent years, authorities have used similar…directives to discourage or even
ban civil servants, teachers, and students from fasting during Ramadan. In March, a
Hotan court convicted 25 Uighurs of “endangering state security” for their participation
in “illegal” religious studies—in this case, private religious classes. (pg. 8)
Some Uighurs who were detained were Uighur language website editors and writers.
Yet despite the outcry, the Chinese government vowed that it would continue to maintain its
“strike hard” policy against “violent terrorism” indefinitely. Amnesty International noted that
in March of 2016 all unofficial preaching in the XUAR (Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous
Region) had been shuttered, while also publically documenting that:
In October, media reported that several localities within the XUAR had announced that
they will require all residents to hand in their passports to the police. Thereafter, all
XUAR residents would be required to present biometric data, such as DNA samples and
body scan images, before being permitted to travel abroad. The measure came amid a
security crackdown and greater travel restrictions targeting ethnic minorities in the
XUAR. In August, the provincial government announced a large-scale plan to send 1,900
Uighur teachers to schools throughout mainland China to accompany Uighur students
living in boarding schools in Han-majority areas. The government pledged to increase
the number of such dispatched teachers to 7,200 by 2020. The move is billed as a way
to “resist terrorism, violent extremism and separatism and promote ethnic solidarity,”
but Uighur groups overseas have criticized the plan as a means to dilute Uighur cultural
identity. (pgs. 122-123)
These reports were corroborated by other sources such as Human Rights Watch, who
in 2017 broadcast to the world that since Xinjiang authorities issued new directives to
implement China’s “abusive” Counterterror Law in 2016, 10 Uighur middle school students
were arrested for terrorism (with no other information after that available), and that Uighur
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economist Ilham Tohti was serving a life sentence for peacefully criticizing the Chinese
government’s policies in Xinjiang. The denial of passports was particularly applied to travel
to Saudi Arabia for the Hajj, to other Muslim countries, and to Western countries; further,
during this time period Reuters reported that movement inside the XUAR was internally
restricted via the requirement of travel documents and other identification checks, and that
family members of Uighur activists who were residing abroad were denied visas to reenter
China (U.S. Dept. of State, 2017).
The crackdown on rights nationwide was decried for its increasing impact on the
Tibetan people and their ability to move about, speak freely, and assemble peacefully. During
this period, negative attention globally was aroused when the surveillance of monasteries and
Tibetan villages experienced a marked uptick, resulting in a greater frequency of arrests of
Tibetans involved in cultural and social activities, writers and singers who produced content
which was deemed as sensitive, and also of local community leaders in the Tibetan regions
(Human Rights Watch, 2016). Multiple prominent Tibetan prisoners died in jail, with the
authorities sometimes refusing to release the corpses or allowing independent investigations as
to their deaths (Human Rights Watch, 2016).
In addition, during this time period China received considerable negative press for
destroying a large portion of Larung Gar, thought to be the largest Tibetan Buddhist Institute
on the globe. Amnesty International (2017) observed that “Local Chinese authorities ordered
the population of Larung Gar to be reduced by more than half to 5,000 in order to carry out
‘correction and rectification’…Thousands of monks, nuns and lay people were at risk of
forced evictions” (pg. 122). It also came to international attention that multiple Tibetans had
died in Chinese custody, and that the Tibetan areas of Qinghai and Sichuan provinces were
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scheduled for greater extraction of resources (prompting protests that were violently put
down) (Human Rights Watch, 2017). China was also accused of making it increasingly
difficult for Tibetans (particularly monks) to acquire passports. The U.S. Department of State
(2017) publicly reported that “The unwillingness of Chinese authorities in Tibetan areas to
issue or renew passports for Tibetans created, in effect, a ban on foreign travel for…the
Tibetan population…Han Chinese residents of Tibetan areas did not experience the same
difficulties…The government continued to try to prevent many Tibetans and Uighurs from
leaving the country and detained many who were apprehended while attempting to leave.”
6.2.4 Mediation
With a reputational bloody nose after receiving scathingly negative international
attention and condemnation worldwide as well as being threatened by sanctions and tariffs
during 2016 and early 2017, it appears that China tried to counterbalance this negativity
through providing global public goods associated with conflict resolution. Case in point, China
turned its attention to mediating the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Legarda, Hoffman, 2018).
Interestingly, since the founding of China in 1949, by and large China has seldom (relatively
speaking) acted as a mediator in international conflicts. This is thought to be because of
China’s foreign policy of non-intervention, the belief that the status of being a neutral
onlooker is better at maximizing China’s national interests (since it provides more diplomatic
wiggle room), and that China prefers to avoid conflict and confrontation unless there is a
direct impact to Chinese core interests (security, sovereignty, etc.) (Chaziza, 2018b). However,
there does appear to be a trend away from these traditional stances in regards to mediation.
This foreign policy pivot in of itself doesn’t necessarily diverge from China’s official
presentation of its purpose in international affairs, namely to promote peace (Large, 2008). In
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1955 at the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai expressed
support for the adoption of a ten-point “declaration on promotion of world peace and
cooperation” (Li, 2019). That being said, there are some notable differences in mediation
tactics between Western countries and China. Wu and Qian (2010) observed that:
Unlike Western mediation approaches that emphasize truth finding, the Chinese
approach is concerned more with creating and sustaining, from beginning to end, a
peaceful or harmonious state, even if only at a superficial level. Nor do Chinese
mediators follow a fixed protocol or procedure, preferring flexible processes that can
be navigated to a mutually acceptable conclusion. Chinese mediators also tend to be
context oriented; there are no right or wrong, only workable and unworkable processes.
Chinese mediators also naturally take into account, looking forward to the outcome as
well as in the process that leads up to it, face-saving for all parties. Finally, because
among Chinese the selection of mediators might be based not on professional
background, but on seniority and authority within the context of a specific dispute, it is
not uncommon for the mediation process to be led by figures of authority or individuals
who enjoy good relations with the disputants in lieu of professional mediators. (pg. 8)
China has no colonial, historical, religious, or political baggage in the Middle East,
which seems like it would be conducive to China being perceived as an “honest broker” in
conflicts (such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict) there (Chaziza, 2018b). Further, China was
engaged in nine mediation projects in 2018 (rising from just three in 2012), behavior which
suggests that its mediating behavior with the Palestinians and Israelis might just be part of an
overall strategy to act as a mediator more often (Li, 2019).
The problem with that assessment (and what makes Chinese involvement in the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict so unique) is that China’s mediating efforts to date outside of those
involving its immediate neighbors have involved states which are part of its Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) (Li, 2019), or are otherwise important in an immediately strategic sense. This
is not the case with either Israel or Palestine, as neither of them have signed a Memorandum
of Understanding with China so as to be a part of the BRI, as opposed to the vast majority of

114

countries on the planet (Nedopil, 2021). Thus, explanations as to why China mediates in other
countries (their direct geographic proximity to the conflicting states, whether the belligerents
are members of the BRI, etc.) do not apply to Israel and Palestine. Further, as an aggregate,
China’s important economic and core interests which might be impacted by this conflict are
exceedingly minimal in scope (Sun, Zoubir, 2018). This opens up the probability that China
has other reasons for attempting to mediate between the two parties, perhaps as a means of
rehabilitating its reputation after it has come under scrutiny and condemnation by acting as a
mediator in a conflict which garners a large degree of global attention.
Given the lambasting which China experienced from 2016 through part of 2017, it is
notable that coincidently there was a widely noticeable increase in China’s mediation efforts
in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Chaziza, 2018a). The year 2017 saw a flurry of high-level
diplomacy between the Chinese and both the Israelis and Palestinians. Chaziza (2018a)
observed:
In 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping, put forward a new four-point Middle East peace
proposal, as part of China’s conflict-management diplomacy. The new peace proposal
signaled China’s heightened engagement with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The
proposition called for advancing the political settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian issue
on the basis of the two-state solution of the 1967 lines, which stipulated: East Jerusalem
as the capital of a future Palestinian State; the upholding of a common, comprehensive,
cooperative and sustainable security concept; enhanced coordination and strengthening
of concerted efforts for peace; and the promotion of peace with
development…Moreover, in July 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping, during a meeting
with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, proposed the establishment of a
tripartite dialogue mechanism between Israel and the Palestinians…[and] Later [that
year] China will hold a peace conference…to discuss possible ideas for managing the
conflict. (pg. 36)
All of this activity represented a marked increase in Chinese involvement in this most intractable
of conflicts, and as such is a notable departure from previous Chinese efforts in this area.
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6.2.5 Rewards
It is notable that China, after previously experiencing a large amount of negative
scrutiny in 2016 and earlier in 2017, in the latter half of 2017 saw a significant amount of
praise and recognition for both its role in mediating the conflict as well as its human rights
record and government policies in general. After China’s proposal for its new four-point
Middle East peace proposal, both Israel and Palestine praised and welcomed the proposal and
declared their willingness and desire to engage with China in the mediating process (Chaziza,
2018a). The secretary-general of the Palestinian Presidency and aide to President Abbas,
Tayeb Abdul Rahim, praised China for its possible role as an “honest broker” between
Palestine and Israel (and that China could have a vital role in future mediation and peace
agreements) (Chaziza, 2018a). This positive feedback and praise from the two belligerents in
such a high profile conflict inherently drew in international attention from both states and
international organizations alike.
Praise and positive attention for China was not only relegated to the PalestinianIsraeli conflict specifically, but extended out into other areas which it had hitherto fore been
criticized in. Less than a year after China noticeably stepped up its mediation efforts in the
conflict, China received international recognition in the area of human rights achievements
by both the United Nations as well as numerous other countries. According to Shukun
(2018):
China’s achievements in advancing human rights…received the United Nations Human
Rights Council’s recognition when its human rights report was discussed at the
Universal Periodic Review [in 2018]…The report…includes details about how China
had made progress in legislation on protection of human rights and the rights of special
groups of people, and developing human rights in other areas…China has outperformed
all countries in poverty alleviation and fulfilled the UN Millennium Development Goals
ahead of schedule, an achievement the international community has praised. China’s
poverty reduction work could be used as an example by other developing countries,
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said Mozambique’s representative to the UN-UPR…The Anti-Domestic Violence Law
promulgated by China was hailed by Mali’s representative to the UN-UPR as an
important move to promote human rights…At the Universal Periodic Review
meeting, the Mauritius representative praised China’s inclusive development, and the
Nepal representative complimented China for adhering to interactive contact in human
rights. (pgs. 1-2)
At the UPR meeting, multilateral human rights values which China put forth were wellreceived, with the Chinese-proposed global governance model (characterized by the notions of
shared benefit, common development, and consultation) receiving international recognition
(Shukun, 2018). This praise in the realm of human rights by other countries and the United
Nations was a stark departure from 2016 and the first part of 2017, when China received much
negative attention and condemnation in this area.
Even the United States, under notorious China-baiter President Donald Trump, was
effusive with its praise of China in a wide variety of areas in the latter part of 2017. Trump, a
staunch supporter of Israel, just a year before on the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign trail
brutally criticized China in areas as far ranging as trade practices to human rights. Amongst
some of his more inflammatory criticisms of China was his assertion that China was using the
U.S. as “a piggy bank to rebuild China” and that China was “taking our jobs” (Beech, 2016).
At a campaign rally in Indiana in 2016, Trump excoriated China for “raping” the U.S.,
accusing it of being a “currency manipulator” and promising to rip up trade deals and confront
China with trade barriers such as tariffs and sanctions (Corasaniti, Burns, Appelbaum, 2016;
Wilson, 2016). But shortly after China’s increased mediation efforts between Israel and
Palestine, Trump sang a very different tune in the latter part of 2017. In November of that
year, Trump met Xi and effusively praised him on areas ranging from trade to narcotics
control to North Korea. Munroe (2017) recounts:
“My feeling toward you is an incredibly warm one,” Trump said, standing beside Xi...
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“As we said, there’s great chemistry, and I think we’re going to do tremendous things,
both for China and the United States,” Trump said…Trump went so far as to call Xi a
“very special man” in a joint briefing on Thursday, and seemed so enthusiastic that
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson was asked if Trump had been too deferential… “I don’t
blame China,” Trump said of the trade deficit. “Who can blame a country for being able
to take advantage of another country for the benefit of their citizens? I give China great
credit.”
For someone who had just accused China of “raping” the U.S. months before in trade matters
while threatening China with sanctions and tariffs, this was a startling change of rhetoric. It
can’t help but be noted that Trump was a staunch supporter of Israel as president, with a vested
interest in seeing an end to the conflict during his term in order to please his evangelical
supporters.
6.3 Libya
From 1998 to 2000, Ethiopia fought a bloody border war with Eritrea which left tens
of thousands dead, sparked an arms race between the two impoverished countries, as well as
resulting in a buildup of military personnel between the belligerents. The pariah state of
personalist dictator Muammar Qadhafi took this opportunity to act as mediator, opening up
Libyan good offices for ending the conflict in 1998. From this point through 2000, shuttle
diplomacy commenced. Qadhafi and his top cronies, as well as the leaders of Ethiopia and
Eritrea, travelled amongst Africa in a series of high-profile meetings with the goal of ending
the conflict. The personal involvement of Qadhafi, who held the entirety of Libya in his direct
control, put the entire state of Libya behind these intense efforts at conflict mediation. After
this personalized involvement, the provision of good offices, and shuttle diplomacy across
Africa, it was reported in 1999 that Eritrea and Ethiopia had accepted a Libyan-brokered
peace plan. The Libyans stated that Ethiopia and Eritrea had agreed to a cessation of military
operations, and not too long after that a peace agreement was signed in 2000 that called for
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the belligerents to abide by an independent ruling over their 1,000 kilometer contested
frontier.
Similar to the other autocracies which have been analyzed, Qadhafi was to materially
and immaterially benefit from his energized and personal involvement in mediating the
conflict. As the Libyan mediation took place in the backdrop of negative scrutiny and attention
which was being paid to Qadhafi’s regime globally, this case supports my theory that
autocracies will mediate in seemingly unrelated conflict in order to improve their image and
obtain rewards. As such, the following sections discuss the conflict broadly, introduce the
mediating state, reflect on the negative scrutiny which Libya was enduring at the time,
expound on the successful mediation efforts of Libya in the conflict, and then recount the
tangible and intangible rewards which Libya was able to derive post-mediation.
6.3.1 The Conflict
One of the more vicious international conflicts which have taken place in modern
times, the border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea around the end of the 20th century was
seemingly as intractable as it was deadly. Between 1998 and 2000, at least 70,000 individuals
perished in the war between the two belligerents, a conflict which fueled a serious arms race
between two of the globe’s poorest countries, and which was characterized by mass
expulsions (also referred to as “forced repatriations”) of a large amount of each state’s
citizenry (Hamilton, 2000; Malone, 2009). The two countries were once one, federated
together since 1952, but in 1993 Eritrea obtained its independence from Ethiopia. For several
years later, relations between the two countries experienced no serious bilateral problems.
However, relations between the two countries began to sour in 1997. According to Hamilton
(2000):
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The first military incident occurred in July of that year when Ethiopian troops took over
a small village in southwestern Eritrea and dismantled the civilian administration there.
A month later, Ethiopian forces took similar action in the village of Badme in the Yirga
Triangle, along Eritrea’s southwestern border. Eritrea says that on 6 May 1998, a group
of its officers went, unarmed, to tell the Ethiopians that they were on Eritrean territory;
six of its officers were then shot dead. Ethiopia claims that there were casualties on both
sides. A week later, Eritrea sent troops and armored units into and beyond Badme—into
territory administered by Ethiopia. After several weeks of fighting, a number of areas
previously administered by Ethiopia fell under Eritrean control. (pgs. 115-116)
At this juncture, international mediation attempts began with a joint U.S.-Rwandan
shuttle-diplomacy effort led by Rwandan Vice-President Paul Kagame and U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice. Their four-point peace plan stipulated that
both sides should return their troops into their own territory and away from the border, the
border would then be placed under international observation by means of monitors, civilian
authority would then be brought back to the disputed areas followed by an investigation into
the events which occurred on May 6th. But this peace effort was not to last. Although both
belligerents said they agreed to the plan, Ethiopian forces were instructed to take any steps
necessary to “foil the Eritrean invasion” while Eritrea stated it would only withdraw its
soldiers once the border was demilitarized; on June 5th of that year, the Eritrean air force
reportedly bombed Mekele, the capital of Ethiopia’s Tigrayan province, while the Ethiopian
air force bombed the Eritrean capital of Asmara (Hamilton, 2000). After this, fighting was
reduced to a lull as the belligerents agreed to a U.S.-brokered airstrike moratorium as the rainy
season began in the Horn of Africa.
During the months which constituted this lull, a vicious arms race and the
recruitment/training of an increasing amount of soldiers on both sides commenced. Both
Ethiopia and Eritrea were ranked amongst the most impoverished countries on the planet
during this time period. Yet both sides engaged in this increased militarization. Ethiopia
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commissioned Israel to modernize its bomber fleet as well as purchasing T-55 tanks from
Bulgaria and SU-27 fighters from Russia, while Eritrea doubled its air force by purchasing
four MiG-29s from Ukraine and $50 million worth of missiles and rockets from Romania
(Hamilton, 2000). During this arms race amidst the lull in combat (which lasted until February
of 1999), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) put forth a “Framework Proposal” to end
the conflict. This proposal was more or less identical to that put forth by the US and Rwanda,
and called for the border to be settled by a joint Eritrean-Ethiopian-UN cartography team.
Although Ethiopia agreed with the proposal, Eritrea refused since it would allow Ethiopia to
continue to administer civilian authority in parts of the contested area. The proposal was
unsuccessful, and in February of 1999 military conflict once again recommenced. According
to Hamilton (2000):
On the 6th, at Badme, Ethiopian forces advanced against dug-in Eritrean fighters with
the goal of winning back the territory lost nine months earlier…the battle for
Badme was characterized by mass processions of infantry, meant to overwhelm the
enemy by sheer numbers…the second phase of the Ethio-Eritrean war “turned out to be
something of a first-world-war throwback, with human waves walking into banks of
machine-gun, tank, and artillery fire…the Ethiopians managed to coax the Eritreans out
from their trenches and engage them in…fierce hand-to-hand fighting. The Eritrean
line buckled, and Ethiopia’s “Operation Sunset” succeeded in retaking
Badme…[Eritrea] announced that [it] was ready to sign the OAU peace proposals. But
[Ethiopia], who had accepted the deal nine months earlier, now refused to sign. Instead,
Ethiopian forces opened fire on a second front a few weeks later…on the plain of
Tsorona. Employing the same archaic battle tactics, the Ethiopians sent waves of tanks
and infantry towards the Eritrean line, suffering a casualty count of 10,000 in the span
of just sixty hours. This time, the Eritreans repulsed the attack, leaving the conflict to
simmer on in an uneasy stalemate through the summer months. (pgs. 117-118).
Finally, not too long after mediation attempts by Colonel Qadhafi’s Libya (which will
be covered more in depth shortly), a peace agreement was signed in 2000 that called for both
sides to abide by an independent ruling over the 1,000 kilometer frontier; however, both
Ethiopia and Eritrea kept their forces close to the border and tensions remained high (Malone,
2009). It wasn’t until 2018 that Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a peace agreement to end this
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“frozen war” and settle what appeared to be an intractable border dispute (Stigant, Phelan,
2019).
6.3.2 The Mediator
Roughly 3,000 kilometers away from where the fighting between Ethiopia and
Eritrea took place in the Horn of Africa region, Libya is a relatively sparsely populated state
with a current population of about 7 million people (mostly living close to the Mediterranean
coast), it is about the size of Alaska, and it is located in the MENA geographic region (CIA
World Factbook: Libya, 2020). Its capital is Tripoli, an ancient city which was founded in
the 7th century BC by the Phoenicians. Libyan wealth primarily is derived from (and
dependent on) petroleum and natural gas, which has been used liberally at times to finance
both revolutionary movements as well as other states. Libya has traditionally been a part of
another state or empire during its history, with early inhabitants being invading Berbers who
arrived in 3,000 BC (“Libya, Qadhafi, and the African Union,” 2021). However, Arabs have
had the most lasting impact of these groups (having converted the population to Islam), and
traditionally Libya has identified itself as a Mediterranean Arab country instead of African.
The Ottomans conquered Libya in the sixteenth century and ruled until the early twentieth
century, followed by the Italians until the end of World War Two. In 1951, the United
Nations gave its blessing to Libyan independence under the repressive King Idris, who
promptly banned political parties and drove opposition to his rule underground; this was to
prove a fatal mistake, because on September 1st of 1969, Colonel Muammar Qadhafi led a
bloodless military coup with a cabal of around 70 other disaffected officers (“Libya, Qadhafi,
and the African Union,” 2021).
Qadhafi’s foreign policy goals, amongst other things, involved opposition to Israel and
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support of Palestinians, pursuing a federation of Arab nations, the advancement of the Muslim
religion, and opposition to colonialism. He was a key player in advocating for the use of oil
embargoes against the West, viewing capitalism as a violation against the human race. Born in
1942 in Sirte, Qadhafi was expelled from school for organizing student demonstrations but
was able to continue a military education which helped him to overthrow King Idris with the
backing of powerful elements of the Libyan armed forces (“Libya, Qadhafi, and the African
Union,” 2021). Once in power, Qadhafi instituted a revolutionary regime in Libya (which at
that juncture was named “The Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”) which combined
elements of Islam and socialism, which he attempted to export using his countries petroleum
wealth (CIA World Factbook: Libya, 2020). Qadhafi drew much of his power from the
Libyan military, but was also in charge of a number of other intelligence and security entities
tasked with safeguarding the regime.
Initially, Qadhafi was an active advocate for Arab unity, advocating for a single legal
system, business infrastructure, foreign policy, and a centralized military. When this didn’t
work, Qadhafi instead turned to proposed regional alliances (supporting Egypt during the Yom
Kippur War, for example) and offering to dissolve his borders in order to create a union with
other nearby Arab countries (“Libya, Qadhafi, and the African Union,” 2021). Despite his
calls for unity, Libya under Qadhafi actively supported groups throughout the MENA which
planned coups against Arab countries, conspired to assassinate leaders which Qadhafi
disagreed with, and aided in setting up guerrilla armies (“Libya, Qadhafi, and the African
Union,” 2021). Libya began to acquire a reputation as a pariah state, opening it up to
condemnation and negative press on issues ranging from terrorism to human rights (as well as
to the consequences of such a bad reputation, such as sanctions).

123

This reputation coalesced amongst Western nations during the 1980s after high profile
terrorist attacks (supported by Libya) against Western targets. In 1986, a Berlin discotheque
bombing killed two U.S. servicemen and injured over 200 others; eventually a German court
found a former employee of the Libyan embassy and three other individuals guilty in
connection to the bombing (“Foreign Relations of Libya Under Muammar Gaddafi,” 2021).
Then in 1988, the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland killed 259
passengers and crew as well as 11 people on the surface; this prompted sanctions and an air
embargo by the United Nations and the United States, which crippled the Libyan economy
and solidified its pariah categorization (CIA World Factbook: Libya, 2020; “Foreign
Relations of Libya Under Muammar Gaddafi,” 2021). To his horror, Qadhafi was shocked at
the Arab countries’ willingness to enforce sanctions, further isolating his regime
Later in the 1990s, after actions designed to deflect criticism and his regime’s bad
reputation (actions which included his mediation efforts between Eritrea and Ethiopia in the
late 90s), Qadhafi was able to rehabilitate his regime’s image in the eyes of the West and other
states (more of which will be covered below). However, this wasn’t enough to save his regime
from his own disaffected citizens. According to the CIA World Factbook for Libya (2020),
“Unrest that began in several Middle Eastern and North African countries in late 2010 erupted
in Libyan cities in early 2011…Qadhafi’s brutal crackdown on protesters spawned a civil
war…After months of seesaw fighting between government and opposition forces, the
Qadhafi regime was toppled in mid-2011 and replaced by a transitional government known as
the National Transitional Council (NTC)” (pg. 1). Although the fall of Qadhafi was an
interesting phenomenon in its own right, the study of such is beyond the scope of this analysis.
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6.3.3 International Condemnation
Even for a regime renowned for its autocratic nature and human rights violations
(Human Rights Watch World Report 1998, 1997), 1997 and early 1998 saw it receive
condemnation and negative press to such a large degree that it threatened Qadhafi’s attempts
to rehabilitate Libya’s image and reputation. Libya was already known for a lack of an
independent judiciary and general political participation, restrictions on academics and the
freedoms of the press, assembly, association, religion, speech, privacy, collective bargaining
in labor disputes, movement, as well as forced abductions and disappearances of undesirables
both domestically and abroad. But international condemnation and negative press over Libyan
human rights violations in 1997 and early 1998 threatened to irrevocably tip the scales of
global opinion and sink any Libyan hopes of shedding this image. According to the U.S.
Department of State (1998):
There were reports of mass expulsions of foreign workers and residents to neighboring
countries in 1997, and the regime again contemplated the return of the approximately
30,000 Palestinians currently residing in Libya. Traditional attitudes and
practices…discriminate against women, and female genital mutilation (FGM)
is…practiced in remote areas of the country. The government discriminates against and
represses certain minorities and tribal groups…A large number of offenses, including
political offenses and “economic crimes” are punishable by death…In July 1996, a new
law went into effect that applies the death penalty to those who speculate in foreign
currency, food, clothes, or housing…and for crimes related to drugs and alcohol. On
January 2, two civilians and six army officers were executed, the civilians by hanging
and the army officers by firing squad; while at least five others were given prison
sentences, all convicted on charges of being American spies, treason, cooperating with
opposition organizations, and instigating violence to achieve political and social goals.
(pg. 2)
Despite Libya being party to the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, in 1997 Libya was accused of torturing
prisoners (chaining them to walls, applying electric shocks, pouring acid in open wounds,
breaking bones and letting them heal without treatment, suffocation, starvation, beatings, etc.)
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and holding them incommunicado without allowing visits by human rights monitors; in
addition, Libya was condemned for failing in 1997 to comply with UNSC demands relating to
the bombing of Pan Am 103 (U.S. Department of State, 1998). According to a scathing report
by Amnesty International (1998):
In March [of 1997] a new law came into force authorizing collective punishment for
communities deemed to have protected or helped those responsible for “terrorism,” acts
of violence, unauthorized possession of weapons or sabotaging “people’s power.” Under
the new law, which also provides for the punishment of those who fail to report such
“criminals,” the authorities could cut off water and electricity supplies, deprive
villages or tribes of subsidized food, petrol, and public services, and transfer
development projects to other parts of the country…In April, Libyan soldiers
dismantled a camp on the border between Libya and Egypt, where around 250
Palestinian refugees had been stranded since they were forcibly expelled from Libya in
1995. The Palestinians were believed to have been forcibly relocated to another camp
near Tubruq inside Libya…Hundreds of political prisoners…remained held without
charge or trial…Scores of people, including possible prisoners of conscience, were
detained during the year in connection with their political or religious beliefs or
activities. Many were believed to…remain detained at the end of the year…Torture and
ill-treatment was reported. Reports suggested…cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
(pgs. 1-2)
In January of 1997, Libya received condemnation for executing eight men, while in
June a report surfaced that detailed a large amount of human rights violations, calling for
Libyan authorities to cease such activities (Amnesty International, 1998). Then, in May of
1997, The UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights accused Libya of
threatening to lock up anyone accused of disobeying disciplinary rules, causing a large amount
of societal and human rights problems related to its domestic policies, and providing shoddy
and inadequate housing to its citizenry (U.S. Dept. of State, 1998). Libya was also condemned
for implementing previously passed legislation which had up to that point gone unenforced.
According to the U.S. Department of State (1998):
The Purge Law of 1994 provides for the confiscation of private assets above a nominal
amount, describing wealth in excess of such an undetermined nominal amount as the
fruits of exploitation or corruption. In May 1996, Qadhafi ordered the formation of
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hundreds of “Purge” or “Purification” Committees composed of young military officers
and students. The Committees…implemented the Purge Law through mid-1997. The
“Purification” Committees reportedly seized some “excessive” amounts of private
wealth from members of the middle and affluent classes; the confiscated property was
taken from the rich to be given to the poor, in an effort to appease the populace and to
strengthen Qadhafi’s power and control over the country. (pg. 5)
Reeling from these criticisms, Qadhafi sought a way to deflect such scathing condemnation
and negative press in order to improve his and the country’s reputation.
6.3.4 Mediation
Traditionally speaking, Libya (both under Qadhafi and in general) identified itself
with and aimed its foreign policy at other countries in the MENA region, these efforts having
pride of place over sub-Saharan Africa (Huliaras, 2001). However, the brutal and bloody war
between Ethiopia and Eritrea provided Qadhafi with a high-profile arena for his efforts to cast
Libya as a peace-loving and humanitarian nation, and to neutralize the recent scathing
attention and condemnation which his regime had endured in 1997 and 1998. This explains
his persistent efforts to get the belligerents to sit down together at the bargaining table.
Huliaras (2001) observed that “…Qadhafi embarked on systematic and intensive efforts to
give his country a new image as a moderate and peace-loving state, with himself as a
peacemaker in Africa…Hence, since 1998, the Libyan leader has tried to use his good offices
towards ending the hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea” (pg. 17).
These mediation attempts very often took the form of personalized shuttle diplomacy
on the part of Qadhafi (who met with both Ethiopian and Eritrean leaders in early 1999) and
senior members of his regime (such as Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Abdulsalem Attaricki).
On July 2nd of 1999, after engaging in shuttle diplomacy, it was reported that Eritrea and
Ethiopia had accepted a Libyan-brokered peace plan designed to end the border conflict, with
the Libyans stating that the belligerents had agreed to an immediate cessation of military
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operations ahead of the signing of a cease-fire (“Eritrea and Ethiopia ‘Agree Peace Deal’,”
1999). On July 10th, it was reported that the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, held
talks with Qadhafi personally on his way to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit
in Algiers; following this meeting, Qadhafi then spoke to the Eritrean President, Isaias
Afwerki, in a personalized effort to move the peace process forward (“Gaddafi Talks Peace
with Ethiopian PM,” 1999). Both belligerents had agreed to a previous OAU agreement
regarding a ceasefire, but did not agree to its implementation (“Little Progress at Horn Peace
Talks,” 1999). Finally, not too long after mediation attempts by Qadhafi, a peace agreement
was signed in 2000 that called for both sides to abide by an independent ruling over the 1,000
kilometer frontier (Malone, 2009).
6.3.5 Rewards
Shortly after Libya’s mediation efforts between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Qadhafi was
the beneficiary of both tangible and intangible rewards at the end of the 1990s and into the
early 2000s for his efforts at portraying his country as a humanitarian, peace-loving
country that seeks to bring conflicts to an end. These efforts seemingly quashed the
negative attention which Libya had so recently endured. Praise and positive recognition
from numerous states was one of the most notable of these benefits, considering the rough
press and condemnation which Libya had only just previously been going through.
Indeed, now heads of state heaped accolades upon Qadhafi, as well as demanding a
Libyan role in future negotiations to end conflicts. For example, according to Huliaras (2001),
“In August 1999, the newly elected Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo visited Tripoli and
commended Qadhafi for his efforts towards ending conflict…’The world knows Muammar
Qadhafi as the leader of the world revolution, which is contributing to the liberation of
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peoples’…’And now that the liberation stage has ended, the world wants to know Muammar
Qadhafi as the leader of peace and development in Africa and other countries…In fact, I hope
that Muammar Qadhafi meets this description’…” (pgs. 15-16). This represented high praise
from not only the leader of Africa’s largest economy and most populous country, but also
from a staunch ally of both the U.S. and the West.
Further, although the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea remained a “frozen war”
after the signing of the peace agreement, the belligerents insisted on and supported a continued
Libyan role as mediator between them in the future. In 2009, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles
Zenawi expressed that his country supported Qadhafi’s efforts to mediate between it and
Eritrea, and that Ethiopia was open to peace talks. Expressing the belief that Gadhafi would
“devote a lot of energy,” Zenawi stated that “We very much welcome (Gaddafi’s) offer to help
us resolve our problem…The only way for us to do that is for us to get together and iron out
our issues” (Malone, 2009). And no less of a personality than Nelson Mandela had Qadhafi
come to South Africa that eventful July in 1999 as his last official guest as president, referring
to him as “my brother leader” (“Mandela Welcomes ‘Brother Leader’ Gaddafi,” 1999).
Mandela also helped engineer one of the more tangible benefits for Libya post-mediation due
to its recent positive policy actions, namely successfully lobbying for the removal of Westerninspired UN travel and economic sanctions on Libya in 1999 (Adebajo, 2011).
Perhaps the crown jewel amongst the benefits which Libya received as a result of its
newfound reputation was the manifestation of Qadhafi’s persistent dream of a regional union
of countries within which he could function as a major player (if not leader). According to
reports, “In 1999, Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-Qadhafi…called a meeting
of all African heads of state to discuss the creation of a new union of African states…The new
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union Qadhafi proposed was to be far stronger than the existing Organization of African Unity
(OAU), which had been formed by 32 independent African states in 1963 in order to promote
unity and to defend the sovereignty of its members and eradicate all forms of colonialism on
the continent…Following several meetings and a two-day summit of 40 African heads of state
in Sirte, Libya, in March 2001, Libya announced the creation of a new African Union, to be
roughly modeled on the European Union…Upon the announcement of the new pact,
established by a unanimous decision of all 53 member states of the OAU, Colonel Qadhafi
flashed a victory sign” (“Libya, Qadhafi, and the African Union,” 2021, pg. 1). For a former
pariah state recently on the receiving end of withering international criticism, attention, and
sanctions, this development represented a huge turnaround in terms of Libya’s reputation as a
good global neighbor. The inception of the African Union brought many benefits to Libya in
terms of support from other states as well as this new regional body, and on February 2nd of
2009, Qadhafi himself took up the mantle of chairman of the African Union (with Prime
Minister Zenawi of Ethiopia specifically going on the record as having voted for Qadhafi’s bid
to be chairman of the Union, suggesting gratitude for Libyan mediation put in action)
(Malone, 2009).
6.4 Turkey
For the two cases that did not experience condemnation and yet still offered mediation,
I start with the case of Turkey’s mediation attempts in the 1990s conflicts in the former
Yugoslavia. From 1992 to 1995, ethnic conflict broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the
disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. Conflict broke out between Muslim Bosniaks, Croats,
and Serbs in the new state. Several years of bitter fighting between the ethnic groups as well as
elements of the Yugoslav army ensued. After several years of combat, NATO and Western
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countries managed to create a cease-fire between the groups with the Dayton Accords in 1995.
However, conflictual relationships amongst the ethnic groups and the successor states to the
former Yugoslavia continued, and the situation remained volatile. In 2009, both the Western
countries of the EU and an increasingly autocratic Turkey conducted separate mediation
attempts to settle the conflict once and for all, with the EU’s attempt seen as a failure while
Turkey’s mediation was considered a success.
Unlike the previous examples of Qatar, China, and Libya, at the time of the Turkish
mediation effort, Turkey was not experiencing a steep increase or significant amount of
international condemnation and/or sanctioning. In fact, Turkey was well-integrated with the
West at that point diplomatically, politically, and militarily, and was not subject to negative
scrutiny from other actors such as the United Nations or private organizations. Turkey’s
mediation effort therefore seems to have been for more traditional geopolitical reasons such
as regional security, religious affiliation, economic interests, and national influence. This
case offers a contrasting example of my theory on autocratic mediation. However, this case
does not undermine my theory in practical ways. The theory is not meant to completely
supplant traditional reasoning for third-party state mediation, but instead is designed to fill
the gaps in these theories which cannot explain cases of autocratic mediation in seemingly
unrelated conflicts to the mediating state. The following sections discuss the conflict
broadly, introduce the mediating state, discuss the more traditional motivations which
Turkey had in mediating the conflict, and then analyze the nature of the Turkish mediation.
6.4.1 The Conflict
During the final years of the Cold War in the 1980s, the decline of Yugoslavia’s
command economy resulted in public dissatisfaction with the communist political system. In
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addition, politicians began to agitate nationalist feelings as a means of drumming up support,
which further led to the destabilization of the political situation in Yugoslavia. In 1991, several
areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina which were heavily populated by Serbs declared themselves
as “Serb Autonomous Regions,” and by August of that year full-scale war had broken out in
Croatia. In early 1991, Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognized as independent by the U.S.
and the EC (the precursor to the EU). In response, Serbian groups began shelling Sarajevo
while paramilitary and Yugoslav army units launched an offensive in several towns in eastern
Bosnia and Herzegovina, leading to ethnic cleansing of Bosniaks and Croats. After both
cooperating and fighting each other at different points in time, in 1994 Bosniaks and Croats
formed a joint federation. However, neither the federation nor the United Nations was able to
prevent the massacre of 7,000 Bosniak men by Bosnian Serb forces in what was supposed to
be a UN protected “safe area.” From 1994 to 1995, NATO airstrikes and a Bosniak-Croat
offensive led to the Bosnian Serbs agreeing to the Dayton Accords in December of 1995.
The Dayton Accords resulted in a federalized Bosnia and Herzegovina where 51% of
the land was governed by a Croat-Bosniak federation and 49% was governed by a Serb
republic. However, the Dayton Accords did not result in non-conflictual and placid relations
between the ethnic parties and the successor states to Yugoslavia. Despite high profile
international efforts, the large amount of support for rival ethnic-based parties caused the
conflict to continue to act as a fearful specter for those concerned. Zenelaj et al (2015) noted
that conflict continued to be of great concern, observing that amongst other destabilizing
dynamics at play that “Republika Srpska (RS), one of the two semi-autonomous entities
founded with the 1995 Dayton Agreement, has repeatedly asserted its right to secede from
Bosnia-Herzegovina…Furthermore, two major Croat parties excluded from the government
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of the other entity, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, refused to recognize its
legitimacy and formed their own assembly…The Croat parties’ occasional calls for separation
from the Federation further threaten…stability…Despite this precarious situation, and its
possible negative spillovers in the region, the international community…lost interest and
became increasingly unwilling to intervene…” (pg. 415). In addition, the Dayton Accords did
not include any arrangement for the demobilization of ex-combatants or the reduction of
armed forces (Zenelaj et al 2015). Despite the perilous situation, Turkey successfully
mediated between rival parties by mediating between the successor states to Yugoslavia
involved (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia) in order to put the post-Dayton
Bosnian conflict to rest in its entirety.
6.4.2 The Mediator
The successor state to the Ottoman Empire, Turkey is a majority Muslim state which
straddles Europe and Asia (with deep cultural and historic ties to both) and is slightly larger
than the U.S. state of Texas, with a population of over 80,000,000 citizens. Modern Turkey
was founded in 1923, and after a period of one-party rule, an experiment with a multi-party
political system resulted in the 1950 election of the opposition Democrat Party and a peaceful
transition of power. However, Turkey has increasingly become more autocratic. According to
the CIA World Factbook (2021), “Since [1950] …democracy has been fractured by periods of
instability and military coups (1960, 1971, 1980)…In 1997, the military again helped
engineer the ouster…of the then Islamic-oriented government…An unsuccessful coup attempt
was made in July 2016 by a faction of the Turkish Armed Forces” which resulted in hundreds
of deaths and thousands of injured citizens. Further, although political parties have to an
extent been able to compete in Turkish elections, this hasn’t resulted in a deep democratic
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tradition. According to McLaren and Cop (2011):
…[Turkish political] parties have generally been able to compete freely in Turkish
elections. What occurs after an election, however, is a different matter…in the past 45
years there have been 25 closures of political parties, all occurring after general or local
elections. In addition…Turkey has experienced…difficulties in the area of respect for
free speech and human rights. The lengthy war in the south-east of the country in the
1980s and 1990s and the perceptions that the state was under significant threat…led to
large-scale human rights violations and restrictions on free speech…The adoption of
Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code in 2005…introduced…severe restrictions on free
speech, as the Article stipulates that it is illegal (and punishable by imprisonment) for a
person to publicly denigrate Turkishness, the Turkish Republic, the Grand National
Assembly of Turkey, the Turkish government, [and] the judicial institutions or the
military or security organizations…the Article itself and the possibility of punishment
are both considered to be fundamental restrictions on speech that is normally protected
in a democracy…The final major problem to note regarding Turkish democracy is
that…the military has been relatively actively involved in politics when compared
to established democracies, with…high-ranking military officials…implying that force
will be used to produce policy change. (pgs. 486-487)
To summarize, military interference in Turkish politics, the shuttering of political parties,
and curbs on freedoms of speech and expression make it clear that democracy has not
managed to take root in Turkey (McLaren, Cop, 2011). In fact, autocratic tendencies and
actions have continued to abound in the country, with the failure of political elites to reach
a complete settlement on the basic functioning of Turkey’s ostensibly democratic
institutions resulting in a lack of will to defend democratic rules of governance (McLaren,
Cop, 2011).
6.4.3 Motivations to Mediate
As opposed to the examples of Libya, Qatar, and China, Turkey was motivated to
mediate between Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina for more traditional reasons,
which could be considered as alternative explanations that are common in the literature on
mediation. For example, Turkey and Bosnia enjoy cultural, historic, and social bonds which
stretch back centuries. In addition, there are more practical contemporary political, military,
regional, and economic dynamics which contributed to Turkey’s desire to lay the conflict to
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rest once and for all. Zenelaj et al (2015) noted:
Turkey supplied arms to the Bosnian fighters…Military-wise, it takes an active part
in…the EU’s peacekeeping operation to assist [Bosnia and Herzegovina] consolidate
its statehood. Economically, Turkey has significantly contributed to the reconstruction
of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The two countries also concluded a Free Trade Agreement in
2002. Lastly, Turkey supported Bosnia-Herzegovina’s integration with Euro-Atlantic
institutions including NATO and the EU. Similarly, Turkey and Croatia have shared
common goals such as integration to the Euro-Atlantic structures, and the
establishment of regional cooperation schemes. Turkey had also supported Croatia’s
mediation efforts to bring Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims under the Federation
of Bosnia- Herzegovina under the 1994 Washington agreement. Unlike its relations
with Bosnia and Croatia, Turkey’s relations with Serbia were icy at best…Despite
these tensions, Turkey did not overlook the key role Serbia could play to establish
peace and stability in the troubled regions of the Balkans…To conclude…Turkey has
always been close to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and took a firm position in defending
Bosnia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. This stance led Turkey to occasionally
confront Croatia and Serbia when the latter two refused to recognize Bosnia’s
independence. Turkey, however, has not hesitated to improve relations when the two
countries changed positions towards recognizing a sovereign and independent Bosnia.
(pg. 426)
In addition to these reasons for mediating, Turkey has also increasingly taken up conflict
mediation in general as a tool of statecraft. Akpinar (2015) observed that Turkey has
repositioned itself “…as a peace and stability promoter and a soft power in neighboring
regions…It reconstructed its identity by referring to its historical-geographical depth in
addition to its social and cultural affinities…Subsequently, Turkey has…mediated in a
number of peace talks, including the ones between Syria-Israel, Iran-the West,…the SunniShia groups in Iraq, Somalia-Somaliland, Palestine-Israel and Georgia-Russia,” as well as in
a number of conflicts involving Bahrain, Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen during the Arab
Spring (pg. 256). These motivations place Turkey in contrast to the examples of mediation by
China, Libya, and Qatar.
6.4.4 Mediation
As opposed to the EU mediation effort which attempted to focus on important
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domestic political stakeholders in Bosnia, the Turkish mediation effort focused on the
international aspects of the post-Dayton Bosnia conflict by reconciling the states of Serbia,
Croatia, and Bosnia in an effort towards maintaining Bosnia-Herzegovina’s territorial integrity
and sovereignty (which Turkey viewed as essential to the region’s stability) (Zenelaj et al,
2015). According to Zenelaj et al (2015), “…Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia have a history of
intense conflict. The memories of massive killings and destruction in the three years of war
after Bosnians self-declaration of independence are still fresh in the region…While Bosnia’s
relations with Croatia improved due to the latter’s apology for crimes committed in Bosnia
from 1992-1995, relations with Serbia remained hostile…A main reason for this tension
related to Bosnia’s perception that Serbia did little to halt the Bosnian Serb leader Milorad
Dodik’s actions aiming to undermine the effectiveness of Bosnia’s central government
institutions” (pg. 425).
An intriguing and innovative approach that Turkey utilized in mediating between the
three states was to maintain two sets of dialogues independent from each other but on
parallel tracks, one track with Turkey mediating between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia,
and another track with Turkey mediating between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Turkey
offered several carrots for expanding cooperation with Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia on both
economic and diplomatic levels during these talks. Zenelaj et al (2015) recounted that
“Turkey and Serbia signed six agreements including the free visa travel agreement,
cooperation in the construction sector and reviewed their military, cultural and
administrative relations…They also held several talks on the prospect of selling Serbia’s
financially distressed main airliner (JAT Airways) to Turkish Airlines…Lastly, Turkey has
started undertaking projects to help develop the infrastructure in Sandzac, a Serbian
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province populated with Muslims…Similarly, Turkey and Croatia agreed to raise the trade
volume between the two countries to one billion Euros by the end of 2013” (pg. 428). The
Turkish mediation efforts with Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia met with success, with a number
of tangible outcomes following. In 2009, relations between the states were finally
normalized. In February of 2010, Serbia agreed to accept the Bosnian ambassador to
Belgrade, and just over a month later the Serbian Parliament officially apologized for its
role in the Srebrenica Massacre in 1995 by adopting the Declaration of Srebrenica. Finally,
in April of 2010, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina signed the Istanbul Declaration on Peace
and Stability in the Balkans, helping to wind down the conflict and returning peace between
the neighbors to the region.
Through its mediation, Turkey accomplished a number of its objectives which are
traditionally seen as important for why states mediate international conflicts, including
regional security, religious affiliation, economic interests, and national influence. I included
Turkey because, similar to the cases of Libya, China, and Qatar, we see an example where an
autocratic government offered and (in the cases of Libya and Qatar) was successful at
mediating an international conflict. Otherwise, though, there were important differences
between these cases. For example, some of the control variables utilized during my
quantitative analysis apply to the case of Turkey. Turkey has extensive previous economic
and political ties to Balkan nations, as well as sharing the same region of the globe with these
states. As such, the causal mechanisms and motivations for their offer and success at
mediation appear to be different than the cases of China, Libya, and Qatar, demonstrating
that although there is evidence to back up my theory, it is not able to fully explain all cases of
autocracies mediating international conflicts. However, in of itself the case of Turkey is not
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sufficient enough to disprove my theory on mediation by autocracies, in light of the previous
case studies on China, Libya, and Qatar.
6.5 Iran
With origins stemming back to the 1990s, the internationalized conflict in Yemen has
proven to be as intractable as it is tragic. Indeed, this conflict has been referred to as one of the
worst humanitarian crisis in existence in the world today. Despite both international military
support for the various sides including a Saudi-led coalition in opposition to Iran as well as
mediation efforts by a number of parties, the Yemeni conflict remains undecided in terms of
its conclusion. Amongst other potential mediators who have attempted to insert themselves
into this quagmire, Iran offered to mediate in April of 2015. However, their efforts were
rebuffed on the grounds of their tactical support for the Shiite Houthis in their endeavor to
gain control. At the time of this writing, the conflict has continued to wreak havoc and
bloodshed amongst Yemenis and their backers.
At the time of the Iranian mediation attempt, Iran was not experiencing a steep
increase or significant amount of international condemnation and/or sanctioning. In fact,
Iran’s standing globally at that time was on the upswing. Iran had successfully weathered
massive protests that had followed the controversial 2009 Iranian elections and its domestic
convulsions associated with the Arab Spring, as well as the international condemnation
which it endured for its heavy- handed responses. Further, 2015 saw the signing of the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, which helped bring Iran in from out of the cold by leading to
the lifting of crushing economic sanctions and a general rapprochement with Western and
other countries as well as institutions. Iran’s failed mediation effort therefore seems to have
been for more traditional geopolitical reasons such as regional security, religious affiliation,
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and national influence, and offers a contrasting example with my theory on autocratic
mediation. However, this case does not undermine my theory in practical ways. My theory is
not meant to completely supplant traditional reasoning for third-party state mediation, but
instead is designed to fill the gaps in these theories that cannot explain cases of autocratic
mediation in seemingly unrelated conflicts to the mediating state. The following sections
discuss the conflict broadly, introduce the attempted mediator, discuss the more traditional
motivations which Iran had in attempting to mediate the conflict, and then analyze the
outcome of the Iranian mediation attempt.
6.5.1 The Conflict
Following the reunification of Yemen in the 1990s, President Ali Abdullah Saleh
tacitly supported the Houthis which resulted in them gradually gaining power. However, after
Saleh arrived at a border demarcation agreement with Saudi Arabia in 2000, Saleh sought to
disarm the Houthis (Montgomery, 2021). In 2004 the Houthis rebelled, leaving hundreds of
dead. From 2005-2010, the situation oscillated between the Houthis and the government
fighting each other and periodic ceasefires. However, with the advent of the Arab Spring in
2011, street protests and violence led Saleh to hand over power to his deputy Abdrabbuh
Mansour Hadi. After various attempts at forming a unity government which ultimately
resulted in Hadi dissolving his cabinet in August 2014, from September to October of that
year saw the Houthis take control of the majority of Yemen’s capital of Sanaa and the Red Sea
port of Hodeida (AP News, 2021; Montgomery, 2021). After being placed on house arrest by
the Houthis in January of 2015, Hadi fled Sanaa to Aden and (after the Houthis seize Aden
International Airport) from there to Saudi Arabia in March. At this juncture, a Saudi-led and
U.S.-backed coalition including the UAE, Egypt, Kuwait, Sudan, Bahrain, Jordan, and
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Morocco began Operation Decisive Storm to bolster up Hadi’s supporters via airstrikes, smallscale ground deployments, and a naval blockade (AP News, 2021; Montgomery, 2021). In
April of 2015, the Houthis took the city of Ataq and fired mortars and rockets into Saudi
Arabia (killing at least three Saudis). By August the Houthis had taken over the Shabwah
governorate, and despite UN-sponsored peace talks fighting continued.
In November of 2017, the Houthis claimed responsibility for firing missiles into Saudi
Arabia (widely believed to have been made possible by Iranian support and technical
expertise). By this point in time Yemen was facing a severe humanitarian crisis with rampant
civilian casualties and food insecurity, and the next month the Houthis killed former president
Saleh after he reached out to the Saudi-led coalition. In July of 2018, the Saudi-led coalition
launched an offensive on the port of Hodeida, which is Yemen's primary entry point for
humanitarian aid and food (AP News, 2021; Montgomery, 2021). International concern
continued to grow, but UN-led mediation efforts continued to be in vain. UAE-backed
separatists began fighting the government near Aden in August of 2019, further destabilizing
the country. The next month, the Houthis engaged in drone attacks on Saudi Arabia’s oil
facilities (again thought to be made possible due to Iranian support and expertise), severely
affecting the world’s supply of oil (AP News, 2021; Montgomery, 2021). Fighting continued,
and in October of 2020 Iran announced the arrival of its ambassador in Houthi-controlled
Sanaa (AP News, 2021; Montgomery, 2021). The Biden administration placed temporary
holds on several large arms sales to the UAE and Saudi Arabia in January of 2021, with Biden
stating that the U.S. is ending support for the Saudi coalition in February. From February to
March of 2021, the Houthis launched drone and missile attacks against Saudi Arabia (AP
News, 2021; Montgomery, 2021; Global Conflict Tracker, 2021). At the time of this writing,
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combatants are still wrangling for control with no sign of abatement.
6.5.2 The Attempted Mediator
Iran is an ancient country located in the Middle East, and was known as Persia up until
1935. The country is slightly smaller than the U.S. state of Alaska with a population of
85,888,910 citizens. The vast majority of Iranians (90-95%) are Shia Muslims, with smaller
populations of Sunnis, Zoroastrians, Christians, and Jews also residing within the country
(CIA World Factbook, 2021). Ruled by the monarchic and despotic Shah Mohammad Reza
Pahlavi up until 1979, the monarchy was toppled that year and an autocratic Islamic republic
was declared. Although having some institutions which appear to be democratic, in reality the
absolute power to have the final say on all state matters as well as acting as commander-inchief of Iran’s armed forces and security services is vested in the person who is Supreme
Leader (Nalapat, 2009). According to the CIA World Factbook (2021):
Conservative clerical forces led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini established a
theocratic system of government with ultimate political authority vested in a learned
religious scholar referred to commonly as the Supreme Leader…US-Iranian relations
became strained when a group of Iranian students seized the US Embassy in Tehran in
November 1979 and held embassy personnel hostages until mid-January 1981. The US
cut off diplomatic relations with Iran in April 1980. During the period 1980-88, Iran
fought a bloody, indecisive war with Iraq that eventually expanded into the Persian
Gulf and led to clashes between US Navy and Iranian military forces. Iran has been
designated a state sponsor of terrorism and was subject to US, UN, and EU economic
sanctions and export controls because of its continued involvement in terrorism and
concerns over possible military dimensions of its nuclear program until Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Implementation Day in 2016. The US began
gradually re-imposing sanctions on Iran after the US withdrawal from JCPOA in May
2018.
Although the Biden administration is reportedly pursuing a revival of the JCPOA
with the Iranians as a means of keeping them from possessing a nuclear bomb, the future of
the deal remains up for conjecture. Iran continues to be isolated for its support of the Syrian

141

government of Bashar al-Assad, Hezbollah, as well as the Houthi rebels in Yemen. The
sanctioning of Iran continues to be practiced, as well as ongoing proxy wars between Iran
and Saudi Arabia and a cold war between Iran and Israel.
6.5.3 Motivations to Mediate
Since the advent of the Arab Spring, Iran has attempted to utilize mediation as a means
of staving off counter-revolutionary ideas and efforts as well as a tool of meddling in the
domestic situation of various countries. Post-Arab Spring, Iran began to change tactics from
those designed to facilitate expansionism to those which are conducive to the survival of the
Iranian regime (Akpinar, 2015). After witnessing the toppling of leaders across North Africa
and the Middle East as well as the civil war in Syria, Iran came to be known for its use of hard
power tactics rather than utilizing soft power statecraft. As such, by attempting to mediate
conflicts, Iran sought to cultivate a more stable geopolitical situation for itself. Iran has
attempted to support and mediate in favor of other Shia parties in the region. Achieving a
preferential regional configuration is one that is commonly thought to be a reason for
mediation attempts by third- party states, as well as the supporting of a favored side in a
conflict. As such, the motivations for Iranian mediation attempts are more in line with what is
cited in conventional literature on the subject as opposed to the given examples of Qatar,
China, and Libya, namely concerns involving regional security, religious affiliation, and
national influence.
6.5.4 Mediation
As the war in Yemen raged, Iran offered to mediate the internationalized conflict in
Yemen in April of 2015. However, the Iranian mediation effort failed as it was simply a
nonstarter. The offer of Iranian mediation was rejected by Yemeni Foreign Minister Riad
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Yassin, who noted that “Iran has become a major part of the Yemeni crisis and those who are a
party to the crisis…cannot become mediators” (Akpinar, 2015). Support for the Shia Houthis
led to the perception of Iran as a biased meddler, one who could not be trusted. The rejection
and failure of the Iranian mediation effort was part of a pattern involving Iran’s various
mediation attempts in the region. During the course of the Arab Spring, Iran offered to mediate
in Syria, Iraq, and Bahrain. However, all of these mediation efforts were rejected due to the
unfavorable light which Iran was viewed with across the region and the globe because of its
role in supporting the sides involved in the various conflicts at hand. Akpinar (2015) nicely
summarized the situation by observing that “…Iran clearly lacked legitimacy as a mediator
since it was perceived rather as a party to the conflicts it aimed to mediate…Similarly, Iran
lacked an audience that was receptive to its mediator role…In all of the mediations it offered,
its role was made unwelcome by at least one of the conflicting parties…It was perceived as a
biased, partial mediator” (pg. 262).
In this regard, the Iranian efforts at mediation in the Yemeni conflict were doomed to
failure from the start. I included Iran in my analysis because, similar to the cases of Libya,
China, and Qatar, we see an example where an autocratic government offered to mediate an
international conflict. Otherwise, though, there were important differences between these
cases. For example, some of the control variables utilized during my quantitative analysis
apply to the case of Iran. Iran has extensive previous economic and political ties to Yemen as
well as numerous states in the Saudi-led coalition fighting there, and shares the same region of
the globe with many of these states. As such, the causal mechanisms and motivations for
Iran’s offer to mediate appear to be different than the cases of China, Libya, and Qatar,
demonstrating that although there is evidence to back up my theory, it is not able to fully
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explain all cases of autocracies mediating international conflicts. However, in of itself the case
of Iran is not sufficient enough to disprove my theory on mediation by autocracies, in light of
the previous case studies on China, Libya, and Qatar.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter discussed and analyzed five cases of offers of mediations in international
conflicts by autocracies. In line with my theory that autocracies will be more likely to offer to
mediate seemingly unrelated conflicts when subjected to negative scrutiny and/or
condemnation by Qatar and Libya when they were being subjected to negative scrutiny lends
support to my theory. The case of China, which mediated when it was under negative
scrutiny but has not to this point been successful, lends support to my theory because China
did improve its image and derived benefits from the mediation. However, because China still
derived benefits even though they were not ultimately successful suggests that merely
offering and/or attempting to mediate in a conflict may be enough for a state to improve its
image and obtain benefits when enduring international scorn.
Unlike these three examples, the cases of Turkey’s mediation effort and Iran’s failed
mediation offer are not ultimately supportive of my theory. It would appear that these
mediation efforts were grounded in more traditionally understood motivations for third-party
states to mediate in conflicts. However, these cases are not sufficient to discount the validity
of my theory on autocratic mediation since the theory is not meant to completely scrap
traditional reasoning for third-party state mediation. Instead, examining these latter cases is
used to fill holes in the theories that cannot explain cases of autocratic mediation in seemingly
unrelated conflicts to the mediating state.
The qualitative case studies analysis covered in this chapter also sought to supplement
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my quantitative analysis by delving more in depth into different autocratic regime-types and
their experiences involving mediation. Ultimately, this qualitative analysis uncovered evidence
that when being subjected to international condemnation and scrutiny, autocracies are likely to
offer to mediate international conflict.
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CHAPTER 7: Conclusion
7.1 Review
Democratic states, understood as states in which candidates compete for political office
through fair and frequent elections and where a large portion of the adult populace can vote
(Frieden et al, 2016), are often seen to be most likely to act as mediators in violent conflicts,
generating more and longer lasting peace agreements between disputants as opposed to their
autocratic counterparts (Melin, 2013). In addition, they have been traditionally theorized as
domestically more attracted to peace than autocracies, in that they veer towards opposition to
conflict (for example, coherent democracies experience fewer civil wars than anocracies or
autocracies), the valuing of human life and welfare above power, generating more peaceful
leaders, and propounding human rights (Wright, 1942; Hegre et al, 2001). Further, democratic
states are thought to be better at international cooperation as a whole (Gaubatz, 1996; Leeds,
1999; Martin, 2000; Mansfield et al, 2002; McGillivray, Smith, 2008; Mattes, Rodriguez,
2014). This stands opposed to autocratic regimes. These regime types can be understood as a
political system where a small group of people or a single individual wields power with little
constraints, competition, or political participation by the general populace (Frieden et al, 2016;
Honig, 2019), and as mentioned are often known for abuses such as political imprisonment,
repression, and torture (Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, 2014; Akpinar, 2015), which can lead to
reputational costs to autocracies.
Interestingly, autocracies have in fact been found to not be less active in mediating the
conflicts of other states when compared to their democratic counterparts (Bercovitch,
Schneider, 2000), even in seemingly unrelated conflicts for the mediator. Current mediation
literature proposes that states may mediate given such considerations as trade ties, former
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colonial relationships, alliances, and direct geographic proximity (Crescenzi et al, 2011). Yet,
examples such as former Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi’s attempted peacemaking between
Ethiopia and Eritrea, China’s attempts at mediation between Israel and Palestine, Qatar’s
efforts at mediation between Djibouti and Eritrea, Saudi Arabia’s efforts at mediating
between Algeria and Morocco in Northwest Africa, and Turkey’s mediation efforts between
Afghanistan and Pakistan, autocratic governments which do not neatly fit this characterization
continue to play a role in conflict mediation (Adebajo, 2011; Akpinar, 2015; Guner, 2015;
Rieger, 2016; Chaziza, 2018a). It is puzzling why autocracies, which typically are not
renowned for their human rights record or their observance of international norms related to
human rights and are frequently inured in their own violent conflicts, would choose to take on
the seemingly humanitarian role of peacemaker in the conflicts of other states in the absence
of such things as (for example) a former colonial relationship or shared geographic proximity
with them.
Thus, in this dissertation I focused on investigating how autocratic regimes play a part
in the phenomenon of mediation in international conflict, attempting to fill the gap in the
literature on mediation and different autocratic regime-types. I argued that autocracies will
offer more often to mediate international conflicts when they are subjected to international
scrutiny, sanctioning, and/or condemnation, as well as materially and immaterially
benefitting from their efforts afterwards. I also posited that based on institutional attributes
such as the presence of domestic audience costs, transparency, and a professional
bureaucracy (such as is found in a party-based autocracy), or by contrast an all-powerful and
unconstrained autocrat (such as is found in personalist regimes), different autocratic regimetypes will be more likely to offer to mediate than others. I hypothesized that when being
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condemned or sanctioned, party-based autocracies will offer mediation more frequently than
other autocratic regime types, followed by military juntas, monarchies, and lastly
personalists.
7.2 Sanctions, Condemnation, and Autocratic Mediation for Mediation
Unfortunately for the purpose of this analysis, nearly all of my quantitative results came
Statistically insignificant. In many ways this is a plus, however. Although I’m unable to make
many inferences based on my quantitative analysis, my results also did not undermine my
hypotheses at all. In fact, the results that I did attain which were statistically significant were
those stating that autocracies indeed were more likely to offer to mediate international conflicts
when being confronted with sanctions. This has several implications for future research, and
provides need insight into the different facades of various autocracies. For example,
understanding the sensitivity to international economic consequences which Party-based
autocracies seem to have not only allows them to potentially be more manageable through the
court of public opinion, but also suggests that there are indeed important comparative
differences in the behavior of autocracies, especially when the results were compared to how
other autocracies performed at large when being confronted with sanctions. Clearly there is
much to learn here, and the sensitivity which Party-based autocracies have to outside pressure is
a boon not only for academia (which all too often seems to neglect investigating the
comparative differences in autocratic behavior, conflict-related or otherwise), but also offers a
valuable tool for affecting the behavior of many repressive states around the world while they
are engaging in negative policy behavior (at least in the eyes of the beholder). The fact that
many of my results came back inconclusive also opens the door for further analysis on this
subject, since clearly there is a lot out there to learn if only we can figure out the means in
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which to do so. For the purposes of my dissertation, I chose to do so by shifting into an in-depth
cases studies analysis on a variety of autocratic regimes to fill in the gaps left over from my
analysis.
7.3 Qualitative Analysis of Autocratic Mediation
In order to focus and contextualize my investigation into autocratic mediation, I shifted
into qualitative analysis and used a least-similar case studies approach to explore whether
international condemnation and sanctioning leads autocratic regimes to offer to mediate
international conflicts and whether this will lead to increased rewards in the form of tangible
benefits (such as foreign aid, trade, and investment) and intangible benefits (such as praise,
acceptance, avoiding criticism, and the bestowing of legitimacy) being conferred upon the
autocracy. In addition, I sought to delve deeper into the different experiences of different types
of autocratic regimes with the offering of mediation. The use of process-tracing in the case
studies approach I adopted for my qualitative analysis, a detailed examination of a portion of a
historical episode to test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events, was
appropriate due to the high level of conceptual validity as well as the ability to model and
explore complex causal relations in detail in relatively infrequent phenomena (a quality that
can be missing from quantitative analysis) (George, Bennett, 2004; Bennett, Elman, 2007).
The use of a least-similar case studies approach enabled me to identify interactions between
variables, and helped create a chronological sequence of events that aided in the analysis of
the phenomenon at hand (Sambanis, 2004). Indeed, examples of multiple types of autocratic
regimes were found during my qualitative research which responded to international
condemnation and sanctioning by offering to mediate international conflict. In line with my
theory that autocracies will be more likely to offer to mediate seemingly unrelated conflicts
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when subjected to negative scrutiny and/or condemnation so that they can improve their image
and derive tangible and/or intangible rewards from it, the cases of the mediations of
monarchic Qatar, communist China, as well as Libya under the erstwhile personalist military
strongman Colonel Muammar Qadhafi when they were being subjected to negative scrutiny
lends support to my theory. Ultimately, this qualitative analysis uncovered evidence that when
being subjected to international condemnation and scrutiny, autocracies are likely to offer and
succeed at international conflict mediation, as well as to benefit from it. This fills in crucial
gaps, not only due to my lack of quantitative results which could prove definitive, but also
demonstrates the unique workings of autocracies, how they are fundamentally different in
their architecture and governing style, while at the same time establishing a clear habit of
behavior when regarding mediation offers while they are experiencing autocratic
condemnation and/or sanctioning. This teaches us how these governments can be manipulated
to adopt a good neighborly approach to their fellow global citizens, as well as demonstrating
their priorities and how they go about to achieve them. Much of the literature on regime-types
seems to curiously omit discussing autocracies and their subtypes in the same way which more
democratic states are feted, and thus creates not only a repository of background information
on autocracies but fills in the gaps in current literature which seems to have a curious lack of
insight into the comparative behavior of autocracies, and their behavior within such high
stakes endeavors like war and peace, and “good” and “bad” policy behavior.
7.4 Limitations
As previously mentioned, because of the lack of statistical significance frequently
found in my quantitative analyses on autocratic mediation, it may be perhaps beneficial to
obtain more quantitative data and observations regarding the independent variables than what
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was used in this dissertation. For example, the dataset used to capture international
condemnation was the most appropriate one to use in this dissertation, however it only covered
observations from 1976 to 2000 (amounting to thirty less years than the dataset on
sanctioning). It is conceivable that this more modest mustering of observations led to problems
achieving statistical significance. Fortunately, my qualitative results were able to help fill in
this gap when it came to successfully completing analysis on this matter.
7.5 Suggestions for Future Research
The degree of the lack of evidence for or against mediation offers by autocracies as a
group as well as for which ones stand where in relation to each other is frustrating, although it
could be a function of a lack of updated data or a more thorough evaluation of past evidence
which could increase the sample size. Rectifying this issue, although slow and steady work,
would be worthwhile in rounding out the study of the responses of autocracies to punitive
measures internationally as well as the comparative differences in autocratic regime-types.
Similarly, collecting more quantitative data on international condemnation over a longer
period than what is provided in the dataset used in this dissertation would be a way of
supplementing my qualitative findings regarding condemnation, and autocratic mediation from
a statistically significant quantitative standpoint. This would also require a significant amount
of academic investment, and could yield many different routes of research on the subject once
it has been completed. Lastly, investigating autocratic regimes and the outcome of their
mediation attempts would be an excellent way to discern the important institutional and
policymaking differences in these prolific and complicated regimes.
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